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Executive summary 
The London Homelessness Social Impact Bond (‘the SIB’) was launched in November 
2012.  It was designed to bring new finance and new ways of working to improve the 
outcomes for a cohort of rough sleepers whose needs were not being met by existing 
services and who were not being targeted by other interventions.  In July 2013, ICF GHK1 
(ICF) was commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) to undertake a qualitative process evaluation of the SIB.  This is the first interim 
report from the qualitative evaluation.  An economic impact evaluation is being undertaken 
internally at DCLG.  The qualitative and impact strands will be brought together in a 
synthesis evaluation in 2016. 
1 Social impact bonds 
The Open Public Services White Paper (HM government, 2011)2 laid out a comprehensive 
policy framework to promote a fundamental shift in public services.  The White Paper 
identified Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) as an innovative opportunity to access new forms of 
external finance for the delivery of services.  It also promoted greater use of payment by 
results (PbR) contracts. 
 
SIBs are one product within the growing social investment market.  Social investment 
provides funding to social ventures to expand their services, exploit new opportunities and 
achieve scale in order to achieve greater social impacts.  The first UK SIB was introduced 
in 2010 and, in early 2014, there are 15 SIBs in the UK. 
Payment by results (PbR) 
PbR contracts mark a shift towards paying providers for the outcomes they deliver in 
markets that have traditionally purchased activities measured by outputs. PbR contracts 
have begun to be been widely used (outside of SIBs) and are a cornerstone of the 
government’s ‘Open Public Services’ agenda.3  They are an important risk transference 
tool as commissioners only pay for those results that are evidenced, transferring the risk of 
paying for ‘failure’.  In SIBs, they structure the link between achieved outcomes, payment 
of providers and the financial return for investors. 
Key features of a SIB 
Although there are variations in SIB models, a typical structure usually involves an 
investor-owned Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)4, which takes on the PbR contract and 
                                            
 
1
 In March 2012 ICF International acquired GHK Consulting.  ICF GHK was the brand until May 2014, when 
it became ICF. 
2
 Open Public Services White Paper. 2011. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255288/OpenPublicServices-
WhitePaper.pdf  
3
 NCVO. 2013. ‘Payment by Results contracts: a legal analysis of terms and process’. Available at: 
http://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/practical_support/public_services/payment_by_results_contracts_
a_legal_analysis_of_terms_and_process_ncvo_and_bwb_30_oct_2013.pdf  
4
 A special purpose vehicle is an off-balance sheet vehicle comprised of a legal entity created by the sponsor 
or originator to fulfil a temporary objective of the sponsoring firm. SPVs can be viewed as a method of 
disaggregating the risks of an underlying exposure held by the SPV (in this instance, a provider contract) and 
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sub-contracts to a service provider(s) - the Service Delivery Organisation (SDO). Social 
investors may include private funders, foundations, trusts, social banks or philanthropic 
investors, providing the finance for the SDO’s set-up and delivery costs via the SPV. The 
SPV usually hosts a Performance Director or Board responsible for monitoring SDO 
performance.5  In this way, the risk in the PbR contract is transferred away from the 
provider, promoting the involvement of voluntary and community sector (VCS) 
organisations. 
 
A key role in the development of a SIB is that of an intermediary.6  The typical role varies 
with each SIB but can be categorised by three distinct functions: 
1. Advisory – advising commissioners about the structure of the SIB and the payment/ 
outcome metrics.  
2. Corporate finance functions – involvement with establishing the SPV and structuring 
‘the deal’. This could include attracting investors, undertaking due diligence and 
collecting data on service delivery organisations, and providing support during the 
commissioning process. 
3. Performance management of the PbR contract – this generally involves tracking the 
progress of the performance outcomes by the SDO and reporting back to investors. 
Critiques of the SIB model 
 For many social outcomes, agreed measures do not exist and have to be created7 
and the collection of information to evidence outcomes brings an associated 
burden.8  This need for detailed development brings ‘transaction costs’ for SIB 
development. 
 Whilst intended to promote VCS involvement in public service delivery, there is a 
concern that few providers are placed to make the transition to new approaches 
required by models such as SIBs.9  
 Achieving a balance of risk is a debate critical to the future of the SIB model.  
Structures for transferring the risk to investors are new and the pricing of risk and 
return has proved problematic.  Higher risk inevitably brings higher investment 
costs.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
reallocate them to investors willing to take on those risks. (PwC. 2011. ‘Creating an understanding of Special 
Purpose Vehicles’.) 
5
 Social Market Foundation. 2013. ‘Risky Business’. http://www.smf.co.uk/research/public-service-
reform/risky-business-social-impact-bonds-and-public-services/  
6
 Disley, E., Rubin, J., Scraggs, E., Burrowes, N., Culley, D. (2011), Lessons learned from the planning and 
early implementation of the Social Impact Bond at HMP Peterborough. RAND Europe, Ministry of Justice 
7
 McHugh, N., Sinclair, S., Roy, M., Huckfield, L. & Donaldson, C. 2013. ‘Social Impact bonds: a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing?’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 21(3), pp247 – 257. 
8
 ibid. 
9
 See Big Society Capital (2013) Social Investment Compendium 
http://www.bigsocietycapital.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Social%20Investment%20Market%20Compendium%2
0Oct%202013%20small_0.pdf  
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2 The London homelessness social impact bond  
The SIB targets a named fixed cohort of 831 entrenched rough sleepers, identified through 
the CHAIN database10, with a personalised, flexible approach delivered by keyworkers that 
helps them access existing provision and achieve sustained long-term positive outcomes.  
This includes reconnection for non-UK nationals to their home country where this is the 
most appropriate outcome for them (assisted voluntary repatriation, administrative removal 
or deportation).   
 
Two organisations (St Mungo’s and Thames Reach) are contracted to deliver the SIB 
intervention to a matched half of the cohort.  The cohort is rough sleepers who on 31st 
October 2012 had been: 
 
 Seen sleeping rough and/or stayed in a London rough sleeping hostel in the last 3 
months; and,  
 Seen rough sleeping at least 6 times over the last 2 years. 
Rough sleepers are amongst the most vulnerable people in society - of the cohort:  48% 
had an alcohol support need; 29% a substance misuse support need; and, 44% a mental 
health support need.11  A wide range of provision exists for rough sleepers and homeless 
people (151 providers operating in London in 201212), with the GLA having strategic 
responsibility for pan-London commissioning and coordination.  The SIB helps the cohort 
access appropriate services, across personalised recovery pathways, and into sustained 
outcomes.  It targets a cohort not covered by key programmes for the most challenging 
long-term entrenched sleepers or for those new to the streets.    
The SIB structure 
There are two organisations contracted to deliver the SIB – St Mungo’s and Thames 
Reach – each targeting half of the cohort.  The cohort is split between them according to a 
range of support needs identified in CHAIN and by the borough where each individual was 
last seen.  Given its centrality as a location for rough sleeping (529 of the cohort of 831), 
the Borough of Westminster is a shared area. 
 
The two providers have developed different structures to finance their SIB contracts, as 
shown in Figure 1.1 below.  St Mungo’s has established an SPV, which holds the risk.  
Thames Reach has funded their intervention through social investors’ unsecured loans, 
and in this model the risk is shared. Both providers have also invested their own equity. 
 
                                            
 
10 CHAIN is the ‘Combined Homeless and Information Network’.  The database is for organisations who work 
with rough sleepers in London.  The system is used to help workers share information about the people that 
they work with, across organisations.  Over 80 projects contribute.  It is hosted by Broadway on behalf of the 
GLA  
11
 ‘Cohort Split’ analysis, Social Finance SIB commissioning document, November 2012 
12
 London Housing Federation (2012), Atlas of Services for Homeless People in London. 
http://www.lhf.org.uk/sites/all/themes/lhf/pdf/atlas_2012.pdf (latest version available at time of writing). 
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Figure 1.1 The two providers’ social investment structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Developing and commissioning the London 
homelessness SIB 
The SIB emerged as a potential way of trialling innovation in, and bringing new finance to, 
provision for rough sleepers in London within DCLG in 2011, reflecting the wider 
discussions across government about the potential of PbR and SIB structures for 
innovation in public services.   
Research and consultation 
Informal consultations were held with stakeholders from the GLA, local authorities and 
providers delivering contracted services for rough sleepers and homelessness support in 
London to take soundings on the SIB concept.  There was initial interest and discussions 
within DCLG, Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Cabinet Office built political and stakeholder 
backing.  A potential £5m fund was identified and Social Finance (in partnership with the 
Young Foundation) was commissioned to develop the skeletal structure through a 
Feasibility Study. 
 
The Feasibility Study included a wide-ranging consultation and evidence review to identify 
an effective intervention model.  In the absence of a model that had been subject to robust 
evaluation, the review instead identified the key features of an effective intervention: a 
‘Navigator’ model. 
Key features of a navigator model 
 The Navigator has a budget to support a personalised approach, act as 
a single point of contact for the client and the services working with 
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them, and help the cohort through the landscape of existing provision.   
 They would be a key worker, supporting the client from an 
individualised assessment through the network of provision necessary 
to address their support needs, and sustaining this support over time.   
 An outcomes based structure would enable Navigators to take an 
assertive, tailored and personalised approach rather than the delivery 
of any one intervention.    
A wide range of analysis and modelling was undertaken, which showed a budget of £5m 
could achieve a high level of support across the cohort through improved outcomes. The 
PbR structure and outcomes developed are summarised in Table 1.1, with the outcome 
payments proportioned to incentivise delivery and recognise scale and challenge.   
Table 1.1 The PbR structure  
Goal Metric Payment Mechanism Payment 
Proportion 
Reduced 
rough 
sleeping. 
Reduced number of 
individuals rough sleeping 
each quarter. 
Payments based on 
progress beyond 
expected baseline.    
25% 
Sustained 
stable 
accommodatio
n. 
Entry to non-hostel 
tenancy, and sustained for 
12 and 18 months. 
Payment on entry to 
accommodation, and at 
12 and 18 month points.   
40% 
Sustained 
reconnection. 
Confirmed reconnection 
outside of the UK. 
Payment on reconnection 
and at 6 month point. 
25% 
Employability 
and 
employment. 
Level 2 qualification 
achieved 
Sustained volunteering 
Sustained part-time 
employment  
Sustained full-time 
employment. 
Payment for achievement. 
Payments when 
volunteering or 
employment sustained for 
13 and 26 weeks. 
5% 
Better 
managed 
health. 
Reduction in Accident and 
Emergency episodes. 
Payments for reduction in 
episodes against baseline 
data from Department of 
Health. 
5% 
Source: GLA 
Social Finance, DCLG and GLA then ‘sense tested’ the model through meetings and 
stakeholder forums.  Providers contributing to the study explained that ‘the consultation 
was meaningful and our concerns were listened to.’ 
Commissioning the SIB: competitive dialogue 
A ‘Competitive Dialogue’ process was followed to commission the SIB.  This was new for a 
service intervention of this type, but important as it enabled a dialogue with providers 
about the complex issues in the SIB design.  It was intended to ensure that viable, high 
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quality tenders resulted, with attention focused on a shortlist with the capacity and 
capability to deliver the contract. 
 
The process produced refinements rather than substantial changes, but those involved 
agreed that it enabled both commissioners and providers to develop confidence: for 
commissioners, that high quality tenders would be submitted; and for providers, that they 
could develop their initial plans to meet the requirements of commissioners. 
Engaging social investors 
A ‘Market Information Day’ for social investors followed the first competitive dialogue 
meeting.  Each shortlisted provider presented on their organisation, intervention model and 
ability to deliver the outcomes.  Some providers presenting found the event disappointing – 
reporting limited opportunity for engagement with the investors and that few questions 
were asked of them.  Social investors also had mixed views, and felt that there had not 
been enough time to discuss providers’ models.  A minority thought the event was useful 
in providing an initial introduction to the providers and their credibility in delivering the SIB. 
Provider-investor discussions 
There were two models of negotiation between shortlisted providers and potential social 
investors:   
 
 Provider-led – followed by three providers, who contacted and met with social 
investors attending the Market Information Day, as well as others found through 
existing contacts and internet research. In this model, providers hold initial ‘in 
principle’ discussions to explore investor interest before moving to more detailed 
negotiations.  Providers found this extremely time consuming, as investors required 
much information on the providers’ financial standing, track records in delivering 
support to rough sleepers, and their planned delivery model (including plans for 
outcomes over time and associated payments and cash-flow).  Despite this detail, 
they remained exploratory discussions.   
 Intermediary function – followed by one provider (St Mungo’s), who agreed that 
Triodos bank would act as an intermediary following the Market Information Day.  
For a fixed fee, Triodos prepared the information investors required, liaised with 
them on St Mungo’s behalf and provided a high level of support with negotiations.  
Investors were positive about the Triodos role as it reduced the work that they 
needed to undertake.    
Commissioning the SIB 
Contracting the SIB 
The ITT was issued to the shortlisted providers, with five weeks for submissions building 
on their competitive dialogue materials.  Four tenders were received and the two contracts 
awarded.    The tenders were judged for both the scale of outcomes proposed and the 
discount provided on the maximum tariffs (the amount paid per outcome).  The proposed 
delivery models were also judged in qualitative terms.  In this way, a balance was 
achieved in assessing: how achievable the outcomes were in each model; the ambition of 
the providers to achieve outcomes; and, value for money. 
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Securing social investment 
One key challenge for commissioning the SIB was the need to closely align the award of 
contract with the final investment models so delivery could begin as planned on 1st 
November.  Investors were not able to commit funds until the contract(s) were awarded, 
and after their full due diligence processes.  Each investor has their own institutional 
priorities and decision-making processes, and due diligence was time consuming for 
investors and providers.  For St Mungo’s, Triodos played a crucial role in brokering these 
discussions and investigations.   
Structuring the investment 
St Mungo’s SPV involves two institutional investors and two high net worth individuals, 
each brokered by Triodos.  In addition, St Mungo’s equity investment is at risk before the 
bonds; in this way some of the risk is shared.  The investors have the set annual interest 
rate paid quarterly, with the principal sum repaid after the end of the contract once all 
potential sustained outcomes have been achieved.  The rate of return cannot be reported 
due to commercial confidentiality; but it is around the mid-point of the range of SIB rates 
reported elsewhere.13 Although the rate of interest is higher than is available from a high 
street bank for other products the risk of the SIB investment, its nature as a pilot product 
and the high due diligence costs makes this an appropriate rate of return in the view of 
investors. 
 
Thames Reach has a mixed equity and loan structure. One potential investor withdrew 
very late in the process as they considered the risk too difficult to assess.  This required a 
lot of late work to secure the full investment.  Two investors provided unsecured loans at 
discounted rates.  One investor has an additional rate of return linked to achievement of 
outcomes.  The primary rates of interest on these loans are less than that paid by the SPV.  
In addition to these loans, Thames Reach secured a grant to support the reconnection 
outcomes.  This grant was provided from a Trust with existing links with Thames Reach 
and to support them in achieving a successful financial model.  Thames Reach’s equity 
investment is at risk before the loans (similar to St Mungo’s equity in the SPV).  Because 
the loans are unsecured, both Thames Reach and the investors share the overall risk.   
 
4 Delivering the London homelessness SIB  
 
The two providers’ models are broadly similar, where key workers provide a personalised 
and client-centred approach that is flexible and responsive. Although features of the 
support model are not new, their combination in providing a long-term focus on sustained 
outcomes is the innovation.   
Governance 
A Project Board of DCLG, GLA and London Boroughs meets quarterly to review progress 
against the outcomes and address any issues that are identified.  The Board is informed 
                                            
 
13
 Big Society Capital (2013), Social Investment Compendium: portfolio of research and intelligence on the 
social investment market, p8 
http://www.bigsocietycapital.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Social%20Investment%20Market%20Compendium%2
0Oct%202013%20small_0.pdf  
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by a Project Group, featuring the providers, GLA and DCLG, which focuses on operations 
and provides a forum to raise issues and share effective practice. 
 
GLA has created a dedicated post for monitoring the two SIB contracts.  This is in contrast 
to other contracts for homelessness services, all of which are covered by a single post.  
The post was created because the evidential and monitoring requirements are much more 
onerous than a standard contract. 
 
For St Mungo’s, the SPV holds the contract and this provides the governance.  The SPV 
Board is made up of representatives from the two institutional investors and from St 
Mungo’s.  For Thames Reach, the SIB contract is a dedicated item on the finance sub-
committee, which receives information on results and expenditure and income versus 
budget.   
Partnership working 
The boroughs that participated in the research had broadly positive views of the SIB, 
although there were early concerns about the focus of the intervention as a new funded 
initiative; the PbR structure; and, the impact on the existing landscape of provision.  
Similar concerns were expressed by providers from the wider service landscape that the 
SIB interacts with.  Early difficulties in developing effective partnership appear to have 
been addressed.  Other providers are willing to work with the SIB for the benefit of clients 
– it is this shared commitment to outcomes that motivates them.     
Performance and experiences of early implementation 
Performance in the first year of delivery is summarised below: 
 
 Outcome 1: Reducing rough sleeping - Both providers struggled to meet their 
quarterly reduction in rough sleeping targets, although St Mungo’s exceeded their 
target in quarter four.  The flexibility of the SIB to secure appropriate 
accommodation quickly as the basis for long-term support is seen as important for 
success.  Challenges include: missing out on outcomes if clients occasionally sleep 
out, and the difficulty in finding accommodation for some clients. 
 Outcome 2: Into stable accommodation - Both providers performed strongly 
against the entering stable accommodation outcome, with 12 and 18 month 
sustained accommodation being reviewed in later reports.  Key features of success 
include:  accessing accommodation outside of traditional frameworks; and providing 
practical and emotional support to help clients to sustain it.  Challenges include: the 
limited accommodation available.  
 Outcome 3: Sustained reconnection to home country - Both providers fell 
behind with their initial reconnection and sustained reconnection targets, with 
performance being stronger for Thames Reach than St Mungo’s, and identified by 
them as a focus for work in year two. Challenges include: clients’ needs being as 
complex needs as entrenched rough sleepers; early reconnection requiring much 
preparatory work; and clients not wanting to be reconnected.    
 Outcome 4: Progress towards employment - Performance was mixed across the 
different sub- measures, and while few qualifications or volunteering placements 
were achieved, entry into and sustained full-time employment was above target.  
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Most clients were reportedly at some distance from securing work, with common 
challenges including having no or few qualifications and work histories, in addition 
to the risk factors associated with rough sleeping (such as a history of life in care) 
commonly combined with tri-morbidity (co-occurring health conditions). 
 Outcome 5: Improved health - At the time of writing, the data for this outcome was 
awaited from the Department of Health in April 2014.  For both providers, the 
achievement of the health outcome is contingent upon the success in meeting the 
other outcomes.  Nonetheless, St Mungo’s work with a specialist partner to support 
this work. 
5 Client perspectives 
 
Each stage of the evaluation will include fieldwork with clients and a subsample of those 
who participated in each stage will be contacted in the next, to build a longitudinal sample 
that explores pathways over time and long term outcomes.  25 clients were interviewed in 
the first stage.  The examples of support that they provided mirror that described by the 
Navigators themselves.  Their experiences and perceptions also confirm the rationale of 
the SIB intervention model in terms of the need for a flexible, personalised and long-term 
approach that coordinates provision. 
 
Clients identify with their Navigator as their key worker and with their provider organisation, 
with limited awareness of the name of the intervention or the SIB.  But they are aware of 
the intervention being something new and different to the support that is provided 
elsewhere. 
 
Clients highlighted the persistence of their Navigator in securing suitable accommodation 
and the wide range of support they received to help them sustain it and to make it their 
home. They also reported receiving support from other organisations that was identified, 
brokered and coordinated by their Navigator.  Navigators advocate for their clients and 
provide a constant source of advice and support.  The relational aspect is central to 
effective key worker support.  For clients who were not British nationals, having a 
Navigator who spoke their language and understood their culture was important. 
 
6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Key findings 
It was important that the SIB was developed through consultation with a wide range of 
stakeholders.  A thorough design process was necessary, but there were limits to the 
evidence base and informed judgements were the basis for commissioners, providers and 
investors in reaching final decisions. 
 
Social investors are motivated by the potential for both social outcomes and the returns 
that their investment can achieve.  A higher assessment of risk brings a higher cost and 
investors make individual judgments.     
 
The development of the SIB required a high level of investment from all stakeholders - 
DCLG in developing the model; GLA in developing and undertaking a new commissioning 
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structure; providers in developing a tender for a PbR contract (including within the 
commissioning structure); providers and investors in negotiating and agreeing investment. 
 
The development of the SIB fits with best practice criteria that have been proposed for SIB 
products.  Although there was a single procurement process, there are two very different 
structures, demonstrating the diversity of SIB models. 
 
The providers’ models bring together different elements of best and effective practice; with 
the innovation lying in how these elements are brought together in a single role that 
supports a client along the entire pathway from the street/point of first contact and blends 
direct support with wider provision brokered and coordinated to sustain long term 
outcomes. 
 
Performance in year one of the programme, against the five outcomes and in the context 
of the targets set at the outset, has been variable.  Providers experienced a range of 
challenges, nevertheless many positive aspects of the navigator model were cited.  The 
achievement of client outcomes over the implementation period will be the focus of 
subsequent strands of the evaluation. 
 
Clients who participated in the evaluation research see the SIB interventions in contrast to 
previous and other support.  They identify with their key worker as someone providing a 
wide range of long term support, coordinating services and advocating on their behalf. 
Key learning  
From the development of the SIB 
 
The development of outcome measures, metrics and the evidential requirements requires 
a complex interplay of evidence, modelling and judgement.  There is a cost associated 
with this process that is necessary for developing a product for the investment market, 
particularly in the absence of an evidence base for an intervention to allow for modelling 
the associated outcomes and metrics.  Given the desire for innovative practice, such a 
context is likely to be common for SIBs. ‘Sense checking’ through market engagement with 
different stakeholders can address evidential limits. 
 
Providers see PbR as an emerging trend in service commissioning and, although they 
have some reservations about what this might mean for them and the wider VCS, they 
recognise the strategic importance of experience in both designing PbR and delivering 
PbR contracts and welcome the opportunity for flexibility in service delivery that is 
outcomes rather than delivery focused.   
 
PbR contracts are new for commissioners.  A competitive dialogue process offers a 
structure for engagement with credible providers, helps build commissioner confidence in 
the viability of proposed delivery models, and for amending contract requirements within 
an open-tender procurement process.  When commissioned, PbR contracts place a high 
level of administrative burden on commissioners.  The new role of outcomes monitoring 
rather than delivery scrutiny can present a challenge.   
 
There is concern amongst providers and some investors that SIB investment models result 
in ‘leakage’ of funding away from provision.  Balancing this with the requirement to account 
for risk through investment returns requires negotiation and agreement.  Neither providers 
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nor social investors are homogenous groups with shared priorities and concerns.  There is 
not a consensus about an appropriate level of investment cost.  Nonetheless, there is a 
high level of strategic interest in: the potential of SIBs for securing new investment; and, in 
learning about PbR as a structure for outcomes-based commissioning. The strategic 
interest in the SIB provides a driver for investment in learning.   
From the delivery of the SIB 
 
Delivery to date suggests that a Navigator model is an effective key work approach to 
supporting entrenched rough sleepers towards long-term outcomes.  Skilled, motivated 
staff are required.  There is a wide variation in the characteristics and support needs of the 
cohort and no typical client.  An informal approach to assessment provides the basis for an 
effective Navigator approach. 
 
Securing and sustaining stable, appropriate accommodation provides the basis for 
pathways to long term, transformational outcomes.  Partnership working is a central 
element of effective Navigator interventions.  As with all partnerships, effective practice 
requires a dedicated focus to build understanding and clarity about roles and 
responsibilities.   
 
A PbR structure to an intervention for entrenched rough sleepers enables a flexible, 
outcomes focused approach not restricted to a set model of delivery.  Evidence to date 
suggests that the balance in the SIB PbR does not create perverse incentives to achieve 
inappropriate outcomes, although this will only be confirmed as delivery builds in the 
second and third years.  Outcomes that are currently behind target will need to be 
achieved for contract value and investment returns to be realised. 
Recommendations 
For Social Impact Bonds 
 Commissioning should consider the ways in which investors can be engaged in the 
development of SIB structures so that investment risks can be identified and 
addressed; or, allow sufficient time for due diligence and investors’ decision making 
processes to be followed. 
 Whilst SIBs remain new, specialist support is required to build capacity and facilitate 
investments.  Although an intermediary body may not be necessary, financial 
modelling tools, contract and other templates are all important.   
 An intermediary body and SPV are not always necessary.  SIB commissioning 
should be open to different investment structures, as this facilitates the involvement 
of a wide range of social investors and different ways of accounting for and 
addressing risk. 
 ‘Competitive dialogue’ offers an appropriate process for commissioning a SIB.  
Consideration should be given to awarding contracts prior to investment being 
brokered. 
 
 
 xiv 
 
For Payment by results 
 The design of a PbR model depends upon high quality data, which is not always 
available.  To account for this, research should be accompanied by meaningful 
stakeholder consultation.   
 PbR brings new roles for commissioners and a heavy administrative burden.  
Commissioners should ensure sufficient capacity for monitoring and provide 
governance responsive to learning. 
For delivery of the London homelessness SIB 
 Effective partnership working is essential and should remain a focus of the SIB 
providers as they seek to achieve sustained outcomes and address areas of under-
performance.   
 If any Navigator leaves their post, their clients’ transition should be carefully 
managed. 
 The Project Board should keep the evidential requirements of the SIB under review 
whilst maintaining the integrity of each outcome.  
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1 Introduction 
The London Homelessness Social Impact Bond (SIB) is an innovative programme to 
support entrenched rough sleepers, launched in November 2012.  The London 
Homelessness SIB (‘the SIB’) was designed to bring new finance and new ways of 
working to improve the outcomes for a cohort of rough sleepers who needs were not being 
met by existing services and who were not being targeted by other interventions. 
In July 2013, ICF GHK14 (ICF) was commissioned by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) to undertake a qualitative process evaluation of the SIB.  The 
evaluation team is working with sector research experts Crunch Consulting and the Centre 
for Housing Policy (University of York) and social finance expert Dr Nick Henry (ICF 
Associate, Coventry University).  This is the first interim report from the qualitative 
evaluation.  An economic impact evaluation is being undertaken internally at DCLG.  A 
final report in 2016 will draw analysis from the two strands together. 
1.1 The London homelessness social impact bond 
1.1.1 Background  
The SIB targets a named, fixed cohort of 831 entrenched rough sleepers in London with a 
personalised, flexible approach delivered by keyworkers that aims to support them to 
access existing provision and achieve sustained long-term positive outcomes.  This 
includes reconnection for non-UK nationals to their home country where this is the most 
appropriate outcome for them (assisted voluntary repatriation, administrative removal or 
deportation).   
There are two organisations (St Mungo’s and Thames Reach) each contracted to deliver 
the SIB intervention to a matched half of the cohort.  The cohort was finalised the day 
before the contract start date (1st November 2012).  The cohort is rough sleepers who on 
31st October 2012 had been: 
 Seen sleeping rough in the last three months and/or have stayed in a London rough 
sleeping hostel in the last 3 months; and,  
 Seen rough sleeping at least 6 times over the last 2 years. 
DCLG and the Greater London Authority (GLA) began to explore the potential for a SIB in 
bringing new finance to address the issue of rough sleeping in London in 2011.  GLA are 
responsible for pan-London coordination of provision to address homelessness and are 
commissioners of a range of key interventions. DCLG devolve funding for homelessness in 
London to the GLA. Analysis of the CHAIN15  database identified a cohort of rough 
sleepers who were not being targeted by existing special initiatives, beyond the broader 
landscape of provision for rough sleepers and homelessness prevention.  CHAIN monitors 
                                            
 
14
 In March 2012 ICF International acquired GHK Consulting.  ICF GHK was the brand until May 2014 when 
it became ICF. 
15
CHAIN is the ‘Combined Homeless and Information Network’.  The database is for organisations who work with rough sleepers in 
London.  The system is used to help workers share information about the people that they work with, across organisations.  Over 80 
projects contribute.  It is hosted by Broadway on behalf of the GLA (http://www.broadwaylondon.org/CHAIN.html).  
 
 2 
 
contacts with rough sleepers in London on behalf of the GLA.  The key special initiatives 
across London targeting different groups of rough sleepers at the time of the SIB design, 
and that would be in operation during the SIB, were:  
 RS205 – a programme starting in May 2009 that focuses on a cohort of 205 long-
term entrenched rough sleepers with more complex needs; 
 RS45 – a programme of more tailored responses to the 45 members of the RS205 
group still sleeping rough one year on. 
 No Second Night Out – launched as a pilot in London in April 2011, and now a 
national approach, this programme aims to ensure that new rough sleepers do not 
spend a second night on the streets by providing a 24 hour assessment and 
reconnection service. 
The SIB was designed, through consultation with a range of stakeholders in homelessness 
and rough sleeping.  This began informally and was then undertaken formally as part of 
detailed work commissioned from social investment product experts Social Finance.  This 
development work explored the feasibility of a payment by results (PbR) approach that 
accessed social investment to incentivise a long-term approach to new outcomes for the 
cohort.   
PbR aims to change the incentives facing the providers of services by linking their rewards 
to the outcomes they achieve, rather than the service specification and output model that 
characterises traditional public server contracting.  In SIB models, private investment is 
used to pay for interventions delivered by expert providers.  Financial returns are paid by 
the public sector on the basis of the improved social outcomes the interventions achieve.  
If outcomes do not improve, then investors do not recover their investment and thus the 
investment is at risk.  Improved outcomes are those that would not be achieved by existing 
interventions, promoting service innovation.  Demonstrating this requires a baseline of 
expected performance or a comparison group exploring what happens without the 
intervention. 
Social investors are motivated both by the returns they can make and by the social impact 
their investments can achieve.  To make the investment, they must have confidence that 
the outcomes can be achieved through the innovation but be prepared to accept a level of 
risk that they will not be and thus the investment will be lost.  The public sector rewards 
this risk when the outcomes are achieved instead of placing public funding at risk or 
placing the risk with the providers delivering the interventions.   In this way, SIBs aim to 
bring new forms of finance into public sector services delivered by (primarily) voluntary and 
community sector (VCS) providers with the expertise to design innovative approaches. 
The funding for the SIB is provided by DCLG to GLA, who commissioned and manage the 
SIB contracts. 
1.1.2 PbR structure 
Following a detailed design process and a two stage procurement process (explored in 
section 4) the contracts to deliver the SIB were awarded to St Mungo’s and Thames 
Reach.  Both are long-standing providers of homelessness and rough sleeping services in 
London.    Rough sleeping in London is concentrated primarily in Westminster with lower 
numbers in the surrounding Boroughs.  The cohort targeted by the SIB is split between two 
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providers according to a range of support needs identified in CHAIN and according to the 
Borough where each individual was last seen at the time of definition.  Given its centrality 
as a location for rough sleeping (529 of the cohort of 831), the Borough of Westminster 
was allocated as a shared target area. An even split was achieved and the target 
Boroughs (beyond Westminster) for each contract are:   
 St Mungo’s Street Impact targets: East and South East ("ESE"): City of London, 
Croydon, Redbridge, Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Southwark, Lambeth, Lewisham, 
Greenwich and Newham. 
 Thames Reach’s Ace targets: West and North West ("WNW"): Kensington & 
Chelsea, Hammersmith & Fulham, Wandsworth, Camden, Islington, Barnet, Ealing, 
Heathrow, Hounslow, Hillingdon, Brent, Harrow and Richmond 
The PbR structure pays providers for the achievement of a set of interrelated, defined 
outcomes.  For each, there are clear evidential requirements.  The structure is presented 
in Table 1.1 below.   
Table 1.1 The PbR structure 
Goal Metric Payment Mechanism 
Reduced rough 
sleeping 
Reduction in the 
number of individuals 
recorded in CHAIN as 
seen rough sleeping 
each quarter 
Outcome payments 
according to progress 
beyond baseline of 
expected reduction. Paid in 
arrears each quarter. 
 
Paid according to baseline. 
Sustained stable 
accommodation 
Confirmed non-hostel 
tenancy sustained for 
12 and 18 months.  No 
more than two rough 
sleeping incidents 
recorded in CHAIN in 
the first 12 months and 
no more than one 
between 12 and 18 
months. 
Payment on written 
confirmation of entry to 
accommodation. 
 
Payment after 12 months. 
 
Payment after 18 months. 
 
Paid by individual outcome. 
Sustained 
reconnection 
Confirmed reconnection 
outside of the UK with 
no rough sleeping 
incidents recorded in 
CHAIN in the following 
6 months. 
Payment on confirmed 
reconnection (range of 
evidence accepted). 
 
Payment after 6 months. 
 
Paid by individual outcome. 
Employability and 
employment 
NQF Level 2 or 
equivalent 
 
 
Payment for completion 
when commencement is 
after contract start date. 
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Goal Metric Payment Mechanism 
 
Sustained volunteering 
or self-employment 16+ 
hours per week. 
 
Sustained employment 
8-16 hours per week. 
 
Sustained employment 
16+ hours per week. 
 
First payment when 
sustained for 13 weeks. 
 
 
Second payment when 
sustained for 26 weeks. 
 
 
Paid by individual 
achievement. 
Better managed 
health 
Reduction in average 
number of Accident and 
Emergency episodes 
per head per year. 
Annual payments for 
reduction in average A&E 
episodes per head against 
baseline at start of contract. 
 
Paid according to baseline. 
Source: GLA 
1.1.3 Finance structure 
The two providers each have a different structure to finance their SIB contract.  These are 
presented in Figure 1.1 below.  St Mungo’s has established a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV), which manages the contract and holds the social investment that pays for the 
delivery of the contract and repays investors as outcome payments are received.  If the 
intervention fails to achieve outcome payments, the SPV will fail as this holds the risk (a 
full discussion of SIB models is provided in section 3 and of the London Homelessness 
SIB models in section 4).  Thames Reach has funded their intervention through social 
investors’ unsecured loans and in this model the risk is shared. 
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Figure 1.1 The two providers’ social investment structures 
St Mungo’s
Improved social 
outcomes 
leading to public 
sector benefits
TARGET 
POPULATION
COMMISSIONER
SERVICE 
PROVIDER
SPV
Up-front 
funding for 
interventions
Implementation 
risk transferred 
to investors
INVESTORS
Service delivery
Payment-by-results: 
% of savings from 
improved outcomes
 
 
Thames Reach
Improved social 
outcomes 
leading to public 
sector benefits
TARGET 
POPULATION
COMMISSIONER
SERVICE 
PROVIDER
Unsecured loan 
funding for 
interventions
Implementation 
risk shared
INVESTORS
Service delivery
Payment-by-results: 
% of savings from 
improved outcomes
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1.2 The evaluation  
The qualitative process evaluation will take place alongside a quantitative impact and 
economic evaluation being undertaken internally by DCLG.  Overall the two components of 
the evaluation seek to address the following questions: 
1. Has the intervention succeeded in addressing entrenched rough sleeping 
amongst its target cohort? 
2. Has the intervention made a cost-effective impact on outcomes for rough 
sleepers resulting in overall cost-savings for the Exchequer? 
3. What are the advantages/disadvantages of delivering this intervention via a SIB 
compared to other ways of providing similar services? 
4. Are there any unintended consequences for the SIB-targeted rough sleepers 
and/or knock-on effects for other rough sleepers resulting from the targeting 
services at specific groups of rough sleepers and the incentivisation of service 
provision? 
While the qualitative process evaluation will contribute to each of the four questions above, 
it will focus on questions 3 and 4.  The qualitative and impact strands will be brought 
together in a synthesis evaluation in 2016.   
1.2.1 Aim and objectives 
The aim of the qualitative process evaluation is: 
 To provide an in-depth understanding of the merits of different aspects of the 
intervention design, including the role and impact of the social investment 
dimension and of incentivisation through a payment by results system.   
There are four associated objectives, to: 
 Draw out lessons from the design and implementation of the London 
Homelessness SIB project to inform future SIB-based interventions in England; 
 Understand the role and impact of social investment on the two provider 
organisations and the way that they develop and deliver services for the target 
group; 
 Identify and explore any impact that the payment by results system has on the 
target cohort, other rough sleepers in London not targeted by the SIB, and on 
the wider landscape of service provision in London in terms of both incentivised 
outcomes and the impact of the SIB on the patterns of working relationships across 
the sector; and, 
 Contribute to the overall evaluation by identifying and understanding the factors 
relating both to the design of the intervention and other external factors that 
may have contributed to its success or otherwise. 
The qualitative process evaluation involves three stages: 
 An initial baseline analysis – reported here; 
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 Mid-point data collection and analysis – to be undertaken in summer 2014 and 
building from the baseline understanding to explore change and continuity in 
delivery models, cohort outcomes and experiences and partner and stakeholder 
perspectives; 
 Final data collection and analysis – with data collection in autumn 2015 reported in 
late 2015 or early 2016 and drawing on the impact strand where feasible.  (A 
synthesis of the qualitative and impact evaluations will be produced in 2016.) 
Each stage of the process evaluation involves qualitative data collection with a wide range 
of stakeholders, provider staff and members of the cohort of entrenched rough sleepers in 
receipt of support. 
This report is the first, baseline output from the qualitative process evaluation and explores 
the: 
 Process of the design and implementation of the SIB;  
 Role and impact of social investment to date; 
 Delivery and performance to date; 
 The views of stakeholders; 
 Experiences of the cohort; and, 
 Learning to date from all aspects of the SIB development and delivery. 
1.2.2 Data collection and analysis 
The evaluation has involved a detailed review of a range of documents and data relating to 
the development and early delivery of the SIB; and, qualitative research with a range of 
stakeholder groups.  The qualitative data collection activity is presented in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 Data collection for this report 
Group Stakeholders  Number of 
interviews 
Commissioners and 
Strategic Stakeholders 
Cabinet Office, DCLG, GLA,16 
Social Finance. 
7 
London Boroughs City of London, Lambeth, Tower 
Hamlets, Westminster.17 
4 
Providers Senior management, Trustees, 
project management, delivery staff. 
17 
Social Investors and 
Intermediaries 
Big Issue Invest, Bridges Ventures, 
Charities Aid Foundation 
7 
                                            
 
16
 Some commissioners from GLA have since moved to other organisations but were interviewed in relation 
to their role whilst at GLA 
17
 Other Boroughs will be included in later phases of the evaluation 
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Group Stakeholders  Number of 
interviews 
Venturesome, City Bridge Trust, 
Social Enterprise Investment Fund 
(SEIF), Triodos, Orp Foundation. 
Provider and partner 
landscape 
Provider organisations in London 
including providers who tendered 
or considered tendering for the SIB 
contract. 
13 
Members of the cohort Individuals in the cohort being 
supported by each provider, at 
different stages of recovery 
pathways (target 15 with each). 
25 
Total  73  
1.2.3 The structure of this report 
The remainder of this report is structured by the following sections: 
 Section 2: Context for the London Homelessness SIB – summarises the issues 
associated with homelessness in London and the landscape of provision that the 
SIB works with and alongside; 
 Section 3: Social Impact Bonds – provides an overview of SIBs and PbR structures, 
including success factors and critiques; 
 Section 4: The development of the London Homelessness SIB – explores the 
process of development of the SIB from initial exploratory discussions to 
commissioning the two providers, including the negotiation and agreement with 
social investors; 
 Section 5: The two provider models – sets out the features of each model, delivery 
to date and the views of partners and wider stakeholders; 
 Section 6: The experiences of the cohort – including an outline of how this work was 
undertaken; and, 
 Section 7: Conclusions and recommendations – learning and recommendations 
from the SIB to date. 
 9 
 
2 The context for the London 
homelessness SIB 
This section provides a brief outline of the context for the London Homelessness SIB (‘the 
SIB’). The following section (3) discusses the background to Social Impact Bonds and 
Payment by Results approaches.  This section explores: 
 The problem of entrenched rough sleeping in London; 
 Some characteristics of the cohort targeted by the SIB; 
 The network of service provision in London; and, 
 The key features of effective provision for entrenched rough sleepers. 
2.1 The problem of entrenched rough sleeping in London 
The CHAIN database indicates that there were 6,437 rough sleepers in London 2012/13 
(latest figures available), a rise from 5,768 the previous year.18  Detailed analysis of 
CHAIN data for the planning and development of the SIB19 identified that within this: a 
cohort of approximately 17% are entrenched rough sleepers; who account for 44% of 
‘bedded down rough sleeping contacts’ – the contacts that services have with rough 
sleepers on the streets.    
Rough sleepers are amongst the most vulnerable people in society.  The issues faced by 
the 2011/12 cohort of 650 were explored in depth by the Young Foundation and Social 
Finance (2012) in research and analysis to support the design of the SIB:20 
 They are likely to have complex, interrelated needs linked to drug (39%) and 
alcohol (53%) use; 
 There is a high level of mental health problems (38%); 
 They are more likely to die young and 35 times more likely to commit suicide than 
the general population; and, 
 A very significant proportion are non-UK nationals (51%).   
The total cost of this defined cohort of rough-sleepers to the public purse in London was 
estimated to be £20,000 a year per person (excluding additional costs related to drug and 
alcohol abuse treatment and long-term imprisonment). 
                                            
 
18
 CHAIN (2013) Street to Home Bulletin 2012/13, Broadway: 
http://www.broadwaylondon.org/CHAIN/Reports/AnnualBoroughReports.html  
19
 The Young Foundation (2011) Designing an Intervention for a Rough Sleeping Social Impact Bond: Final 
Report; Social Finance & The Young Foundation (2012) A Social Impact Bond for Entrenched Rough 
Sleepers: Outline Business Case – discussed in more detail in section 3. 
20
 ibid 
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2.2 The cohort targeted by the SIB 
The cohort is rough sleepers who on 31st October 2012 had been: 
 Seen sleeping rough in the last three months and/or have stayed in a London rough 
sleeping hostel in the last 3 months; and,  
 Seen rough sleeping at least 6 times over the last 2 years. 
This provides a cohort of 831 named individuals (an increase from 2011/12).  Detailed 
analysis of the cohort will be undertaken by GLA during 2014, as more data is collected 
about them through the delivery of the SIB interventions.  Data about the cohort held in 
CHAIN at the time it was defined shows that: 
 63% (529) were in Westminster; 
 49% (408) were non-UK nationals (of which 218 (53%) were from Central and 
Eastern Europe (26% of cohort)); 
 48% (397) had a recorded alcohol support need (of which 163 (41%) have recorded 
‘high’ need (20% of cohort)); 
 29% (243) had a recorded substance misuse support need (of which 78 (32%) have 
a recorded ‘high’ need (9% of cohort)); and, 
 44% (363) had a recorded mental health support need (of which 63 (17%) have a 
recorded ‘high’ need (8% of cohort).21 
2.3 The network of provision for rough sleepers in London 
The Mayor’s Rough Sleeping Commissioning Framework 2011-201522 is the strategy for 
pan-London commissioning of provision to reduce rough sleeping in London.  This 
commissioning was devolved to GLA in 2011, with £33.8m funding provided for 2011-
2015.   Most central government funding to tackle homelessness and rough sleeping is 
provided to boroughs directly and they commission relevant services at a borough level. 
The Framework sets out the role of the Mayor and GLA in using devolved funding to 
complement and supplement the work of the London boroughs by commissioning services 
that are pan-London or enable greater coordination between boroughs and relevant 
partners.  
Mayor’s Rough Sleeping Commissioning Framework 2011-2015 
Priorities 
Over-arching priorities: 
 Stemming the flow of new rough sleepers and ensuring that no one 
                                            
 
21
 ‘Cohort Split’ analysis, Social Finance November 2012 
22
 Mayor of London October 2012, 
http://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2012.10.17%20Mayor's%20Rough%20Sleeping%20Commissioni
ng%20Framework_0.pdf  
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spends a second night on the street; 
 Helping entrenched rough sleepers off the streets; 
 Preventing a return to the streets (measure: ensure that no rough 
sleeper supported off the streets returns to rough sleeping). 
Cross-cutting priorities: 
 Meeting the physical and mental health needs of rough sleepers; 
 Improving partnership working around enforcement; 
 Tackling rough sleeping by non-UK nationals; 
 Tackling hidden or mobile rough sleeping; 
 Ensuring the availability of emergency accommodation; 
 Sustaining rough sleepers in a life away from the streets; 
 Enhancing the service offer from faith and community based 
organisations. 
The strategic approach is supported by The Mayor’s Rough Sleeping Group, which is 
made up of DCLG, seven boroughs (Westminster, City of London, Camden, Ealing, Tower 
Hamlets, Southwark and Lambeth), the voluntary sector, the Metropolitan Police and 
MOPAC. It meets quarterly.23 
This strategic approach reflects both that: rough sleeping is a pan-London problem 
requiring borough and sector coordination; and, rough sleepers’ complex and multiple 
needs are difficult to meet with provision restricted to a borough level.  Rough sleepers are 
highly mobile and may therefore come into contact with services in a number of boroughs.  
2.3.1 Services and initiatives 
The SIB sits alongside a wide range of other services and initiatives for rough sleepers 
and homeless people in London. The Mayor’s Framework outlined 17 different 
commissioned and grant funded services (some of which have now come to an end).  
                                            
 
23
 This Rough Sleeping Group replaced the earlier London Delivery Board, disbanded in March 2013 and 
made up of a wide range of 23 organisations. Established in Feb 2009, it was a strategic partnership set up 
to take responsibility for tackling rough sleeping on a pan-London basis and to deliver the objectives of the 
government’s national Rough Sleeping Strategy.  The London Delivery Board was charged with fulfilling the 
Mayor of London’s Revised Housing Strategy (December, 2011) aim that rough sleeping should be ended in 
London by 2012. 
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Key services operating over the period of the SIB   
 CHAIN (Combined Homeless and Information Network): the 
database to help workers share information on the rough sleepers, 
which provides for the monitoring of trends in rough sleeping. 
 Clearing House: lettings service for long-term tenancy (two years in 
the first instance) properties provided under the Rough Sleepers 
Initiative. 
 London Reconnections Team: helps vulnerable rough sleepers 
from the European Union to return to and access services in their 
home countries. 
 London Street Rescue: works with current rough sleepers in 
London boroughs without dedicated outreach services. 
 Tenancy Sustainment Teams (North and South): support to 
former rough sleepers living in Rough Sleepers Initiative properties. 
 Housing First pilot project: helps entrenched rough sleepers with 
multiple support needs to access and sustain long-term, self-
contained accommodation. 
 Rolling shelter(s): 60 to 70 free at the point of entry shelter beds for 
rough sleepers accessed across all 33 of London’s boroughs. 
 There is a personalisation pilot in the City of London, which has 
recently received grant funding for a pan-London pilot expansion. 
The two SIB interventions are intended to support the cohort to access the services that 
are appropriate to them, across personalised recovery pathways and into sustained long 
term outcomes.  The SIB is specifically designed to address the needs of a cohort that are 
not supported by two key programmes, which were outlined in section 1 (Introduction): No 
Second Night Out; and, RS205.  
In addition to special initiatives, there is a wide range of provision delivered and 
commissioned in London Boroughs.  The London Housing Federation Atlas of Services for 
Homeless People in London (2012) shows that at the time of publication there were 151 
homelessness providers operating in the 33 London boroughs.24  The different elements of 
provision are set out in Table 2.1.25 
 
 
                                            
 
24
 London Housing Federation (2012), Atlas of Services for Homeless People in London. 
http://www.lhf.org.uk/sites/all/themes/lhf/pdf/atlas_2012.pdf (latest version available at time of writing). 
25
 Ibid. 
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Table 2.1 Services and providers in London (2012) 
Service  Number of 
different 
dedicated 
services  
Number of 
different 
providers 
Outreach 19 11 
Day centres 35 33 
First stage beds 1,907 18 
Second stage beds 8,418 79 
Specialist hostel beds 1,687 30 
Floating support 5,551 24 
Employment, training 
and education 
36 34 
Health care 25 21 
Ex-offender 8 8 
Drug & alcohol  9 9 
Advice service 23 20 
Source: London Housing Federation Atlas of Services for Homeless People in London (2012) 
These services tend to operate on a localised basis. A total of 81 providers operate in only 
one borough, 33 in just two boroughs, but eight providers operate in more than ten London 
boroughs.  Local authorities are the primary funding source for over 70 per cent of 
homelessness services, and 84 per cent of services receive at least some funding from the 
local authority.26  The content of the ‘Atlas’ illustrates the variety of those providing 
services, including faith-based and small to large voluntary and community sector 
organisations.  In addition London Councils, the body established by the 32 London 
boroughs to support a strategic approach to issues in the capital, provides grants for pan-
London homelessness services.  For 2013/2014, £2.8million (of a total £9.4million) will be 
shared between eight initiatives to tackle homelessness.27  
2.4 Effective provision for entrenched rough sleepers 
Entrenched rough sleepers are often well-known to a range of services beyond street 
outreach teams, such as day centres, hostels and hospitals, and may cyclically access 
these services. However, many of these individuals face multiple exclusion from services, 
either as a result of complex support needs or because of challenging or anti-social 
behaviour. An additional barrier to accessing accommodation and services for this group is 
that they may have undiagnosed mental health problems.28   
                                            
 
26
 Homeless Link (2013), Who is Supporting People Now? Experiences of Local Authority Commissioning 
after Supporting People.  
27
 http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/services/grants/news/pressdetail.htm?pk=1580 accessed 19.03.2014 
28
 Homeless Link (2013), Working with Entrenched Rough Sleepers (Rough Sleeping Portal) [online]. 
Available at: http://homeless.org.uk/specialist-interventions#.UcME8ZxFqrb; Theresa McDonagh and 
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A review of practice evidence and sector consultation undertaken to inform the 
development of the SIB29 identified that an effective intervention must:     
 Be responsive to the diversity of the cohort and tailored to complex and specific 
needs, supporting access to and through specialist and more universal provision;  
 Address the overlap between rough sleeping and other social problems and support 
needs, such as substance misuse, street culture activities – primarily drinking and 
begging – and institutional care: rough sleeping is both a symptom of – and an 
underlying cause of – the problems facing members of the cohort;  
 Provide personalised, holistic approaches that promote pan-London cooperation 
between different local authorities and other providers including statutory agencies 
(such as the police and UKBA) and landlords;  
 Provide support and guidance for clients in navigating their way through 
bureaucratic processes, particularly in accessing Housing Benefit; 
 Sensitively and appropriately address the challenge of cohort members being 
ineligible for public funds and not having the right to remain in the UK and thus 
support reconnection, administrative removal or deportation; 
 Provide tailored accommodation pathways and personalised support to sustain 
accommodation according to individual need including the use or personalised 
budgets;   
 Find new, effective solutions for clients for whom rough sleeping services have not 
met needs; 
 Support the development of new, positive social networks that contribute to the 
higher chance of sustained long-term change; and, 
 Be based upon an assertive outreach approach that provides long-term key worker 
support beyond initial contact and support. 
The review concluded that a ‘Navigator’ approach is an effective approach to delivering 
this personalised, flexible model.  How this review informed the development of the SIB 
(section 4) and the delivery models of the two providers (section 5) is returned to in later 
sections. 
2.5 Summary  
This section has presented an overview of the context for the development of the SIB.  It 
has shown how: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Multiple Exclusion Homelessness Research Programme (2011) Tackling homelessness  and exclusion: 
Understanding complex lives,  JRF York; Lígia Teixeira (2010) Still left out? The rough sleepers ‘205’ 
initiative one year on, Crisis; Centre for Economic and Social Exclusion (2005) A Literature review on access 
to mainstream public services for homeless people, Crisis 
29
 Young Foundation (2011), Designing an Intervention for a Rough Sleeping Social Impact Bond, Young 
Foundation 
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 There is a persistent rough sleeping problem in London, centring on the central 
borough of Westminster but an issue across the central London boroughs and 
reflecting rough sleepers as a mobile group;  
 Rough sleepers are one of the most vulnerable groups in society with high levels of 
complex and interrelated needs, borne out by data available for the cohort targeted 
by the SIB; 
 There is a wide range of provision for rough sleepers in London, with both boroughs 
and the GLA responsible for commissioning services.  Analysis of CHAIN data 
shows that there is a cohort who are not targeted by key pan-London initiatives; 
and, 
 A review of evidence and sector consultations has identified a keyworker – 
‘Navigator’ – model as a providing the flexible model of personalised support 
necessary for an effective approach to delivering improved outcomes for the target 
cohort of entrenched rough sleepers. 
Section 3 provides an overview of the background to SIBs and PbR in public services.  
Section 4 explores how the SIB was developed to reflect the cohort and the proposed 
Navigator model across existing provision.  Section 5 explores how the interventions are 
being delivered.   
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3 Social impact bonds (SIBs) 
This section provides an overview of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs).  The background to SIBs 
as a mechanism for bringing new finance to public services and promoting innovation 
through an outcomes-based approach is explored.  Learning about key success factors as 
well as emerging critiques are discussed, providing important background for the 
evaluation of the London Homelessness SIB. 
3.1 Background 
SIBs are one product within the growing social investment market.  Social investment 
provides funding to social ventures to expand their goods and services, take up new 
opportunities and achieve scale in order to achieve greater social impacts. Social 
investment includes: 
 Debt finance – usually in the form of secured and unsecured loans as well as 
overdrafts; 
 Secured loans – take security over a property or asset; 
 Unsecured loans – usually have a higher interest rate than a secured loan; 
 Equity investment – usually in the form of shares issued in exchange for capital, 
provided by an investor who believes the organisation will grow and provide a 
dividend return; 
 Quasi-equity investment – similar to an equity investment but without the issuing of 
shares, the investor receives a royalty payment as a fixed percentage of income; 
 Social Impact Bond – investment in an outcomes-based contract (see box below).30  
The Cabinet Office defines a SIB as: ‘a funding structure for payment by results (PbR) 
contracts, which enable socially motivated investors to provide the upfront financing to 
service providers for the interventions that target a social outcome. The commissioner 
agrees to make PbR payments based on the social outcomes achieved.  In this way, 
social investors place their funding at risk – if the provider does not deliver the outcomes, 
commissioners may not pay anything and the investment is not returned; if the outcomes 
are achieved, investors will receive a return on their investment.’31   
The move towards SIBs (and more broadly PbR contracts) can be located within a range 
of policy factors. These include deepening public sector spending cuts and reduced 
budgets across national and local government, with an associated focus on promoting 
greater efficiency in public services.  The Open Public Services White Paper, presented to 
                                            
 
30
 ICF GHK and BMG Research (2013) Growing the Social Investment Market: The Landscape and 
Economic Impact, London: City of London, Big Lottery Fund, Big Society Capital and Her Majesty’s 
government.  Available at http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-
information/research-publications/Documents/research-2013/Growing-social-investment-market.pdf  
31
 Cabinet Office Centre for Social Impact Bonds. 2013. ‘Glossary of terms’. Available at: 
http://blogs.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/socialimpactbonds/2012/09/b1/ 
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Parliament in 2011, laid out a comprehensive policy framework to promote a fundamental 
shift in public services. It outlined a significant drive towards PbR, arguing that the 
principles of open public services would switch the default from one where the state 
provides the service itself to one where the state commissions the service from a range of 
diverse providers.32 The White Paper identified SIBs as an innovative opportunity to 
access new forms of external finance for the delivery of services.  As the latest stage of a 
move away from conventional delivery of services, SIBs were seen to allow government to 
effectively transfer financial risk and incentivise delivery of innovative services.33 
Social Impact Bonds? 
The investment risk of a Social Impact Bond varies with that of a traditional 
bond. A traditional bond offers a fixed return to investors over a fixed time 
period. Although a Social Impact Bond similarly operates over a fixed time 
period, the financial returns investors receive varies according to the 
success of achieving social outcomes. In terms of investment risk, this is 
more similar to equity or quasi-equity investments rather than bonds34.  
NOTE: Equity investments are ownership interests – the investor takes 
ownership of stock – and quasi-equity aim to reflect some characteristics of 
equity and loan (debt) financing. Quasi-equity finance is used in situations 
where debt financing is inappropriate or too onerous for charities/ social 
enterprises while the use of equity financing is simply not possible because 
of legal structuring. Quasi-equity shares the risk and reward of the 
investment between investor and investee by allowing the investor to take a 
share of future revenue streams. Unlike a loan, this investment is truly ‘at 
risk.’35 
3.2 History of SIBs and current context of the SIB market 
The first UK SIB was introduced in 2010 and has been followed by a small but steady 
expansion of the product both in the UK and overseas (see Figure 3.1).   
                                            
 
32
 Open Public Services White Paper. 2011. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255288/OpenPublicServices-
WhitePaper.pdf 
33
 McHugh, N., Sinclair, S., Roy, M., Huckfield, L. & Donaldson, C. 2013. ‘Social Impact bonds: a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing?’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 21(3), p247 – 257. 
34
 Bolton, E. & Saville, L. 2010. ‘Towards a new social economy: blended value creation through social 
impact bonds.’ London: Social Finance. 
35
 CAF Venturesome. 2008. ‘Quasi-Equity. Case study in using Revenue Participation Agreements’. 
Available at: https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/VenturesomeQuasiEquityMarch2008.pdf 
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Figure 3.1 A plotted history of SIBs 
 
Source: KPMG. 2013. ‘Social Impact Bonds: Planting for future growth.’ NB this is a 
timeline of launches and not final commissioning 
In early 2014, there are 15 SIBs in the UK; ten funded through the DWP innovation fund 
and a further five, including Peterborough, Essex, Manchester, the ‘adoption SIB’ and the 
homelessness SIB that is the subject of this evaluation. 
Although the SIB market is still in its infancy, social investment is gaining momentum and 
political support and many investors are becoming increasingly interested in the SIB 
market. However, there are two main factors which continue to act as a barrier to current 
development in the market:  
 The early adopters of SIBs (commissioners, investors and service delivery 
organisations) face disproportionate set-up costs as a template does not currently 
exist that can be applied. In this way early adopters of SIBs are subsiding future 
adopters. Until adaptable templates and proven track records emerge, the 
development of a SIB will be associated with higher costs. 
 There exists a lack of investment readiness amongst the public services sector and 
commissioning organisations. A Big Lottery Fund survey identified very low levels of 
preparedness in relation to suitable financial skills, financial acumen, understanding 
of social investment and coordination.36 Therefore, this gap must also be 
addressed. 
                                            
 
36
 Gregory, D., Hill, K., Joy, I. & Keen, S. 2012. ‘Investment Readiness in the UK’. Big Lottery Fund. 
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3.3 Key features of the SIB model 
SIBs are a form of PbR but extend beyond this by harnessing social investment via a 
multi-stakeholder arrangement between government, service providers and investors 
(usually facilitated by an intermediary organisation).37 The principal innovation of a SIB, in 
conjunction with the PbR contract, is that the risk of non-performance is transferred to the 
private sector instead of the taxpayer (through commissioners) and service providers who 
are in most cases voluntary and community sector (VCS) organisations.38 
Although the SIB model varies significantly, Figure 3.2 outlines a typical structure. This 
usually involves an investor-owned Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)39 which takes on the 
PbR contract and sub-contracts to the service provider(s). Social investors include private 
funders, foundations, trusts, social banks or philanthropic investors and provide the 
financing required for the Service Delivery Organisation’s set up and delivery costs via the 
SPV. The SPV usually hosts a Performance Director or Board responsible for monitoring 
the performance of the Service Delivery Organisation(s).40 
Figure 3.2 A standard SIB model 
 
Source: ICF analysis. 
                                            
 
37
 McHugh, N., Sinclair, S., Roy, M., Huckfield, L. & Donaldson, C. 2013. ‘Social Impact bonds: a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing?’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 21(3), p247 – 257. 
38
 Cox, B.R. 2011. ‘Social Impact Bonds: Financing homelessness prevention programs with social impact 
bonds.’ Review of Banking & Financial Law. 
39
 A special purpose vehicle is an off-balance sheet vehicle comprised of a legal entity created by the 
sponsor or originator to fulfil a temporary objective of the sponsoring firm. SPVs can be viewed as a method 
of disaggregating the risks of an underlying exposure held by the SPV (in this instance, a provider contract) 
and reallocate them to investors willing to take on those risks. (PwC. 2011. ‘Creating an understanding of 
Special Purpose Vehicles’.) 
40
 Social Market Foundation. 2013. ‘Risky Business’. 
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Identified good practice: The role of intermediaries 
A key role not outlined in Figure 3.2 is the role of intermediaries. The typical 
role of an intermediary varies with each SIB but can be categorised by 
three distinct roles:41 
1. Advisory – this generally involves advising commissioners about the 
structure of the SIB and the payment/ outcome metrics. 
2. Corporate finance functions – this occurs after the commissioning 
stage and includes involvement with establishing the SPV and 
structuring ‘the deal’. This could include attracting investors, offering 
expertise around the financial products available to investors, due 
diligence and collecting data on service delivery organisations, providing 
support during the commissioning process in order to obtain the PbR 
contract as well as providing general financial expertise. 
3. Performance management of the PbR contract – this role for 
intermediaries generally involves tracking the progress of the attainment 
of performance outcomes by the service delivery organisation and 
reporting back to investors. 
A potential for conflict of interest exists between these three roles and as a 
result, an intermediary would not perform all of these roles for the same 
SIB. 
As part of the evaluation of SIB implemented in HMP Peterborough, the 
stakeholders’ account of the development of the SIB indicate that the role of 
the intermediary in facilitation was paramount to the eventual 
implementation. The intermediary’s ability to engage and negotiate with 
different stakeholders was seen to be very important as was their perceived 
creditability with investors.  
During the evaluation conducted by RAND Europe, the importance of the 
intermediary role and their required skillset were identified as a lesson for 
future SIBs. The range of skills they identified as necessary for successful 
intermediaries included technical skills in negotiating contracts, financial 
knowledge (particularly regarding relevant financial products) and ability to 
understand the policy context as well as softer relational skills. 
Source: Disley, E., Rubin, J., Scraggs, E., Burrowes, N., Culley, D. 2011. 
‘Lessons learned from the planning and early implementation of the Social 
Impact Bond at HMP Peterborough’. RAND Europe, Ministry of Justice. 
3.4 Payment by results (PbR) 
A key component of the SIB model is the PbR contract and the direct link between 
achievement of the outcome metrics and the payment of providers with linked financial 
return for investors. PbR contracts mark a shift towards paying providers for the outcomes 
they deliver in markets that have traditionally purchased activities measured by outputs. 
                                            
 
41
 ICF interviews with stakeholders. 
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PbR contracts have begun to be been widely used (outside of SIBs) and, as mentioned 
above, are a cornerstone of the government’s ‘Open Public Services’ agenda.42  
PbR contracts are an important risk transference tool as commissioners only pay for those 
results that are evidenced, transferring the risk of paying for ‘failure’. There are also a 
number of other advantages attributed to PbR’s: 
 Other agents (i.e. specialist VCS organisations) may be better placed than 
government to know what works through their professional experience and 
therefore are better placed to implement delivery; 
 Performance incentives will be strengthened as no payments are made if results 
are not achieved; and/or, 
 There is the potential for a diverse range of providers to deliver public services, 
driving increased efficiency and quality through competitive markets.  
Despite these identified benefits, issues have been raised that the potential to impact on 
the value of PbR for commissioners and service delivery organisations as well as the 
social impacts themselves. These are summarised in Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 PbR: Key success factors 
Key design 
feature 
Potential issue / key success factors 
Measurable 
outcomes 
 The outcomes need to be easily quantifiable and 
measurable, in order to robustly demonstrate 
whether an outcome has been achieved. 
 Some social outcomes are very difficult to 
quantify, with proxy measures only partially 
representative. 
 Some outcomes (e.g. employment prospects) 
require long time horizons before an outcome can 
be assessed. 
 A process for measuring outcomes and validating 
success needs to be developed independent of 
the contracting parties. 
 (See blue box below, identified good practice: 
lessons learnt around outcome measures) 
Well-defined 
target 
population 
 The population need to be defined so that it 
cannot be manipulated by the service provider. 
 It also needs to be tightly defined to reduce the 
potential of ‘cream skimming’43 however, it may 
not be possible to entirely eliminate this.  
                                            
 
42
 NCVO. 2013. ‘Payment by Results contracts: a legal analysis of terms and process’. Available at: 
http://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/practical_support/public_services/payment_by_results_contracts_
a_legal_analysis_of_terms_and_process_ncvo_and_bwb_30_oct_2013.pdf 
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Key design 
feature 
Potential issue / key success factors 
 Linked to this is the need for a comparable target 
population or acceptable counterfactual. 
Clear causal 
link 
 A clear link between intervention and the result 
needs to be established, ensuring providers are 
not paid for positive outcomes not related to their 
intervention (also known as deadweight). 
 Deadweight cannot be completely eliminated, so 
this needs to be factored into the price. 
 The use of a variety of interventions on the same 
target population makes causal links more difficult 
(see endogeneity concerns below). 
Endogeneity 
concerns 
 There are a variety of interventions and factors 
that impact the target population making 
measurement of social impact very difficult. 
 Payments cannot be attached (or linked) to 
targets that are beyond the providers’ control. 
Accurate price 
for outcomes 
 Commissioners need to be able to calculate the 
value they place on the agreed social outcomes. 
 The pricing can be (but not necessarily) linked to 
the amount of cashable savings the social 
impacts generate. 
 Payments can be 100% performance based or 
could combine with some element of a fixed 
payment. 
Evidence 
burden 
 Risk that payments are attached to too many 
targets requiring significant resources to monitor 
accurately. 
Prescriptive 
provisions 
within contract 
 PbR introduces a significant shift in risk profile 
towards provider and this shift needs to be 
reflected in the contractual rights and 
responsibilities. 
 The contract should be less prescriptive about 
how the service is delivered. 
 In reality, a review conducted by NCVO found in 
many cases the inclusion of overly prescriptive 
provisions within contracts. 
Source: ICF analysis & NVCO (2013)44 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
43
 ‘Cream skimming’ refers to a focus on those that are easiest to delivery services to and achieve outcomes. 
The result of cream skimming is that those most in need (or, those most difficult to service) will remain 
vulnerable. 
44
 NCVO. 2013. ‘Payment by Results contracts: a legal analysis of terms and process’. Available at: 
http://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/practical_support/public_services/payment_by_results_contracts_
a_legal_analysis_of_terms_and_process_ncvo_and_bwb_30_oct_2013.pdf 
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Identified good practice: lessons learnt around outcome measures 
As part of the HMP Peterborough SIB, the process to develop a 
methodologically robust outcome measure that had the confidence of all 
stakeholders, was time-consuming and an analytically complex process. 
Establishing the statistical significance and attributing changes to the SIB-
funded intervention were crucial elements in negotiating the outcome 
measures. It was noted a key lesson learnt was the required balance 
between the robustness of the outcome measure and time, simplicity, 
resources and data availability. 
Source: Disley, E., Rubin, J., Scraggs, E., Burrowes, N., Culley, D. 
‘Lessons learned from the planning and early implementation of the Social 
Impact Bond at HMP Peterborough’. RAND Europe, Ministry of Justice. 
3.5 Advantages of the SIB model 
A distinguishing feature of SIBs from other forms of PbR is the way their financing is 
structured; a SIB is a particular form of (social) investment product within a broader array 
of funding and investment models. 
SIBs are a deliberate instrument to attract external finance to support the delivery of ‘public 
services’.  Given the nature of the services to be delivered, most investors are likely to be 
‘social investors’ who are motivated both by the financial returns they can make and by the 
social impact their investments can achieve (‘blended returns’).  Furthermore, as an 
investment decision against the ability to deliver outcomes, investments are based within a 
particular assessment of risk. The investor: expects to put their money at some level of 
risk; considers both financial and social impact rewards; and are likely to be prepared to be 
more innovative in their approach to delivery as part of seeking reward through outcomes. 
Furthermore, as noted in the box above, SIBs hold a particular ‘quasi-equity’ niche as an 
investment product.  This implies that the investor does take (greater) risk in contrast to 
both secured debt lending to a provider and against traditional bonds.  For the provider, 
this reduces risk that they may incur through other forms of ‘working capital’ investment 
needed to be able to participate in PbR.  In either case, the commissioner has transferred 
risk. Thus it is important to understand SIBs within the wider context of how to fund the 
achievement of social outcomes. 
Table 3.2 below considers the potential advantages of the SIB model in comparison to 
stand-alone PbR contracts, as well as traditional government-funded service delivery. 
The key advantages for the SIB model, in contrast to other PbR mechanisms, are 
identified as: 
 24 
 
 That the service provider is provided with forward funding to deliver the services, 
lowering the cash flow barriers associated with PbR contracts;45 and, 
 That the unsuccessful outcome risk is transferred away from the commissioner 
/taxpayer as well as away from (or, partly away from) the service providers who are 
usually VCS organisations. 
Table 3.2 Comparison of funding models 
 
Social 
Impact 
Bonds 
Payment by 
Results 
Contracts 
government 
Debt – 
Publicly 
Funded 
Public sector only pays for 
success 
✓ ✓ ✗ 
Transference of 
unsuccessful outcome risk 
away from taxpayer  
✓ ✓ ✗ 
Transference of 
unsuccessful outcome risk 
away from (or partly away 
from) service providers 
✓ ✗ ✗ 
Public sector payments 
proportional to 
improvements in social 
outcomes 
✓ ✓ ✗ 
Service providers’ costs 
funded up front 
✓ ✗ ✓ 
Helps to facilitate 
cooperation between 
multiple service providers 
✓ ? ✗ 
Greater potential for 
innovative and more risky 
service delivery models 
✓ ? ✗ 
Source: Bolton, E. & Saville, L. 2010. ‘Towards a new social economy: blended value 
creation through social impact bonds.’ London: Social Finance. 
There are also some potential additional benefits of cohesion with other services that may 
emerge depending on how the SIB and PbR contract are designed. For example, some 
outcomes may encourage complementary service providers to collaborate with each other, 
leading to greater efficiency and effectiveness when they work together with a shared 
goal.46 In addition, it is suggested that the nature of the commissioning process and the 
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 Disley, E., Rubin, J., Scraggs, E., Burrowes, N., Culley, D. ‘Lessons learned from the planning and early 
implementation of the Social Impact Bond at HMP Peterborough’. RAND Europe, Ministry of Justice. 
46
 Bolton, E. & Saville, L. 2010. ‘Towards a new social economy: blended value creation through social 
impact bonds.’ London: Social Finance. 
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priorities of the investors may result in more innovative and riskier projects than the 
government is likely to fund.47  
3.6 Critiques of the SIB model 
Although proponents of SIB structures identify these strengths, there are a range of 
critiques of the model.   
3.6.1 The ability to identify, measure and value social outcomes – and the 
costs of doing so 
Firstly, linked to the PbR component of SIBs, there has been criticism around the 
measurement of social outcomes. The viability of measuring social outcomes (as outlined 
above with reference to HMP Peterborough) is notoriously difficult.  As McHugh et al 
(2013) state, ‘off-the-shelf’ measures that are robust enough for contracting payments do 
not exist for many social outcomes.48 There is resultant complexity involved in formulating 
a SIB contract due to the need to evidence the social outcomes that are attributed to the 
intervention. Furthermore, to ensure certainty of outcomes in order to release payments, 
there can be an associated burden of collecting information to evidence achievements.49  
Whilst this reinforces the point made earlier about the role of intermediaries in facilitating 
the process of SIB development, it highlights also the substantial ‘set up/transaction costs’ 
that have been incurred to date for the SIBs that have been developed. 
3.6.2 The demands and consequences of a blended returns approach 
A second criticism that has been suggested by some authors identifies potential 
unintended consequences for the voluntary and community sector as a whole. This 
criticism is applied to both PbR’s and SIBs alike. An NVCO study (2013),50 after 
interviewing a number of social service providers, argued that there is inadequate 
awareness around the commercial impacts of PbR and SIBs. This predominately relates to 
understanding cash-flow issues and the level of risk that providers are taking. The study 
argued that there is a failure of commissioners to acknowledge the impact on providers 
and that over time there is a risk of adversely affecting the diversity of the provider market, 
and thus the quality of the service being delivered.   
The lack of investment readiness, referred to above at 3.2, has been identified as a major 
barrier to the development of the social investment market more widely.  There is a 
concern that few providers are in a suitable position to make the transition to new funding 
models that is being asked of them by models such as SIBs. 51 
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 Cox, B.R. 2011. ‘Social Impact Bonds: Financing homelessness prevention programs with social impact 
bonds.’ Review of Banking & Financial Law. 
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 McHugh, N., Sinclair, S., Roy, M., Huckfield, L. & Donaldson, C. 2013. ‘Social Impact bonds: a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing?’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 21(3), p247 – 257. 
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 McHugh, N., Sinclair, S., Roy, M., Huckfield, L. & Donaldson, C. 2013. ‘Social Impact bonds: a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing?’. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 21(3), p247 – 257. 
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 NCVO. 2013. ‘Payment by Results contracts: a legal analysis of terms and process’. Available at: 
http://www.ncvo.org.uk/images/documents/practical_support/public_services/payment_by_results_contracts_
a_legal_analysis_of_terms_and_process_ncvo_and_bwb_30_oct_2013.pdf 
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 See Big Society Capital (2013) Social Investment Compendium 
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McHugh (2013)52 also argues that the SIB model of commissioning could result in ‘mission 
drift’ in the VCS. This relates to the potential for perverse incentives leading VCS providers 
away from activities that are most needed to those that are most measurable. As Hudson 
et al’s evaluation for DWP (2010)53 describes, this was evidenced in the provider-led 
Pathways to Work programme.  In this case, the PbR created incentives for the 
organisations to shape their provisions around the contracts rather than the needs of their 
clients. 
An additional criticism that has been made regarding the SIB model is the resultant loss of 
a direct relationship between service providers and commissioners. This criticism is 
particularly voiced in instances where intermediaries have a significant role in the 
development of the SIB. As a result of this role, commissioners no longer have a direct 
relationship with service providers. It is argued that this creates asymmetric information in 
favour of the providers, which could reduce oversight and the ability of commissioners to 
influence provisions.54 
3.6.3 Achieving a balance of risk 
A final critique provided of the SIB models developed to date is the imbalance of risk 
sharing between stakeholders. Although the key benefit of a SIB is the transference of risk 
to investors, how this is structured is new and the pricing of this has remained 
problematic.55   
A high level of risk remains around outcomes and performance, with little data available 
around track-records and thus a lack of clarity about the risk of success or failure. In 
addition, there exist political risks associated with future policy decisions on related 
complementary services (upon which a SIB may depend for joint working), liquidity risks 
(provider failure due to lack of or problems with managing outcome payments) and the 
long-term nature of some outcome metrics defined (and when they can be paid within a 
contract). These risks mean the returns required by social investors are usually quite high.  
Whilst some investors are open to taking lower levels of return than planned, the possibility 
of losing the full principal investment amount (which was a feature of the investment terms 
in HMP Peterborough) is generally not tenable. Rather, investors may accept lower returns 
if downside protection (what happens when there is poor performance) is offered on their 
principal investment.  
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The Rockefeller Foundation, in a 2012 report56, suggested that commissioners should 
share more of the outcome performance risk, rather than shifting this (often) entirely to 
investors. They argue that this lessened risk to investors would work as credit 
enhancement, making investment more attractive and widening the market by bringing 
more commercial investors to SIB products. This would help to adjust the risk return 
required and the related costs of SIBs. 
Risk and return in SIBs to date 
Different SIBs have different levels of risk, which is then reflected in the 
expected return investors have. This means that to make fair comparisons 
of returns between projects, it is important to use a risk-adjusted return, 
which reflects the risk an investor is taking on. So, what may appear to be 
in absolute terms a strong maximum rate of return on offer in a SIB, may 
actually represent a very low risk-adjusted return. 
Expected returns on SIBs have significantly varied. The first SIB, HMP 
Peterborough, had a capped interest return of 13 per cent if the reoffending 
rate dropped beyond the threshold of 7.5 per cent.57 This is significantly 
higher than subsequent SIBs, reflecting the pilot nature of the product and 
respective high risk. The Essex County Council’s SIB (contracting with 
Children’s Support Services) had an 8 per cent medium performance level 
return for investors.58 
Internationally, SIBs are being priced at a range of levels. The first 
Australian SIB, based in New South Wales, targets children in out-of-home 
care and has a financial return of approximately 10 to 12 per cent, with 
capped losses at 25 per cent of capital.59 The New York City bond targeting 
adolescents at Rikers Island correctional facility has a return to Goldman 
Sachs of $2.1 to $2.4 million from a $10 million initial investment 
(approximating to roughly a 20 per cent return).60 
Achieving a balance of risk is a debate critical to the future of the SIB model.  With few 
SIBs there is a high degree of interest in each and each sets a further market indicator on 
how risk can be structured.  For example, the largest SIB to date ($27m) was launched in 
Massachusetts, USA in early 2014 aimed at reducing recidivism. It is significant for its 
investors list, including Goldman Sachs the multinational investment bank. It has, however, 
been criticised for the substantial level of subsidy within the model (more than the total 
possible returns to investors) and approach to leveraging philanthropic investment that 
provides the largest returns to those who have taken the least risk.   SIBs are a new 
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product and all have required subsidy to become operational but this is not sustainable if 
they are to become a mainstream, scaled approach.61 
Identified good practice: Stakeholder sharing of risk 
On July 17th 2013 an adoption SIB was announced, ’It’s All About Me’, 
raising £2 million from social investors.  It was developed by a Consortium 
of Voluntary Adoption Agencies and Baker Tilly. The SIB is designed to 
invert the traditional adoption service model so that the child seeks out 
parents, not the other way round.  
The SIB will support placement of 100 children and investors will receive a 
4 per cent annual return. The investors will be repaid in four instalments 
using funds that local authorities will pay for placement of the children - 
£54,000 per child, which is approximately half as much as it costs to 
provide care for a child for a year. If placement fails before any of the 
payments, no further payments will be made.62 
The fund pays a normal commercial return and it is foreseen the SIB debt 
instrument can move onto the commercial investment market63 – this 
reflects a more effective risk sharing agreement between commissioners 
and investors.  The SIB is expected to entice further, traditional investment 
early next year of £3.5 million. 
3.6.4 Key success factors 
The development of the SIB market to date has provided an insight into the key success 
factors and the common challenges standing in the way of further development and wide 
spread adoption.  In a 2013 report, KPMG identified four sets of success criteria and key 
questions necessary for multi-stakeholder confidence in a proposed SIB. These are 
outlined in Table 3.3 below: 
Table 3.3 Feasibility criteria for SIBs 
Feasibility 
Criteria 
Key questions 
Policy success  Is there a clearly defined SIB target population? 
 Are there measurable SIB outcomes? 
 Are there innovative interventions that are not 
used today? 
 Can a counterfactual be measured? 
Provider market  Are there providers/ delivery partners that would 
be able to deliver the programme? 
 Is there a workable structure for the delivery 
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Feasibility 
Criteria 
Key questions 
model? 
Financial case  Is there a financial case from a commissioner’s 
perspective? 
 Is there a financial case from an investor’s 
perspective? 
 Is there a workable commercial model from a 
provider perspective? 
Stakeholder 
support 
 Do staff support the SIB project? 
 Do the target population support the SIB 
interventions and project? 
Source: KPMG. 2013. ‘Social Impact Bonds: Planting for future growth’. 
3.6.5 Summary 
This section has provided an overview of the development of SIBs as an instrument 
combining PbR and social investment that supports innovation in public service delivery. 
There have been relatively few SIBs to date and they remain in their infancy.   
 There are high costs associated with SIBs, reflecting the early stage of their market 
development, infrastructure development and the learning taking place across 
commissioners, investors and providers; 
 Although there is a standard SIB model, there are major variations on this in 
practice and there is not yet a range of templates for their development; 
 Intermediaries play a central role in the development and commissioning of SIBs; 
 PbR structures are core to SIBs and present a range of challenges including the 
key requirement of providing certainty around outcomes and the associated links 
with payment metrics; 
 SIBs provide service delivery organisations with forward funding, addressing the 
need for cash flow associated with PbR models that do not provide payment until 
outcomes are achieved; 
 SIBs seek to transfer the risk for failure away from commissioners, who only pay 
(public funds) for outcomes achieved, and from providers to investors who hold the 
risk; 
 But this transfer of risk is finely balanced as investors must assess the risk as 
appropriate and higher value risk transfers bring higher investment costs – the 
levels of investment return are dictated by the investors’ assessment of risk and 
remains an area of testing and learning with SIBs as one of a range of social 
investment products; and, 
 To be successful, SIBs should: target a defined population; have clear, measurable 
and attributable outcomes; be suitable for specialist independent providers; offer a 
viable financial model for commissioners (linked to savings from improved 
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outcomes) providers and investors; be developed through stakeholder consultation 
and agreed by them as appropriate.  
The London Homelessness SIB will provide valuable learning in this context.  The next 
section explores how and why it was developed. 
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4 Developing the London homelessness 
SIB 
This section describes the way in which the London Homelessness SIB (‘the SIB’) was 
developed, from initial discussions within government and across stakeholders to a 
commissioned service of two provider interventions.  An outline of the different stages is 
provided, including the perspectives of the different stakeholders, to identify what worked 
well and less well and the learning for future SIB commissioning. 
4.1 Origins 
The SIB emerged as a potential way of trialling innovation in provision for rough sleepers 
in London within DCLG in 2011, reflecting the wider discussions across government about 
the potential of PbR and SIB structures for innovation in public services that were outlined 
in section 3.  A SIB was identified as offering the potential for bringing new finance into 
new provision for rough sleepers.     
Following initial internal discussions, informal consultations were held with stakeholders 
from the GLA, local authorities and providers delivering contracted services for rough 
sleepers and homelessness support in London to take initial soundings on the concept of a 
SIB that had a long-term and outcomes, rather than a service specification, focus through 
a PbR structure.  There was initial interest across all these groups (though some 
concerns) and as part of this process the notion of a cohort of rough sleepers who sat 
within the key existing provision emerged.  Analysis of CHAIN data was undertaken for 
DCLG and this confirmed a definable cohort group of ‘inbetweeners’ who were not being 
targeted by existing initiatives. 
In parallel, this early consultation with stakeholders was an opportunity to discuss potential 
long-term outcomes that would be an appropriate focus for a PBR structure.  Policy leads 
at DCLG had identified broad areas reflecting the issues at the heart of recovery pathways 
from rough sleeping: reduced rough sleeping; sustained accommodation; entering 
employment; improved health and wellbeing; and, reduced crime.  These were seen to be 
appropriate but there was caution amongst providers and local authorities about what the 
detail of the PbR structure would be.  For both, there was concern about two interrelated 
factors at the heart of the model: how would it work with existing provision?; and, how 
would outcomes be attributed in the complex landscape of practice?    
Following the very earliest consultations and the early support of the GLA, the outline 
proposal was discussed at Ministerial level in DCLG, with HMT and with the Cabinet 
Office.  There was support here too and thus from quite early on the core principles of 
what became the SIB began to gather political and wide stakeholder backing.  As a result, 
a potential fund of £5m was identified and Social Finance (in partnership with the Young 
Foundation) was commissioned to further develop the skeletal structure and to explore 
what could be achieved for the cohort through a Feasibility Study.  The study was funded 
by the GLA and DCLG as the two key stakeholders (see section 2) in recognition that the 
SIB could only be developed through specialist expertise.  Social Finance had developed 
the only other SIB in operation at this time (the HMP Peterborough SIB) and was able to 
provide contributory funding from the Big Lottery, available to them in support of the 
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development of new social finance products.  The study undertaken by this partnership 
can be summarised as providing two core elements: 
 What would an effective model of intervention look like for the ‘inbetweener’ cohort 
of entrenched rough sleepers?; and, 
 What would a SIB structure be, including detailed outcomes and metrics? 
The study was conducted in a concentrated period, from autumn 2011 to January 2012.64 
The process followed and described below for the development of the SIB can be seen to 
have followed the good practice structure identified above at 3.6.4 in Table 3.3 (and 
returned to below). 
4.2 Developing the SIB  
4.2.1 An effective intervention model 
This element of the feasibility study involved: 
 A literature review, exploring the context of rough sleeping in London and evidence 
of effective interventions; 
 Interviews with officers and practitioners from London boroughs, charities and 
providers; 
 Workshops with former and current homelessness service users; and,  
 Workshops with stakeholders in a future SIB to address homelessness in London.65 
The review explored the outcomes an effective intervention might achieve as well as the 
features of a successful model of intervention (see section 2.4 for its conclusions).  The 
review identified the need for a (additional) ‘reconnection’ outcome as ‘of critical 
importance’ to the success of the SIB given the number of non-UK nationals in the cohort 
and within this: illegal immigrants with no right to remain in the UK; and EEA citizens who 
are not exercising their treaty rights.  An outcome linked to ‘positive social networks’ was 
also identified, given the importance of a ‘non-harmful social life’ in successful recovery 
pathways. 
Importantly, the evidence base did not suggest a tested intervention model that had been 
proven in robust research and that could be further tested for scalability – as was the case 
for the HMP Peterborough SIB.  Instead, the review identified the features of an effective 
intervention drawn from evidence of promising practice and comprehensive work with 
stakeholders as set out above to identify with them what works in practice: a ‘Navigator’ 
model. 
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A Navigator Model 
The Young Foundation review66 identified a ‘Navigator’ model as an 
effective approach to supporting the cohort.   
The Navigator would have a budget to support a personalised approach, 
act as a single point of contact for the client and the services working with 
them.   
The Navigator would be a key worker supporting the client from an 
individualised assessment through the network of provision necessary to 
address their support needs and sustaining this support over time to 
achieve long term outcomes.   
An outcomes based structure would enable Navigators to take an assertive, 
tailored and personalised approach rather than the delivery of any one 
intervention.   
In this way, the Navigators would support the cohort through the landscape 
of existing provision.  
 
  
4.2.2 A social impact bond 
Alongside the review of an effective intervention model, Social Finance undertook detailed 
analysis of CHAIN data to explore trends in rough sleeping and the characteristics of the 
cohort over time. The study explored the characteristics of a SIB model that would be 
attractive to providers and investors and deliver the outcomes required by commissioners 
(GLA and DCLG).  The identified intervention model was developed and brought together 
with the modelling of the cohort and their service use to provide a business case for the 
SIB that set out: 
 The social need – the vulnerability of the homeless, the Mayoral priority of ending 
homelessness,  the characteristics of the cohort and their pathways over time; 
 Potential interventions – gaps in service provision, principles of effective practice, 
the proposed Navigator model and the costs associated with different (low to high 
intensity) key worker interventions; 
 Outcome metrics – describing the need for a set of multiple metrics that are linked 
to change, incentivise providers, are objective and as simple as possible; and, 
 The value for money case – describing how more intensive interventions are linked 
to higher outcome achievement, reviewing the rationale for outcomes-based 
payment by results as both transferring risk and incentivising implementation by 
those best placed to deliver effective interventions. 
4.2.2.1 Understanding costs and savings 
The CHAIN database was used to identify a cohort of 653 rough sleepers who: 
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 Had been recorded on the CHAIN database as having six or more bedded down 
street contacts during the past two years; and 
 Had been seen rough sleeping, or have been living in a hostel for rough sleepers, in 
the last three months. 
A wide range of analysis and modelling was undertaken for the cohort.  Using CHAIN data, 
the business case sets out the average cost per cohort member across the public sector 
and thus the potential savings of a Navigator intervention focused upon the identified 
outcomes. 
Table 4.1 Costs per individual cohort member across proposed outcome 
areas 
Costs Cost estimates 
used in model 
Cost estimates 
not used in 
model 
Net Present 
Value (NPV) of 
costs over five 
years 
Rough sleeping 
costs 
Average costs 
per person = 
£1,664 
Outreach 
services 
Housing benefit 
uptake 
Average NPV per 
person = £2,985 
Accommodation 
costs 
Average costs 
per person = 
£3,818 
Temporary 
accommodation 
Tenancy 
breakdowns 
Changes in 
housing benefit 
Average NPV per 
person = £6,849 
Criminal justice 
costs 
Average costs 
per person = 
£10,693 
Reconviction 
costs 
Police time 
Probation costs 
Long-term 
imprisonment 
Average NPV per 
person = £19,182 
Employment 
costs 
Average costs 
per person = 
£2,600 
Job Seeker’s 
Allowance  
Employment 
Support 
Allowance 
Exchequer 
benefit from  
employment 
Average NPV per 
person = £4,664 
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Costs Cost estimates 
used in model 
Cost estimates 
not used in 
model 
Net Present 
Value (NPV) of 
costs over five 
years 
Health costs 
Average costs 
per person = 
£1,890 
Unplanned 
hospital usage 
(A&E and 
ambulance 
usage) 
Psychiatric 
hospital usage 
Specific alcohol 
and drug 
treatment 
programmes 
Average NPV per 
person = £3,390 
Average per 
person 
Estimated cost 
of cohort 
£20,000 
£13.5m 
 
£37,000 
£24.2m 
Feasibility Study p.30 
Detailed investigation of each proposed metric was undertaken.  Despite the high level of 
potential public sector savings, the intended crime metric was not proposed in the final 
model, due to difficulties in identifying attribution – because of the way it is recorded, crime 
data is not available for the defined cohort of rough sleepers.  The study concluded that 
crime and associated costs would be reduced on the basis of research evidence of a link 
between stable accommodation and offending.  But the metrics for the SIB had to be 
clearly defined, as simple as possible and objectively measured.  For similar reasons, a 
possible metric for positive social networks was not included. 
By modelling the pathways of different (‘inbetweener’) cohorts over time using CHAIN and 
other available data, baselines of expected achievement were created.  It was not possible 
to create a matched comparison group for the cohort – there is no equivalent of CHAIN in 
other UK cities and by definition it is a unique cohort within London.  As was outlined in 
section 3, attribution of outcome is essential in PbR (and SIB) structures.  Therefore 
baselines are extremely important because they provide the analysis of what is expected 
to be achieved without a specific (targeted) intervention.  For the SIB, they then provided 
the basis for modelling of what the proposed intervention might achieve and what 
payments for these outcomes could be made in recognition of expected savings. By linking 
payments based on achievements beyond the baseline expectations, the achievement of 
outcomes is incentivised.  This is an attempt to account for ‘deadweight’ – what would be 
achieved in the absence of the intervention and therefore what can be attributable to it as 
payment is only made when performance exceeds the baseline. 
The total costs per supported individual member of the cohort were calculated by 
estimating staff and other costs for delivering low and high intensity support through the 
Navigator model.  This gave indicative upper and lower levels of total costs – £11,600 per 
person, total cohort cost £7.6m (high intensity); £5,700 per person, total cohort cost £3.7m 
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(low intensity) – providing an average of £8,650 and £5.6m and suggesting a budget of 
£5m could achieve a high level of support across the cohort. 
The metrics devised are included in section Table 1.1 and provide: 
 A baseline of rough sleeping – the decline in rough sleeping that can be expected 
without a new intervention.  The minimum expected from providers was a 5% 
improvement on the baseline each quarter. 
 A measure of sustained accommodation – with payments on entry and then after 12 
and 18 months, driving a focus on sustained outcomes. 
 A measure of reconnection – agreed return to non-nationals’ home country, with 
payments on reconnection and when sustained for 6 months. 
 A measure of employability and employment – recognising volunteering as well as 
part-time and self-employment, with payments on entry and when sustained for 13 
weeks; and payment for NQF Level 2 or equivalent qualifications achieved. 
 A baseline of Accident and Emergency (A&E) admissions – the average use of A&E 
across the cohort with payments linked to reduced admissions below the baseline. 
4.2.2.2 The case for a SIB 
In a parallel activity, mirroring the earlier consultations with providers and stakeholders, 
Social Finance provided outline information to social investors to test the potential interest 
amongst them for investing in the SIB model as it was emerging.  These consultations 
similarly suggested a high level of interest in the model and the viability of a SIB as an 
outcomes-based approach funded by social investment. 
The feasibility study included a business case, presented by Social Finance in January 
2012, concluding that: 
 There was a clear social case for funding an intervention targeting the cohort – the 
outcomes for the group could be improved bringing savings to the high public sector 
costs associated with them; 
 An individualised support model of personal key workers – Navigators – would help 
the cohort access existing provision and resources, improving their outcomes; 
 Despite the wealth of evidence of need and potential savings there was not a robust 
evidenced model to commission for a complex set of interrelated outcomes and 
thus there would be a high level of risk that outcomes wouldn’t be achieved;  
 Rough sleeping providers would be best placed to manage this risk as they have 
the expertise and skills to model what can be achieved and then to deliver it through 
a flexible approach with outcomes-based payments; 
 Service providers should be supported and encouraged to use social investment to 
fully or partially fund services up front, potentially transferring implementation risk to 
investors and mitigating potential financial impediments they would face without 
working capital; and, 
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 Further consultation should inform an open procurement of the SIB, as this would 
refine and test the outcomes and associated metrics and enable providers to 
propose how the outcomes could be achieved and their costs for doing so. 
The feasibility study presented a SIB that was designed to provide the key elements of an 
effective model and to address the risks that were described in section 3: 
 Attributable outcomes that incentivise a long-term approach and mitigates against 
‘cherry picking’ by spreading reward across a baseline with payments linked to 
achievement across the cohort; 
 Flexibility for providers to develop and deliver an approach that works without being 
constrained by a prescribed intervention model measured by delivery outputs – with 
more than one provider commissioned;  
 Clarity of costs and rewards so that providers and social investors could be clear 
about the level of risk being transferred. 
But there was an important caveat: 
 The lack of a rigorous evidence base for the model and for understanding impact, 
providing additional risk in the assumptions of achievement. 
Included in the rationale for the SIB was the intention that it would result in a wider and 
deeper evidence base about what works as effective monitoring of outcomes and progress 
towards them would be incentivised. 
At the inception of the SIB development, one consideration was to directly commission an 
organisation to develop, procure and manage the SIB directly; this is the model of the 
HMP Peterborough SIB.  With the review by Social Finance concluding that the SIB should 
be put to open tender, and not directly commissioned from an intermediary such as 
themselves who would manage an SPV (see 3.3), their support contract was extended to: 
continue the development of the SIB PbR model; engage social investors and support 
providers to access social investment; and, support GLA in commissioning the SIB. In this 
way, similar but different functions were provided than those when acting as an 
intermediary but reflecting the need for specialist support across both commissioner and 
providers. 
A detailed business case for SIB funding was presented to HMT Treasury by DLCG in 
January 2012 and it was secured in February. In developing this business case, further 
modelling was undertaken using the metrics from the feasibility study to identify how the 
overall cost per individual could be split across the different outcomes.  This was 
complicated work to identify different scenarios that spread the payments across different 
models of what could be achieved from the baselines identified and what different scales 
of change could be achieved for intended outcomes.  The resultant model set minimum 
and maximum outcomes to be paid for across a cohort of 700 rough sleepers – a rounded 
approximation from the 653 identified in the study’s analysis of CHAIN.   
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How outcomes payments were proportioned 
The outcomes pot was allocated: 
 25% to the rough sleeping metric – the starting point of the 
outcomes pathway and allocated to reduce across time to incentivise 
and recognise the importance of higher achievement in the first year, 
reducing by year three; 
 40% to the accommodation metric – to incentivise the 
achievement of sustained accommodation and in recognition of this 
as central to successful outcomes across other metrics and at the 
heart of the model of sustained recovery pathways; 
 25% to the reconnection metric – to reflect the level of work 
required to achieve this outcome for the estimated proportion of the 
cohort to whom it would be appropriate; 
 5% to the employment metric – to reflect the low numbers likely to 
achieve the outcome but the high costs of supporting this; and, 
 5% to the health metric – to reflect the nature of the outcome as a 
baseline metric expected to be achieved as a consequence of 
support rather than the primary focus in itself for large numbers of 
the cohort.   
The final metrics and payment levels were to be developed through further consultation 
and the commissioning process.  They were the starting point, described by participants 
who contributed to the evaluation research as being based on a set of judgements linked 
to the analysis and consultation undertaken to that point in time.   
4.2.3 Further consultation  
Social Finance worked with DCLG and GLA to undertake further consultation with 
providers and stakeholders, to ‘sense test’ the model proposed.  It was presented to a 
range of convened meetings and to stakeholder forums including inter-agency groups 
maintained by GLA to share and coordinate homelessness and rough sleeping practice in 
London.  These consultations confirmed interest amongst providers in tendering for 
outcome-based contracts to deliver a Navigator model and to work with social investment.  
They also confirmed that the outcome areas and payment metrics were seen to be 
appropriate.  Four contracts were proposed, but this was revised to two contracts on the 
basis of feedback from providers about the viability of smaller contracts and values as well 
as the complexity of four providers’ Navigators working across the landscape of provision. 
A formal, open, service provider seminar was held in March 2012, with around 50 
organisations in attendance. This began the procurement process and attendees were 
provided with a briefing pack setting out the rationale, cohort and outcome metrics. A 
questionnaire was circulated after the seminar and both this and the discussions at the 
event itself ‘confirmed there was appetite in the market’ (GLA Participant).   
The SIB was well advertised across provider networks, building on the consultation that 
had taken place during the early development. Providers (both successful and 
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unsuccessful in tendering for the contract) who contributed to the evaluation research 
explained that the event addressed the ongoing concerns that they had prior to receiving 
fuller information.  They felt that, ‘we were part of it from the start’, that ‘the consultation 
was meaningful and our concerns were listened to’; and reported that ‘the SIB was well 
advertised.  Everybody knew about it.’ Concerns centred on how the PbR outcomes would 
be structured and how the contribution to the delivery of those outcomes by other agencies 
would be addressed in the metrics.  There were some concerns about PbR as a funding 
model for work with the cohort, and scepticism linked to a view that it ‘wouldn’t reflect the 
realities of working with this group’ (Provider).  Overall the event was reported by providers 
who contributed to the evaluation research as addressing these concerns and providing all 
the background to, and information about, the SIB in a clear way. 
4.3 Commissioning the SIB 
Commissioning the SIB involved two strands of interrelated activity, with Social Finance 
continuing to support DCLG and GLA.  GLA were the commissioning body for the SIB with 
DCLG providing £5m funding for the outcomes based contract.  Social Finance guided 
GLA on the expectations and requirements of investors in the contracting process as well 
as providers who submitted tenders.  They also provided ongoing support to the 
development of final metrics and payments. 
Provider stakeholders who bid for the SIB contracts (both successful and unsuccessful) 
were clear that they had no hesitation in deciding to tender.  Most organisations who 
submitted tenders had some prior experience of PbR, but none had experience of social 
investment.  Whilst decisions were formally taken by senior management teams and the 
presented to Trustees for final agreement, all stakeholders were clear about the strategic 
importance of the contracts, despite some initial concerns (discussed below) about both 
PbR and social investment.  
‘There was no question of us not bidding for this.  We didn’t need the funding it was more 
reputational.  We just had to go for it’. (Provider) 
The strategic importance of the SIB contracts for providers 
All of the provider stakeholders who contributed to the evaluation research 
were clear about their rationale for entering the tendering process for the 
SIB: the strategic importance of the contract.  There were different, 
interrelated aspects to this: 
 The importance for them as key providers of rough sleeping and 
homelessness provision in London to be seen to be willing to deliver 
the SIB; 
 The importance of winning a key contract for delivery of rough 
sleeping and homelessness provision in London; 
 The opportunity to learn from the development and delivery of a PbR 
contract, with this seen as an feature of future commissioning 
models;  
 The opportunity to learn from the engagement with social investors 
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both for this SIB and for future SIBs or social investment 
opportunities.   
Although the total potential value of the contracts is £2.49m for each successful provider, 
all of the short-listed organisations described the value of the contract as small in relation 
to their overall turnover and scale of contracts delivered.  It was the strategic value that 
was described as the driver of their participation.  
4.3.1 Competitive dialogue: a process for commissioning complexity 
A ‘competitive dialogue’ process was used to commission the SIB.  Local authority and 
GLA social support services are usually commissioned using standard procedures under 
‘Part B’ of the EU public procurement regulations.67  ‘Part B’ services are commonly health 
and social care services, for which there is no requirement to advertise on an EU wide 
basis.  The EU regulations permit the use of a ‘competitive dialogue’ procedure whereby, 
following an initial tender submission, the commissioner can enter into separate, 
confidential discussions with short-listed providers.  The commissioning authority for GLA 
is Transport for London (TfL), where the competitive dialogue procedure is associated with 
large infra-structure projects.  The use of competitive dialogue for a service intervention of 
this type was new but experienced GLA commissioners worked with TfL to design the 
process.  A competitive dialogue process was seen to be important because it enabled a 
dialogue with short listed providers, from an initial open call, about complex issues 
including the multiple outcomes and metrics.  It was agreed that a competitive dialogue 
process would help both commissioners and providers ensure that viable, high quality 
tenders were developed, with attention focused on those with the capacity and capability 
to win the contract and deliver the SIB interventions. 
Following the marketing seminar in March 2012, a ‘Selection for Dialogue Questionnaire’ 
(SDQ) was issued, inviting outline proposals of the delivery model – an initial ‘service 
solution’ – alongside information commonly used in a Pre-Qualification Questionnaire 
(PQQ) to select appropriate organisations for a full tender.  A PQQ is often used for a two 
stage tender, but it does not support a competitive dialogue.  The process was intended to 
address the potential for high interest in the SIB. The service solution required an outline 
of how the SIB outcomes would be achieved. 
 ‘The idea was that we could then select down to half a dozen providers on the basis of 
this initial service solution, and then they could revise that as they went through the 
competitive dialogue’ (GLA Participant). 
In the event, eight submissions were received and on the basis of marks achieved in the 
formal evaluation and marking against organisational viability and the proposed solution, 
five organisations were issued with the ITT mid-April 2012, with submissions for the 
competitive dialogue required one month later (mid-May 2012).  Providers who had not 
submitted tenders for the SIB and who participated in the evaluation research as wider 
stakeholders explained that they did not enter the process due to the breadth of expertise 
required and their more limited focus. 
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The five shortlisted providers were then invited to the first competitive dialogue meeting (of 
three) to discuss their tender submission, in the third week of May.  Meetings were held 
with each of the five providers in turn.  A panel from GLA and DCLG met with them to ask 
questions about the proposed approach and to answer questions about what was 
required.  It provided an opportunity to discuss the proposed metrics and tariffs and both 
providers and commissioners described the process as a two-way engagement.   
Subsequent competitive dialogue meetings were held two and then four weeks (across 
May and June), to further develop the model each provider intended to submit in their final 
tender and the final procurement requirements.  These later dialogue meetings also 
explored the progress with securing social investment and the financial models providers 
were intending to use to structure the SIB.  The original timetable was amended slightly to 
allow for more time for development between dialogue meetings. 
The process produced refinements rather than substantial changes, but those involved 
who participated in the evaluation research agreed that it enabled both commissioners and 
providers to develop confidence: for commissioners, that high quality tenders would be 
submitted; for providers, that they knew what was expected and could develop their initial 
plan to meet the requirements of commissioners. 
Alongside this process, GLA and DLCG facilitated meetings between the short-listed 
providers and stakeholders from some of the key London boroughs so that concerns that 
they held could be addressed and considered in the delivery models.  These concerns 
centred around how the models would work with existing provision – primarily outreach 
teams commissioned by the boroughs to support rough sleepers – and concerns about 
what an outcomes focus may mean for their clients – such as inappropriate interventions 
linked to outcomes rather than client needs.  These were not uniformly held and not all of 
the concerns were perceived by those boroughs to have been addressed.  But 
stakeholders accepted that the SIB was going to be provided and that all would need to 
work together for the benefit of the cohort. 
4.3.2 Engaging social investors 
4.3.2.1 Market Information Day 
Once the short-listed providers had been invited to enter the competitive dialogue process, 
they attended a pre-arranged ‘Market Information Day’ soon after the first meeting.  The 
event has been referred to by many stakeholders in the SIB who contributed to the 
research as a ‘Dragons Den’ event, in that it provided a forum for short-listed providers to 
‘pitch’ their ideas to a group of investors.  But this creates a misleading impression as the 
event was not intended to be similar to the eponymous television programme, despite the 
appeal of the comparison.  The event was not intended to result in agreed financing nor 
agreements that these would be reached between any parties. 
Building on their initial consultations with social investors, Social Finance had circulated 
information about the SIB once funding had been secured by DCLG through their business 
case and when the commissioning process had begun.  This awareness raising included 
information about the forthcoming ‘Market Information Day’ and details were widely 
circulated.  Social Finance also met with each of the short-listed providers to discuss with 
them investor expectations. 
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Views of the day were mixed amongst the participants in the evaluation research.  This 
appears in part to be linked to the different expectations people had about the event in 
terms of what it might achieve in itself.  The format provided an opportunity for each of the 
five short-listed providers to present to the room of investors attending.  Presentations 
covered the organisation, their background and expertise; and, their intervention model 
and ability to deliver the outcomes.  Each provider had a thirty minute slot to make their 
presentation and including time for questions from the floor.   
Some of the evaluation research participants from providers who presented at the event 
found it disappointing – they reported that there was less opportunity for engagement with 
investors than they expected and limited questions asked of them.  They also reported a 
perception that some of the potential investors in attendance were there to find out about 
the development of the SIB rather than to consider potential investment.   There was no 
formal networking; the design of the event purposefully kept the provider organisations 
separate from each other.  A minority thought it was a useful opportunity to position 
themselves as credible organisations and as the basis for further conversations to follow 
this introduction, including for investment opportunities beyond the SIB. 
Social investors – who both did and didn’t invest in the SIB – who participated in the 
research also had mixed views.  They also felt that there had not been enough time to 
discuss providers’ models in the time provided. Some reported that because the event 
would be attended by potential investors unlikely to take an inherent interest forward, 
discussions could not take place until the ‘field had thinned out.’  Similarly, a minority 
thought it was useful in providing an initial introduction to the providers as organisations 
and their credibility in delivering the SIB and thus for investment and as the basis for 
subsequent discussions. 
‘We thought it was good because it’s important that there is an open showcase in 
engaging investors.  It’s good to hear providers pitching.  I think as always with these 
events, the really valuable stuff comes afterwards’. (Social Investor) 
Suggestions for improving future events included:  
 The development of a prospectus by providers that could be circulated in advance 
as the basis for more detailed discussion – this was something that providers 
developed after the event as they subsequently met with and held discussions with 
social investors to explore and secure investment; and, 
 Longer sessions to enable a fuller discussion – one investor described a recent 
event where there had been an hour and a half for each provider. 
4.3.2.2 Provider and investor negotiations 
There were two broad models of subsequent negotiation between short-listed providers 
and potential social investors.  One provider decided early on in the process that they 
would self-finance the SIB contract – this is returned to below. 
One model was provider-led (three providers).  Providers contacted social investors who 
had attended the Market Information Day, circulating their presentation and asking to 
meet.  They also contacted investors who hadn’t attended – identified through existing 
contacts where these were in place. For most of the providers these weren’t extensive and 
were linked to previous discussions exploring social investment to differing degrees prior 
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to the SIB.  One senior provider stakeholder described their links with investors as being a 
result of ‘working my contacts book hard’.  Another route was through internet research. 
In this model, providers spent time holding initial ‘in principle’ discussions to explore 
investor interest and then moving to more detailed negotiations where appropriate.  The 
negotiations with investors were different according to their different interests and their 
different views of the SIB and the provider’s model.  This was described by providers as 
extremely time consuming.  All investors required a wealth of information about the 
providers’ financial standing, their track record in delivering contracts to support rough 
sleepers and address homelessness in London, and their planned delivery model including 
initial plans for outcomes over time and thus associated payments and cash-flow.  Despite 
these detailed negotiations, they remained exploratory discussions.  The final processes 
for securing investment are returned to below.  In parallel, and in light of these 
discussions, providers made adjustments to their models. There was a high degree of 
interplay between investors’ interests in their prospective returns (ability to achieve 
payments and rates of return), social impacts and amendments to the model providers 
made. 
‘Investors have to buy into the judgement you make as a provider and what that means for 
their investment and their return.’ (Provider) 
Investors are generalists, interested in social outcomes rather than being sector specific.  
They therefore spent a lot of time learning about the providers, their past performance, 
ethos and credibility.  Staff from two investors (separately) accompanied one of the 
providers’ outreach teams on a night-shift to enable them to get a better understanding of 
the way in which support was delivered to the cohort and other rough sleepers.  As well as 
being a new and innovative form of service contracting for commissioners, the SIB was a 
new and innovative investment product for social investors.  After HMP Peterborough, 
SIBs had been developed by DWP Social Investment Fund but the London Homelessness 
SIB remained new and with unique features linked to the nature of the cohort, the multiple 
outcomes, the nature of the intervention and the open commissioning process.  Time was 
spent conducting ‘high level’ due diligence as outlined here, but the more thorough work 
did not take place until contracts had been awarded (returned to below).   
Social investors’ interest in the SIB 
All of the social investors who participated in the evaluation research 
highlighted: 
 The potential strategic importance to them of the SIB – as a high 
profile and complex example of a new pilot product; 
 The importance of the clear potential for social impact – with social 
outcomes the key driver in deciding whether or not to consider the 
suitability of a product for investment; 
 The attraction of outcome based contracts in offering providers the 
flexibility to deliver services that they deemed to be effective – 
incentivising performance based on provider expertise rather than 
providing a rigid specification; and, 
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 The risk and uncertainty inherent in the SIB – as with providers there 
were concerns about how the PbR structure would work in practice, 
whether or not the models would achieve their targets and therefore 
the difficulty of assessing risk. 
The second model was that taken by one provider (St Mungo’s) who early on in the 
process, following the Market Information Day, agreed with Triodos bank that they would 
act as an intermediary.  Triodos is one of the few stakeholders in the SIB landscape with 
experience of taking this role – which was discussed in section 3.3.    
Triodos held discussions with three of the providers during this early phase, before 
agreeing to work with St Mungo’s.  For a fixed fee, Triodos were able to prepare the 
information investors required, liaise with them on St Mungo’s behalf and provide a high 
level of support with negotiations as well as with the development of the model taking 
place in parallel.  Investors were positive about the role Triodos played as it reduced 
aspects of the work that they needed to undertake; information they expected was 
presented in the form that they required.  The decision to work together was a decision 
taken by both parties – for St Mungo’s, to pay an intermediary to advise and support their 
tender and development of the SIB financing structure; for Triodos, to work with a provider 
likely to be successful.    
From the outset, St Mungo’s and Triodos took the decision to develop an SPV to contract 
and deliver the SIB.  Other providers, working without an agreed intermediary, were 
unsure about the costs associated.  Although negotiations were ongoing: one provider 
ruled an SPV out on the basis of cost; and, two providers intended to establish an SPV but 
had not secured an intermediary.  A fifth provider intended to self-finance the contract. 
Providers found the specialist of support of Social Finance to be important, helping them to 
understand investor expectations as well as terminology, particularly in the early stages. 
For the second and then third competitive dialogue meetings, an increasing focus of the 
commissioner’s inquiry was the progress with securing social finance and the level of 
financial risk providers were taking themselves, including for the provider developing a 
self-financed model. 
4.3.3 Developing the PbR 
At the heart of the competitive dialogue process and the negotiation with investors was the 
development of providers’ delivery models for the PbR structure of the SIB. 
Developing the PbR model involved providers working through different scenarios of what 
different size staff teams could achieve in terms of the outcomes specified.  This was 
complex and time consuming work. The providers used the indicative cohort provided – 
700 split across two contracts – to make judgements about the likely progress to outcomes 
by different groups.  Modelling involved exploring different outcome achievements with 
different overheads and what this would mean for cash flow across the contract and for 
final outcome payments.  In this way, risk is identified.  Discussions with investors involved 
providing models for expected, over and underachievement (upside and downside) and 
what that would mean for outcome payments and thus investor return.  It involved 
identifying what cash flow would be required for the set-up and then delivery of the SIB 
and how this would be managed alongside making investor returns. 
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Although the SIB intervention model was developed through consultation and was based 
on evidence and views of effective practice for the cohort, the PbR structure and the focus 
on the cohort was new and, ultimately, the models were matters of judgement.  A further 
complicating factor was that, whilst CHAIN is a strong source of data, it is not 
comprehensive in terms of the PbR outcomes and there was a degree of uncertainty about 
the scale of need and vulnerability of those in the final cohort when it was drawn.  The 
cohort was defined by their rough sleeping and although modelling of the cohort over time 
suggested a degree of commonality, this did not relate to comprehensive data about 
support needs and judgements were required about the nature of the group and the issues 
to address to achieve the outcomes.   
All of the providers described the rough sleeping, accommodation and reconnection 
outcomes as key – reflecting the design of the PbR and the payments associated with 
them.  Employment was recognised as an extremely challenging outcome to achieve due 
to the nature of the target group and the barriers entrenched rough sleepers face; health 
was viewed as an extra rather than core source of funding and difficult to predict and 
manage.  The number of individuals in the cohort increased from c.550 when the 
Feasibility Study was commissioned to c.700 at the time of ‘Selection for Dialogue’. This 
was an indicator of uncertainty and hence the challenge providers may face, for them and 
also for investors (returned to below). 
The competitive dialogue process provided an opportunity for both GLA as commissioners 
and the providers to review the proposed models, including the level of ambition GLA 
expected to see.  It was also a forum to clarify issues around the outcome metrics, the way 
in which they would be evidenced and the payments associated with them.  An ongoing 
consideration was how outcomes would be attributed and paid.  The reconnection 
outcome payment was raised slightly, for instance, in recognition of the work required. 
There was also discussion of the evidential requirements for outcomes, and how outcomes 
could be documented.  Ultimately, for everyone involved in the process of model 
development and competitive dialogue, this was a detailed process of review and 
amendment to settle on core scenarios.   
GLA provided a pre-populated spreadsheet of outcomes and payments for modelling 
achievement and cash-flow.  This also enabled them as commissioners to see and 
compare the levels of ambition across the models through the competitive dialogue 
process in a uniform way.  Providers found this a useful tool, although the content relied on 
their judgements.  The providers had knowledge of members of the expected cohort 
through their existing services and this also contributed to ‘a good starting point for 
understanding what outcomes are achievable’. (Provider).  Nonetheless, developing the 
models was ‘one of the most difficult aspects… and ultimately a stab in the dark’ 
(Provider).  
The modelling was led by senior staff in the provider organisations – directors of finance, 
operations and senior managers.  Although there was experience of PbR amongst some 
of the providers, the process was time-consuming and demanding.  Whilst providers 
anticipated that the process would take longer than a ‘standard’ contract tendering 
process, it exceeded their expectations.  For instance, one Director of Finance estimated 
that it had taken more than ten days of their time, in contrast to a few hours for a standard 
approach.  Nonetheless, whether successful in winning the SIB contract or not, all provider 
stakeholders considered the process to have provided invaluable learning about 
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structuring PbR delivery models and (for the four exploring social investment) in 
understanding and meeting social investors’ requirements. 
One provider explained that as a consequence, despite their track record and confidence 
in the data and assumptions used as the basis of their models they have ‘professionalised 
our approach to mapping and predicting outcomes.  We had not done anything like this 
before.’ 
4.4 Procuring the SIB contracts 
Following three rounds of competitive dialogue meetings, the final ITT was issued to the 
short-listed providers at the end of July 2012.  This was slightly later than originally 
planned, due to the extended periods between the competitive dialogue meetings and as 
final details of the commissioner’s requirements were devised. The ITT provided final 
details of the metrics, evidential requirements and payment levels.  It also provided the 
final cohort which had increased to 831.  There was a clear view amongst providers that 
the ITT was well designed and developed through the competitive dialogue process.  The 
providers were given five weeks - to the end of August – to prepare the final submissions, 
building on the competitive dialogue materials.  Crucially, the final financial models were to 
be agreed. 
4.4.1 Awarding the SIB contract 
Four tenders were received in response to the ITT.  One of the short-listed providers who 
participated in competitive dialogue withdrew from the process – linked in part to their 
discussions with investors.  The influence of investors and the process of securing 
investment is returned to below. 
The tenders were evaluated against a range of criteria.  The precise detail of the 
assessment categories and weighting will not be repeated here.  But the key themes and 
parameters are important to understand.  The tenders were judged for both the numbers of 
outcomes that they proposed to deliver across the cohort and the discount they provided 
on the maximum tariffs (the amount paid per outcome).  This was a technical, marked 
assessment with scores attributed to each tender according to their ranking of higher 
outcomes and lower tariffs.  They were also judged in qualitative way for the credibility of 
their delivery model.  This included the way in which the cohort would be contacted, 
assessed, engaged and supported to achieve the outcomes appropriate to them.  In this 
way, a balance was achieved in assessing the interrelationship between how achievable 
the outcomes were in each model, the ambition of the providers to achieve outcomes and 
the value for money that was provided. Aspects of the tender that were assessed included 
proposals for working with partners, the way in which outcomes would be monitored and 
performance management. 
A version of the modelling tool previously provided by GLA, designed by Social Finance, 
for the competitive dialogue was also provided for completion as part of the tender.  This 
provided the format for presenting the modelled achievement of outcomes over time, the 
targets (ambition) set by the provider and the discounts on the tariffs.  It also required a 
summary of how the SIB would be financed and investments repaid.  This spreadsheet 
calculated the cash flow that would be required to set up and fund delivery until payments 
were received, working cash flow required across the contract including to meet finance 
repayments, took account both of the providers’ balance sheet including reserves, and any 
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finance they were contributing themselves.  It provided two key pass/fail criteria for the 
tenders – the financial viability of their tender; and, the financial risk that they were taking.   
A contract was awarded to St Mungo’s and another to Thames Reach.  The two 
unsuccessful tenders were: One provider, judged to be taking too much financial risk – 
they did not have 100% finance secured in principle – and having too high a cost; and 
another provider, which scored lower marks than the successful providers on the delivery 
model proposed.  Social investment was not a requirement of the contract, but both St 
Mungo’s and Thames Reach (and others except the self-financed model) felt it was 
important to demonstrate the willingness to work with this finance in the delivery of the 
SIB.  
4.4.2 Securing social investment 
A SIB ‘is a marriage of two contracts – it’s an outcomes based contract from the 
commissioner and an outcomes based investment from a social investor’ (Social Finance). 
One key challenge for commissioning the SIB was the need to align the award of contract 
with the final investment models as closely as possible so that delivery could begin as 
planned on 1st November.  This was the second SIB to be procured through open tender.  
GLA provided a standard letter of intent, devised by Social Finance, for providers to 
include in their tender to indicate the ‘in principle’ support of social investors.  This was 
because investors were not able to commit to investment until the contract(s) had been 
awarded.  Unlike other SIBs, investors could not be certain about what they would be 
investing in until the contract was issued, notwithstanding all of the preparatory work done 
by them and in discussion with providers across the competitive dialogue.  
Social investors that contributed to the evaluation research explained that the potential for 
the SIB to achieve a high level of social impact was a key driver of their interest.  But as 
investors they must receive a return on their funds.   Thus the rationale and function 
discussed in section 3 was confirmed.  Although there is this common ethos and function 
to social investors, all have their own characteristics and organisational structures.  In this 
way, no two investors are alike and each have their own institutional priorities and 
decision-making processes.  In discussions for the SIB, this was borne out in the 
negotiations that providers had with investors during the competitive dialogue process and 
then the full and detailed due diligence undertaken subsequent to the award of contracts. 
Examples of differences in social investor decision making 
One illustration of the differences between investors is the structures that 
they have for making the decision to invest. Three examples from investors 
engaged in SIB negotiations are provided below. 
 Investor A – have a two stage committee process.  Prior to this, a 
first level of due diligence is undertaken to understand the 
opportunity, the market and the risk.  At the first stage, an approval 
committee considers and identifies key risks for further due diligence 
to address.  Following further and comprehensive due diligence, a 
second stage committee will review the analysis and finalise terms 
for the proposed investment.  A formal final stage is then undertaken 
to agree the investment in line with the second stage committee’s 
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terms. 
 Investor B – require an initial online application form to be 
completed, which is scored. Additional information is then requested 
and a detailed assessment process enacted and a report prepared.  
This is then reviewed by a credit control team who examine the 
proposed terms and conditions.  With their approval the report is 
presented to the Investment Committee, where the provider seeking 
investment is invited to present and take questions on their proposal.  
A decision is then made (usually immediately) and terms and 
conditions provided for the release of funds. 
 Investor C – an investment team undertake a financial and social 
impact assessment of any opportunity as the basis for a decision to 
proceed with due diligence.  Due diligence is then undertaken, 
commonly commissioned by an external provider.  An assessment is 
then made of the findings of the due diligence and a 
recommendation made to the independent Investment Committee.  
A decision is taken, with terms and conditions for the investment 
agreed. 
As noted above, investors investigated the providers’ track records and undertook a range 
of activities and engaged in a range of discussions with provider senior stakeholders 
during the competitive dialogue process.  Yet this was limited to an ‘in principle’ decision to 
invest and was dependent upon a subsequent full due diligence procedure including a 
review of the contract awarded.  This due diligence was time consuming for investors and 
providers, requiring a high amount of detailed review.  For St Mungo’s, Triodos played a 
crucial role in brokering these discussions and investigations, reducing the burden on 
investors and St Mungo’s alike.  
Both St Mungo’s and Thames Reach included their own funding in their SIB models, which 
investors found attractive as it showed their confidence and their willingness to share the 
risk. 
4.4.2.1 Agreeing a contract 
With guidance from Social Finance, GLA included a model contract with the ITT and this 
was adapted from a standard procurement to reflect the nature of the SIB as an outcomes-
based contract.  The contract was new to all parties and negotiations were expected.  A 
detailed review of the contract was not undertaken by investors until it had been issued to 
the successful providers, due to the resources that this committed.  The review by lawyers 
appointed by Triodos provided what GLA commissioners described as ‘pages and pages 
of comments’, some of which were considered negotiable but others that were considered 
to apply to clauses required and standard to public sector commissioning.  In their 
intermediary role, Triodos brokered negotiation so that compromise could be reached.  A 
key area was around break-clauses for poor performance.  Standard contract breaks in 
output based delivery or indeed PbR where there is not social investment were not 
appropriate as investors need a level of security or else their risk is increased.  These 
discussions benefited both contracted organisations, in meeting investor expectations.  
Additional time was required in agreeing the contract with Thame’s Reach (January 2013) 
than with St Mungo’s SPV (December 2012) due to the work required by the former to 
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negotiate across multiple investors without an intermediary role. But, without an 
intermediary and SPV structure, Thames Reach saved on contract value spent on core 
costs.  
All of the investors engaged by Triodos in the competitive dialogue process went on to 
invest.  This was not the case for all of the investors who were in discussion with Thames 
Reach. 
4.4.2.2 A risky context 
For Thames Reach, the due diligence undertaken by a key ‘in principle’ investor led to 
their decision not to invest.  It was not until the contract had been awarded that the 
investor evaluated what they described as ‘the underlying assumptions’ and thus the risk 
in detail.  The investor was proposing a loan with interest payments linked to performance.  
Thames Reach were investing some of their own funds, indicating their willingness to hold 
some of the risk, and had what the investor considered to be a healthy balance sheet.  The 
investor was happy with this proposal rather than an SPV and the associated costs this 
brought to the contract.  A key consideration in assessing risk was understanding the 
context for the SIB model.  These concerns were not unique to this investor but it was an 
important factor in their decision to withdraw their offer of investment. 
There were two aspects to the context that presented a risk to investors.  One was the 
nature of the cohort.  The cohort is by definition a heterogeneous and highly vulnerable 
group.  The cohort increased during the process of SIB development from an initial 650 to 
750 (competitive dialogue) to 831 (ITT) and this increased the uncertainty for investors 
about the ability of providers to deliver on the outcomes proposed.  On the other side of 
this, the increased cohort offered the potential for increased social outcomes and for 
increased outcome payments and returns.  These increased potential returns had to be 
balanced by the increased risk of non-achievement.  This assessment of risk influenced 
the amounts investors were willing to commit and the levels of return that they sought. 
The second contextual factor to risk assessment was the reliance of the SIB on the 
existing landscape of provision.  Investors were concerned about changes to this network 
of services that may result from welfare reform and local authority budget cuts.  The 
concerns were: 
 There may be changes in the social economic context due to welfare reform that 
resulted in an increase in rough sleepers and those at risk of homelessness; this 
would in turn increase pressure on services and their capacity, including to support 
members of the cohort as part of the personalised pathways negotiated by 
Navigators.   
 Changes to budget cuts may impact upon the services available, reducing funding 
available and individual service capacity to support rough sleepers and those at risk 
of homelessness; there may be direct service cuts reducing the network provision 
available or similarly creating a higher demand on services that were in place and 
consequently their ability to support cohort’s pathways. 
 For some investors there were concerns about the metrics and the data that was 
used to understand the cohort and the confidence that investors could have in the 
expected performance of the providers. 
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These were issues raised by both those investors that did invest and those that were in 
negotiation with but did not invest in the providers.  It was part of their assessment of risk 
and ultimately their faith in the organisations; the level of their investment, the structure of 
the finance and the rates of return were all balanced.  The strategic importance of the SIB 
as a pilot product and the potential for high social outcomes were high motivating factors in 
the willingness to take the risk assessed for those that decided to investment.   
‘For us, the social impact needs to compensate for the financial risk we’re taking.  In this 
case, we think it does.’ (Investor) 
4.4.2.3 Structuring the investment 
The final structure of the two SIB models was a result of the negotiations throughout the 
competitive dialogue and then contracting phases.  The structure of the two providers’ SIB 
models is presented in section 1.1.3, Figure 1.1. 
4.4.2.3.1 An SPV 
For St Mungo’s, Triodos had worked with them to develop the SPV model since the outset 
of their agreement.  The SPV was decided upon as it would hold the contract and hence 
the risk as the ‘standard’ SIB model.  St Mungo’s were also interested in the learning that 
the SPV might provide for future contracts.  Triodos worked with institutional investors, 
seeking a lead investor whom other investors could have confidence in.  Charities Aid 
Foundation Venturesome agreed to be lead investor and as a result took the lead in 
negotiations brokered by Triodos.  A second institutional investor (Orp Foundation) was 
also secured.  After consulting with a range of institutional investors, Triodos then 
contacted a number of high net-worth individuals working with them on other investments.  
Most of these individuals were reported to be more interested in lower risk products.  
However, there was some interest and three private individuals took the decision to invest.  
The SPV is viewed by investors who contributed to the evaluation research as an 
appropriate way to manage their risk.  
St Mungo’s have an equity investment in the SPV and the other investors received bonds.  
The equity investment is at risk before the bonds, providing an additional assurance for the 
social investors; in this way some of the risk is shared.  St Mungo’s and the two 
institutional social investors have representatives on the SPV Board. The Board meet 
every six weeks to review performance and manage the contract with St Mungo’s.  More 
informal updates are shared between the meetings. The investors have the annual interest 
rate they have set paid quarterly, with the principal sum repaid after the end of the contract 
once all potential sustained outcomes have been achieved.  The rate of return cannot be 
reported due to commercial confidentiality; but it is around the mid-point of the range of 
SIB rates reported.68   Although the rate of interest is higher than is available from a high 
street bank for other products, the risk of the SIB investment, its nature as a pilot product 
and the high due diligence costs makes this an appropriate rate of return in the view of 
investors.   
                                            
 
68
 Big Society Capital (2013), Social Investment Compendium: portfolio of research and intelligence on the 
social investment market, p8 
http://www.bigsocietycapital.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Social%20Investment%20Market%20Compendium%2
0Oct%202013%20small_0.pdf  
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‘I don’t think anyone is adequately able to price this. I think because SIBs are an untested 
model it’s very difficult to ascertain the credit risk. […] A t the moment, there is simply not 
enough evidence to do so.’ (Investor) 
There are mixed views of the SPV amongst those involved.  The investors see it as 
appropriate for managing the contract and for limiting the risk to them and St Mungo’s.  
They also see it as providing a simple structure.  The rate of return is seen as appropriate 
by all parties, in that it reflects the nature of the investment as new and in line with the 
investors’ assessment of risk.  In initial negotiations some investors were proposing 
returns of twice that agreed in the final structure.  For some participants in the research 
from St Mungo’s, whilst it has been a successful model there are concerns about the high 
costs that were associated with establishing it.  
4.4.2.4 A mixed equity and loan structure 
Although Thames Reach explored the possibility of an SPV, there were concerns about 
whether the level of fees involved was proportional for the size of the contract.  They also 
identified social investors early on in the process who were interested in investing without 
an SPV structure.  Senior staff at Thames Reach had an existing relationship with one 
investor (Big Issue Invest) and this facilitated early meetings.  Networks also led to initial 
discussions with another key social investor (SEIF, set up by the Department of Health to 
invest in social enterprises providing health and social care services in England).  There 
were also ongoing discussions until late in the process with an investor who withdrew late 
in the process, outlined above.   
Each of the investors required individual negotiations in line with their differing structures.  
There were also different terms agreed with each, with negotiations changing in light of 
increased finance required once the in principle investor withdrew.  For all, the reputation 
of Thames Reach as a provider, their track record, their strong balance sheet and their 
willingness to invest their own equity was key to assessing the risk. 
With one (SEIF), an unsecured loan is provided at a rate lower than their standard terms, 
with interest paid quarterly and the principle investment repaid at the end of the contract.  
There was also a small revenue grant, in line with the terms set by the DoH who 
established the fund. For this investor, the primary concern was assessing the ability of the 
provider to deliver the outcomes, rather than the detail of the metrics and payment tariffs 
which were regarded by them as the concern of the provider and commissioner in 
contracting. 
The other key investor (Big Issue Invest), was committed to supporting investment and 
innovation in homelessness and rough sleeping services.  As with other investors, they 
had concerns about the availability of data and the social context but the social impact 
provided the motivation to find a structure that would work for them and support a decision 
to invest.  The SIB was their first PbR investment and there was an interest in investing in 
the SIB on this basis – learning from PbR – as well as a concern about SPV structures due 
to their cost.  Big Issue Invest also expressed a preference for being closer to the 
investment than the intermediary broker model allows.  This investor provides both equity 
and loan financing, including ‘mezzanine financing’ which provides a loan with the right to 
take equity if the loan is not repaid in full.  The investment decision was to provide an 
unsecured loan as this would be less based on performance and thus could be provided at 
a lower interest rate.  The return rate agreed is the same rate as the other, with a further 
percentage linked to the performance and outcome payments achieved.  The primary 
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rates of interest on these loans are less than that paid by the SPV.  The additional return 
rate that is linked to performance takes it above this rate.  This is lower than the standard 
rates provided by this investor but was made because of the close fit of the SIB aims with 
the investor’s and their view of the potential for significant social impacts.  As a condition of 
their loan, the investor required a place on the Board of Thames Reach so that there could 
be a direct link between them and the management of the contract delivery.  
In addition to these loans, Thames Reach secured a grant to support the reconnection 
outcomes.  This grant was provided from a Trust with existing links with Thames Reach 
and to support them in achieving a successful financial model. Thames Reach also have 
an equity investment in the SIB which is at risk before the loans (similar to St Mungo’s 
equity in the SPV). 
Because the loans are unsecured, in this structure both Thames Reach and the investors 
share the risk.  The level of due diligence undertaken before the loans were provided 
reflects the level of risk the investors consider there to be. 
4.5 Summary 
Contracts were signed in December (St Mungo’s) and January (Thames Reach) although 
delivery began close to the November start date and this is the focus of the next section 
(5). 
This section has presented an overview of the process from initial identification of an 
opportunity for a SIB to provide a new intervention for addressing rough sleeping in 
London to the signing of contracts with two providers, each with their own investment 
structures.  The key themes are: 
 The importance of the substantial stakeholder consultation undertaken in 
developing the model – in terms of ensuring there was market interest and in using 
stakeholder engagement to refine the proposal so that there was a viable model for 
commissioners (at all levels of government), providers and investors alike; 
 The importance of a thorough design phase that reviewed the evidence base and 
proposed an effective intervention model drawing on best practice to promote 
innovation in delivery; 
 The core requirement of a transparent, detailed model that had credible outcomes 
and metrics that could be further developed through consultation and negotiation. 
This further development is necessary for a complex and innovative PbR structure 
to be viable; 
 The limits of the evidence base available, the difficulties in assessing risk that this 
created for providers and investors and the resultant informed judgements that were 
the basis of intervention models and investment decisions driven by a desire to 
achieve social impacts;  
 The strengths of the competitive dialogue process, which while not creating 
significant change in any of the models reviewed did provide the opportunity for a 
two-way refinement and clarification of performance expectations and associated 
metrics including evidential requirements; 
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 The complexity of negotiations with investors and the strengths and weaknesses of 
both intermediary and provider-led processes.  Investors are motivated by the 
potential for both social outcomes and the returns that their investment can achieve. 
But they are not a homogenous group and all make their own assessment of risk.  
This can be facilitated through the role of an intermediary body, with associated 
costs; 
 Investors required time for, and needed to commit resources to, the due diligence 
necessary before making an investment and this presented a challenge to the 
commissioning time line.  Investors were not ready to commit the resources 
necessary to assessing risk until they were able to be certain that providers had 
been successful; 
 The development of the SIB required a high level of investment from all 
stakeholders –DCLG in developing the model; GLA in developing and undertaking a 
new commissioning structure; providers in developing a tender for a PbR contract 
(including within the commissioning structure); providers and investors in 
negotiating and agreeing investment; 
 The strategic interest of providers and investors in the SIB as a new and pilot 
product that will provide learning for future commissioning and investment 
opportunities.  As an early example the SIB, as with others, has required a degree 
of subsidy to support it. 
 The commissioning process has been successful in procuring two providers, with a 
range of social investors and a sharing of risk between providers and investors.  
Although there was a single procurement process and set of requirements there are 
two very different structures, demonstrating the diversity of SIB models.   
 The development of the SIB fits with best practice criteria that have been proposed 
for SIB products (structure identified above at 3.6.4 and amended below as Table 
4.2) 
Table 4.2 How the development of the SIB met suggested best practice 
Feasibility 
Criteria 
Key questions London 
Homelessness 
SIB Process 
Policy success  Is there a clearly defined SIB 
target population? 
 Are there measurable SIB 
outcomes? 
 Are there innovative 
interventions that are not used 
today? 
 Can a counterfactual be 
measured? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Feasibility 
Criteria 
Key questions London 
Homelessness 
SIB Process 
Provider market  Are there providers/ delivery 
partners that would be able to 
deliver the programme? 
 Is there a workable structure 
for the delivery model? 
 
 
 
 
Financial case  Is there a financial case from a 
commissioner’s perspective? 
 Is there a financial case from 
an investor’s perspective? 
 Is there a workable 
commercial model from a 
provider perspective? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholder 
support 
 Do staff support the SIB 
project? 
 Do the target population 
support the SIB interventions 
and project? 
 
 
 
 
The evaluation of the SIB will provide learning for commissioners, providers and investors 
engaged, but also for wider stakeholders across these groups.  The learning to date is 
discussed in section Error! Reference source not found.. 
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5 Delivering the London homelessness SIB 
5.1 Introduction 
This section provides a detailed overview of the structure and key features of the two SIB 
providers’ models, before reviewing performance in the first year of implementation.  
Findings from the fieldwork with the providers and partners are also included in the review 
of performance to identify areas of success and continued challenge. 
The SIB rationale, target cohort and rationale were introduced in section 1. 
5.2 Delivery models 
As section 4 described, the specification for the SIB provision required a ‘Navigator’ key 
worker model, building on a review of effective practice.  Consequently, the delivery 
models and approaches followed by the two providers feature several common features, 
with similar underpinning principles. At the heart of the Navigator model is a flexible, 
personalised approach that engages with and supports members of the cohort to achieve 
positive, sustained outcomes. 
This section sets out the overarching delivery models for each SIB provider, before 
exploring in more detail how they are working to achieve each of the five programme 
outcomes.   
5.2.1 The overarching delivery model 
The providers’ delivery models have a set of common features, including: 
 The ‘personal navigators’ as key workers to engage clients and work with them 
on a sustained basis to support access to the services that support a pathway away 
from rough sleeping to sustained, long term outcomes.  The navigators facilitate, 
support and broker resources as required, drawing on provision available in-house 
or from other providers as appropriate – and have the flexibility to engage at points 
when the client is in danger of falling back and returning to a street lifestyle. The 
navigators can also use personalisation funding to purchase provision and provide 
incentives that help achieve and sustain outcomes.   
 A personalised and ‘client centred’ approach – the navigator approach aims to 
provide support that is tailored to the individual client, based on a holistic 
understanding of their needs and experiences.  The use of personalised budgets, 
and individually tailored intervention plans, are central features of both provider 
models.  This allows additional services to be procured as appropriate to the client 
and aims to promote independence and encouraging a sense of personal 
responsibility. 
 The personal navigators have individual caseloads of clients, and work in 
partnership with existing services and providers to ensure that their clients 
receive the help and advice they need in order to enter accommodation and gain 
employment.  This also allows a multi-agency case management approach to be 
developed, with the navigators liaising between the client and range of providers to 
ensure an integrated and holistic approach is followed.   It is important to note that 
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the personal navigator does not take over responsibility for the client and provide 
the services required, but rather works in partnership with services and their staff 
already providing support to the client to ensure the best outcome for the client.   
 The personal navigator engages with their clients through an initial meeting 
with the client and their current service provider (for example, if the client is in a 
night shelter, the meeting will be between the client, the personal navigator and the 
night shelter staff).  At this meeting, the personal navigator will establish what the 
client wants to achieve (for example finding stable accommodation, gaining 
employment, or reconnection with their home country), and what the navigator can 
do to help the client achieve these aims (for example through overcoming 
substance abuse issues or gaining the skills to obtain employment). The personal 
navigator will then work with other service providers to ensure that the client 
accesses the services they need to achieve their aims. 
 The approach is flexible and responsive to individual clients – reflecting the 
personalised approach, there are not set pathways for support.  While this makes 
the individual delivery models hard to describe, the approach offers the degree of 
flexibility and tailoring.  It means that both the content of the support and its 
scheduling are not set, which individuals within the cohort require if outcomes are to 
be achieved and sustained.  It also allows changes in client needs over time to be 
reflected in the services offered to them – for example once accommodation has 
been secured, attentions can focus on other issues, such as alcohol or substance 
abuse, that need to be addressed before progress can be made towards securing 
employment.  
Consequently three main features are identified by providers as differentiating provision 
under the SIB from existing support for rough sleepers: 
 The ongoing relationship between the client and the personal navigator – 
rather than the previous position where clients would receive support from one 
individual / provider for a particular service, and another for a different service (for 
example, support from one provider for assistance with a drug or alcohol problem, 
and another for help with accommodation).  The SIB approach offers the benefits of 
providing a single point of contact for the client, making them more aware of the 
range of services available to them and helping ensure that the services that they 
access with navigator brokerage or support are integrated and directed to meeting 
client needs in a holistic, coordinated and effective manner.   
 The focus on sustained outcomes – traditionally support from one worker would 
not necessarily continue once clients enter accommodation or employment, as 
providers either would not have the capacity to maintain support or were not 
incentivised to do so.  As the PbR element of the SIB places the emphasis on 
securing sustained outcomes, personal navigators continue to provide support after 
an initial outcome is achieved. The focus is on reducing the risk of clients returning 
to rough sleeping and providing a rapid and informed response. 
 An emphasis on flexibility – as demonstrated through the personal navigator 
approach and the ability to use personal budgets, and reflected in the PbR payment 
structure.  As payments under the project are tied to outcomes achieved rather than 
activities delivered, the personal navigators have more freedom than in traditional 
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service models to try new and innovative approaches in order to achieve an 
outcome. 
Although features of the support model are not new – indeed the broad themes were 
based on learning from effective practice – their combination in providing a long-term focus 
on sustained outcomes is the innovation.  Providers who contributed to the evaluation 
research were positive about the potential of the model to add value to existing support to 
help clients achieve stable accommodation, employment and wider outcomes. 
An important aspect to delivery is that navigators need to persuade members of the cohort 
that this is a new offer of support.  Many of the cohort will have had some previous 
engagement with services. Some will have chosen not to engage and others may have 
had negative experiences because services did not meet their needs. The flexibility of the 
support and the availability of personal budgets are seen as crucial to demonstrating this 
new approach. 
One difference between the two provider models is that while St Mungo’s are paying 
partners and other providers on the basis of outcomes achieved for cohort members, 
Thames Reach are not; their view is that the organisations they are working with are 
already funded for the activities they undertake.     
5.2.2 Delivering the five outcomes 
The providers’ approaches to achieving the five programme outcomes are described 
below. 
Outcome 1 - Reducing rough sleeping 
In both cases the personal navigators use their knowledge and experience to engage with 
individuals from the cohort and, through a combination of their own provision and that of 
other partners and providers, secure accommodation for them as the first step towards 
sustainable recovery.  Consequently collaborative working with existing service providers 
is key – both in helping identify and engage with members of the cohort and securing 
accommodation on their behalf.  This may include undertaking case reviews with providers 
already engaged with cohort members in order to identify appropriate pathways to 
recovery.  Individual recovery plans are also developed with clients, which will include 
initial offers of accommodation (or reconnection as appropriate). 
As the majority of the members of the cohort will face multiple barriers, the personal 
navigators must also seek to ensure that these barriers, such as substance misuse issues, 
are addressed as an important step in preventing them from returning to a street lifestyle.  
In some cases the navigators may have to challenge the views of existing service 
providers to ensure that clients get into accommodation (for example, when the client 
states that they want to sleep on the street, some existing service providers may accept 
this assertion due to capacity issues).   
Outcome 2 - Into stable accommodation 
Following initial engagement, the personal navigators provide advocacy to clients to help 
them secure and sustain stable accommodation.  Activities to initially get clients into stable 
accommodation include: providing advice on how to access housing benefits; providing 
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basic household goods to furnish a new tenancy; advocacy when negotiating with private 
landlords (providing an extra guarantee to the landlord that the client will be an acceptable 
tenant, addressing issues that had previously led to exclusion with a landlord, or 
negotiating a reduction in rent), and for a limited number of clients provide the money for a 
deposit (this is very rare). Commonly this comprises an initial move into temporary 
accommodation to get the client off the streets, followed by moves into longer term 
accommodation.  There is flexibility in the types of accommodation that can be accessed 
for clients, so that different tenancies can be matched to client need. 
The personal navigators continue to provide support that aims to ensure a sustained 
accommodation outcome, including dealing with triggers that might cause the client to 
leave their new home (for example by providing support and information to clients to deal 
with utility bills).  Additional services include specific tenancy support staff to help clients 
into new accommodation, and in the case of St Mungo’s clients can receive support from 
complex need workers with skills in working with mental illness and non-engagement.   
Additional activities ongoing or proposed include: 
 Holding networking events with hostel and shelter managers to inform them of the 
SIB, and introduce an identification and early warning system to reduce the risk of 
abandonment and eviction; 
 Key workers will be briefed by the SIB on the additional support available to clients 
including debt management, training, health and resettlement; and 
 In the case of St Mungo’s, establishing a Dreams and Aspirations fund where all 
clients achieving accommodation outcomes will be rewarded with a monthly 
contribution to a savings pot, which can be used to realise a stated goal, aspiration 
or dream. 
Outcome 3 - Sustained reconnection to home country 
Thames Reach has an existing ‘London Reconnection Team’, established to help 
vulnerable EU Nationals who are sleeping rough and expressing a wish to return to their 
home country.69  Building on this expertise, the SIB team includes a Reconnections 
Navigator.  The navigator provides assistance to the personal navigators to help clients 
reconnect with their home country, a process which begins with the navigators discussing 
the potential benefits of returning to their home country with clients before supporting them 
to do so.  However, as will be discussed in Section 5.6, this activity has proved to be 
particularly difficult as suitable clients are often reluctant to leave the UK. 
St Mungo’s can draw upon their Street Legal70 and Operation Ark71 services, and work 
with enforcement agencies and other partners (such as Refugee Action, London 
                                            
 
69
 This service is commissioned by GLA to provide reconnection support across London. 
70
 Street Legal seeks to address the challenge of rough sleeping by non-EU nationals, many of whom come 
from the Indian subcontinent and may have an unknown or irregular immigration status, by providing help 
with complex legal issues and support to get individuals into accommodation. 
71
 Operation Ark seeks to address the issue of rough sleeping amongst migrants from the European 
Economic Area, by either getting individuals to exercise their treaty rights away from the streets, assist those 
to voluntary return home and administrative removal for those who refused to do any of the above. 
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Reconnection, faith and community groups and in-country accommodation and support 
agencies) to support clients to return to their home countries.  Clients will be case 
managed through interim UK accommodation to home, where they will be assisted to find 
accommodation and/or treatment.  Their approach will depend on the nationality and 
circumstances of the client involved: 
 Reconnections for EEA nationals will be arranged directly or through partners in the 
UK (Barka, Thames Reach London Reconnection Team), and for those outside the 
EEA through links with Refugee Action’s Choices programme.  
 For clients not wanting to return to EEA countries, and who have failed benefit 
claims, St Mungo’s Operation Ark approach will be used, with recovery plans to 
address barriers to return being developed, and involving police around ASB and 
UKBA officers as they take individuals through the ‘minded to remove’ process. 
 Street Legal - In partnership with UKBA and Refugee Action, the resolution of cases 
will be overseen where clients have irregular immigration status.  
Outcome 4 - Progress towards employment 
Personal navigators at both providers use considerable flexibility in order to achieve the 
employment outcomes.  Activities include: helping people with job searches; helping with 
enrolment, for instance form filling or accompanying the client to a meeting; referring them 
to courses to acquire skills for the workplace (for example Thames Reach has its own 
employment academy); buying clothes for interviews; buying equipment for jobs; providing 
travel passes so that clients can get to work before they are first paid; paying for the 
‘Construction Skills Certificate Scheme’ (CSCS Card) required for employment in that 
sector; and ongoing support to ensure the client remains in employment.  
In the case of St Mungo’s, key services include skills development, help into work and in-
work support provision – with clients being given priority access to a range of proven 
partner programmes from Crisis, St Mungo’s Recovery Challenge/Pathways to 
Employment, and programmes from The Passage, CSTM, Manna and West London Day 
Centre.   
As the partners in the bid are significant employers in their own right, volunteer placements 
and access to apprenticeships are also offered.  Access to three and six month volunteer 
placements through partners and providers are also intended to be ring-fenced for 
members of the cohort.  Current programmes will also be supplemented by an 
Employment and Training Fund to facilitate the take-up of work (for example by funding 
travel costs) and to pay agencies to deliver the work outcomes for clients. 
Thames Reach have an apprentice scheme which facilitates work placements, and links 
with ‘business supporters’ who have helped devise a Work Ready Programme. 
Outcome 5 - Better management of health 
The Thames Reach personal navigators do not carry out any activities that are directly 
related to achieving the health outcome. Their model is premised on the rationale that 
work towards the employment and accommodation outcomes, which would include work 
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around mental health and substance abuse problems, will support the achievement of the 
health outcome target. 
In the case of St Mungo’s, clients are intended to receive health checks through Homeless 
Healthcare’s72 Street Med service, which will work to ensure consistent and appropriate 
approaches to GP and hospital access and discharge.  A specific peer support programme 
is also proposed to target frequent visitors to A and E, and the project also includes a 
specific health worker to caseload high profile clients to ensure all receive clinical health 
assessments. 
5.3 Staffing 
Both providers have established new teams for the delivery of the SIB, as described 
below.  In both cases the SIB teams are also able to draw upon the wider resources of 
their home organisation – which include their existing portfolios of accommodation and 
other services, and the skills and knowledge of other members of the organisation. 
5.3.1 St Mungo’s 
At St Mungo’s the SIB was designed to be overseen by two managers:  
 One focussed on the initial journey from the street into accommodation – the 
outreach activities to engage with members of the cohort and help them progress 
into initial and longer-term accommodation; and, 
 A second focusing on sustaining clients within the accommodation, as well as 
providing ongoing support to help their clients’ progress towards employment, 
where appropriate.  Sustaining the accommodation requires a wide range of 
responsive support, including addressing health and substance misuse issues. 
In practice these two roles have not been kept discrete. Because navigators support 
clients from first contact to sustained outcomes, in practice the managers’ roles 
overlapped and now there is a more shared approach with each supporting a group within 
the team.  The team comprises 10 staff members – seven outreach/tenancy support 
workers, each of whom have caseloads of between 30 and 40 clients, and headed by two 
managers (one leading on the street outreach work and the second leading on the tenancy 
support element).  An additional member of staff is responsible for the collection and 
analysis of performance data, including the compilation and presentation of information to 
evidence the achievement of the project outcomes.  
The St Mungo’s team were recruited specifically for the SIB, which was considered by the 
staff interviewed to be a strength as it allowed them to ‘buy in’ to the project from the 
outset.  As well as recruiting staff with previous experience of working with rough sleepers, 
two individuals were seconded from The Connection at St Martins and the Passage 
(service providers) respectively.  These individuals were selected on the basis of their pre-
existing relationships with clients within the cohort.  In addition, two of the outreach 
workers were recruited specifically to work with people from outside the UK (mainly ECE 
countries) with language support needs.  Consequently the St Mungo’s team are allocated 
                                            
 
72
 A new CIC established by St Mungo’s in partnership with Gt Chapel Street. 
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to individual clients on the basis of their areas of specialism, as well as their geographic 
distribution. 
5.3.2 Thames reach 
The Thames Reach SIB team comprises seven ‘personal navigators’, a ‘reconnections 
navigator’, an intern and dedicated administrator, and a manager who is responsible for 
the delivery of the project.  Each navigator has a caseload of between 50 and 80 clients, 
assigned broadly by geographic location (i.e. staff are allocated clients in one or two 
London Boroughs). 
Unlike St Mungo’s, the delivery team were drawn from existing Thames Reach staff.  In 
common with St Mungo’s they all have experience of working with rough sleepers and 
connections to wider provider and support networks within their respective catchments.  
For example, Thames Reach has a specialist reconnections team who can provide 
additional advice and support. 
The SIB manager works closely with Thames Reach’s Pan-London Outreach Area 
Manager, both of whom report to the CEO and Director of Outreach and North London 
Services.   
5.4 Governance and management 
The SIB requires a specific form of governance that is particular to its structure as a SIB – 
the management of social investment – and as a PbR contract – the management of an 
outcomes-based contract.  Governance takes place at two levels – between commissioner 
and provider (PbR); and by the provider organisations in managing the contract (PbR and 
SIB). 
5.4.1 Commissioner governance 
As outlined in previous sections, PbR contracts are new in public service commissioning. 
The SIB was the first PbR contract for homelessness at GLA and, although there were 
some examples to draw on, it remains a new approach presenting challenges to traditional 
commissioning and contract management practice.   
The GLA has established the following governance structure for the SIB contract: a Project 
Board; and, a Project Group.  There is also a dedicated monitoring structure in place. 
5.4.1.1 The Project Board 
The Project Board meets quarterly to review progress against the outcomes and to 
address any issues that are identified by GLA or the providers.  The Board is formed of 
GLA, DCLG, the London Borough of Westminster and officers from two London Boroughs 
who were involved in the development of the SIB (selected for their background in the SIB 
rather than their particular boroughs (Lambeth and Tower Hamlets)).  The Board takes a 
strategic approach identifying issues that require GLA intervention and supports 
coordination across boroughs and wider stakeholders, addressing issues raised by the 
more operationally-focused Project Group.  As well as ongoing strategic oversight, the 
Board will include specific agenda items at different times to explore emergent issues.  For 
instance, the Board has invited the providers and their investors to attend to understand 
their experiences to date.   
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A key issue for the Board, from the Project Group, has been the evidential requirements 
for the PbR metrics.  A number of changes have been made in recognition of the issues 
providers raised in light of delivery.  For instance, it emerged early in delivery that some of 
the cohort were already being supported through ‘Housing First’ pathways (see 2.3.1), 
which offer an alternative route away from the street to accommodation without hostel 
placements.  As a result, there was some confusion amongst clients as to their keyworkers 
and the support being provided.  The Board agreed that ‘first contact’ recorded by Housing 
First workers would count, so that there were not multiple workers attempting to make and 
record this.   There have been two amended drafts of the evidential requirement agreed by 
the Board.  The amendments are seen by the Board as reflecting the learning taking place 
through the contract and the responsiveness within the contract governance to addressing 
challenges as they emerge.  This is also recognised by providers: ‘We’re all learning as we 
go along’. 
The Board have expressed an interest in how the performance of the providers to date is 
impacting upon their cash-flow.  The GLA and Board are committed to the success of the 
SIB and wish to ensure that the providers are able to maintain their staffing levels and 
deliver a successful intervention.  They cannot require this and at the time of writing the 
providers were yet to agree to this recent request.  For one provider, the GLA are still 
adapting to a different role as commissioners: without providing upfront investment ‘they 
can be less inquisitive about how we’re spending our money’ (Provider). 
5.4.1.2 The Project Group 
The Project Group meets quarterly, to inform the Project Board.  The Project Group has an 
operational focus and is attended by the providers, GLA and DCLG.  It is intended to 
provide a forum for the providers to raise and share problems impacting upon the delivery 
of the SIB as well as sharing learning about effective practice, in support of the success of 
the programme for the cohort.     
To date, the focus of the Project Group has been on reviewing issues impacting upon the 
delivery of outcomes and the evidential requirements, which have been considered by the 
Board (as outlined above).  There has been some sharing of practice, with providers 
willing to share their experiences but also caution in the earliest stages about sharing 
some of their information.  Nonetheless differences in approach have been shared and 
discussed, for instance St Mungo’s creation of a fund to pay partners for their contribution 
to outcomes. 
5.4.1.3 Monthly monitoring 
GLA has created a dedicated post for monitoring the two SIB contracts.  This is in contrast 
to other contracts for homelessness services, all of which are covered by a single post.  
The post was created because the evidential and monitoring requirements are ‘much more 
onerous than a standard contract’ (GLA).  A high demand for contract support was 
anticipated, but the work required was more demanding than expected and the dedicated 
post was created during the first quarter of the contract with the officer coming into post at 
the start of quarter 2.     
Each quarter the providers submit their outcomes, which are confirmed via CHAIN (other 
than the health outcome).  A bespoke module within CHAIN was commissioned by GLA to 
support the monitoring of the SIB contracts.  This is the sole database for the SIB and acts 
as a case management tool for the providers.  The providers also submit a narrative of 
their performance over the quarter. 
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Checking the evidence of outcomes against those claimed by providers is time consuming.  
There have been mistakes in what is claimed, due to issues with some of the evidence 
provided (meeting the strict requirements), inconsistencies in dates and other 
administrative errors.  This was particularly the case in the first quarters as all parties 
became familiar with the detail of the evidence and issues were identified with providing 
what was required.  Similarly, providers describe checking approved payments as time 
consuming   
GLA meet with the providers separately each month to discuss their monitoring return.  
The monitoring data is then reviewed at the Project Group and then at the Project Board. 
Whilst monitoring and evidencing outcomes is key to the providers – there are no 
payments without them – there is a view that GLA are still adapting to a different role as 
commissioners of a SIB, where they can make fewer demands in terms of monitoring and 
scrutiny; a central tenet of PbR is that the focus is on claimed outcomes only with 
providers free to adapt their delivery as appropriate (as long as this remains in line with 
principles of ethical practice). 
5.4.2 SIB governance 
For the providers, the governance for the SIB contracts is linked to the different structures 
in place for the contract.  The management of the contract in delivery terms, and how this 
impacts upon monitoring progress towards and achievement of outcomes is explored 
above.  
For St Mungo’s, the SPV holds the contract and this provides the governance.  The SPV 
Board is made up of representatives from the two institutional investors and from St 
Mungo’s.  The Board meet every six weeks to review performance and manage the 
contract with St Mungo’s.  More informal updates are shared between the meetings.  This 
was reported to be working well by all of the provider and investor participants in the 
evaluation research.  It was seen to provide the oversight necessary and an appropriate 
structure for monitoring performance. 
For Thames Reach, the SIB contract is a dedicated item on the finance sub-committee, 
which receives information on results and expenditure and income versus budget.  The 
committee reports to the Board, reflecting the strategic importance of the contract and the 
financial risk involved.  Big Issue Invest has a representative who is present at both the 
finance sub-committee and the board meeting, as a condition of finance.  The 
representative is reported to make valuable contributions to the meetings, as well as 
receiving updates on how the project is performing. 
At the time of the data collection for this report, the providers were coming to the end of 
the first year of delivery and this was going to provide an opportunity to review 
performance.  All stakeholders were broadly happy with performance to date but saw the 
second year as the time when achievement against outcomes and the management of 
cash flow would provide higher demands on all involved.  The different governance 
structures were both expected to provide an appropriate structure for identifying and 
addressing any issues that emerge. 
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5.5 Partnership working 
This section explores the nature and experience of partnership between external 
organisations and the SIB providers.  First the perspectives of the local authority staff 
interviewed are reviewed, followed by those of organisations involved in the delivery of 
services on the ground. 
5.5.1 Local authority perspectives 
The London boroughs are key partners in the SIB.  They are commissioners of the wide 
range of locality services and partners in the pan-London initiatives that provide: the 
context for the SIB; and the network of provision that Navigators aim to support the cohort 
across (see Section 2 context).  Four London boroughs participated in this first stage of the 
evaluation and over future waves all the key boroughs will be included. 
The boroughs that participated in the research had broadly positive views of the SIB, 
although there had been differences in the earlier stages.  In the main, there were 
concerns in the early consultation and development stages about: the focus of the SIB 
intervention as a new funded initiative; the PbR structure; and, the impact of the SIB on the 
existing landscape of provision. 
5.5.1.1 The SIB as a new initiative 
Concerns about the SIB as a focus for new funding centred on the view that if there was 
money available to address the problem of rough sleeping, then London boroughs would 
welcome this as additional funding rather than being provided for a new initiative.  There 
was a view that, rather than add value, the SIB would duplicate existing work and further 
complicate the landscape of provision.  This view is still held by some within the boroughs. 
But, broadly, the boroughs felt that the consultation period had involved them in 
developing the SIB and this was welcomed.  Over time attitudes had also shifted; firstly, 
due to an acceptance that the SIB was going to happen; and then later, that as it was 
happening the additional resource should be welcomed.  The boroughs’ attitude, apart 
from the degree to which they welcomed the SIB, was that there was now additional 
support and there needed to be a positive engagement with it to make it work for borough 
clients.  There were concerns, mirroring those of other stakeholders (see Section 3) about 
the role of social investment in taking funding out of the programme through fees and 
returns (‘leakage’).    
5.5.1.2 The PbR structure 
Concerns about the PbR structure broadly mirrored those of providers who were engaged 
in the development and commissioning of the SIB (see Section 3).  There were concerns 
in the early stages that the outcomes focus of the PbR would create the wrong incentives 
in driving outcome-focused behaviour over client-focused ones.  Again, these concerns 
were seen to have been taken into account during the consultation and development 
stages.  As with the provider stakeholders, there was a broad consensus that this stage 
had produced a well-thought through set of outcomes and metrics.  But there was not a 
consensus; there remains a latent concern for some that the outcomes may drive support 
towards outcomes that meet the PbR requirements rather than the client’s needs. 
5.5.1.3 The impact on the landscape of provision 
The third area of concerns relates to the impact that the SIB may have on the services that 
are commissioned by boroughs – outreach teams, targeted initiatives and specialist 
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services.  Again, views on the impact were mixed, and were reported to have developed 
over time from one that was quite oppositional – the SIB is not the right solution – to one 
that was more about joint working for the benefit of clients.  Some borough outreach 
workers have joined the SIB providers’ teams but this was not seen to have had a 
particularly detrimental effect.  The main area of concern was where the SIB providers 
were not seen to have been proactive enough in contacting borough rough sleeping and 
homelessness leads to introduce the SIB and staff and to begin a dialogue to support joint 
working.  For one borough this had been ‘three months and that is just far too long.’  As 
with other concerns, this ‘difficult start’ for some had been overcome through regular 
meetings and a recognition on both sides of the need for communication and coordination.  
A related concern had been how the SIB duplicates effort and confuses clients who 
already have a key worker – through personalised approaches in existing provision or 
particular initiatives such as Housing First.  The change to how ‘first contact’ is recorded 
for the PbR metrics (see 5.4.1.1) was recognised by the Project Board on the basis of both 
SIB provider and borough feedback on the issues that this was presenting.  Two of the 
boroughs identified the higher level of support that the SIB was providing for the cohort: 
‘you’re getting at least 50%, 60% more input from the workers than you would expect to 
see from normal clients, even one that’s been advocated for, and most clients aren’t 
advocated for in that, that vociferously… it’s reassuring that you know that the workers are 
on it, that they’re getting the job done and that they’re working hard to get the job done, 
that’s good’ (Borough stakeholder). 
This support was sometimes tempered by the view that with additional funds boroughs 
could provide a more intensive service.  There was also a concern that, if successful, the 
SIB will be seen by some within local authorities as providing a model in itself for future 
funding, without recognising that it can only be successful with the network of provision in 
place. Nonetheless, there was also an appetite to learn from the commissioning model and 
to reflect on how outcomes-based models could be an effective approach to 
commissioning borough services.  There was also interest in the learning that the SIB 
would provide about effective approaches, despite some scepticism that a new and well-
funded initiative will always do well. 
5.5.2 Delivery partner perspectives 
The principle of partnership is central to both provider delivery models, with each 
describing how they work with partners across a range of services and activities.  The 
initial fieldwork included interviews with a series of partner organisations who had worked 
with the SIB, and its clients, over the first year of operation.  Overall it would appear that 
the ‘partnership picture’ across both projects continues to develop, as opportunities for 
shared working, and the understandings of available skills, experiences and resources, are 
developed further. 
Representatives in a sample of eight partner organisations were interviewed, to explore 
their involvement in the work of either (or both) of the SIB providers and their impressions 
of delivery to date.  The organisations were equally split between those who had worked 
with one provider and those working with both – although in the former case future 
collaborations were not ruled out.  The partners interviewed included: 
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 Two day centre providers and a day and night centre (also offering skills training, 
careers advice and specialist services to address complex needs) – and working 
with both SIB providers; 
 An additional day centre, also providing advice and support services to rough 
sleepers alongside an internal trainee scheme, and which is working with just one 
SIB provider; 
 A provider which supports the medical needs of rough sleepers – and which is 
working with one provider; 
 A provider that supports vulnerable people to access housing in the private rented 
sector and offers ongoing support to ensure tenancies are sustained; 
 A representative of the UKBA – with oversight of UKBA activities across several 
London Boroughs; and, 
 A representative of an education, training and employment support centre, part of a 
larger charity – and who have worked with one SIB provider in year one. 
5.5.2.1 Development of the SIB 
In several cases the partners interviewed had been approached by one or both of the SIB 
providers to be ‘formal’ partners in their bids, and which marked their introduction to the 
SIB.  Others had engaged with the provider(s) during the first year of delivery.  However, 
even when some form of partnership agreement was in place with one provider, at least 
one provider reported working with both providers where the opportunity arose. 
As outlined above, some negative perceptions of the SIB were reported at the outset at 
least.  However, the partners interviewed were more positive.  Day centres reported that 
the SIB filled a gap in service provision. Previously, they found there was little long-term, 
ongoing support for clients in hostels/other accommodation. This resulted in a lot of 
‘bounce back to the streets from hostels’ and supporting this group provided a constant 
strain on resources.  Since the SIB started, it has freed-up resources.  One considered 
that the PbR component “had more integrity than the street count”, while another 
considered that the PbR model: 
‘appears to mean that there are fewer constraints – if the judgement is made that it’s worth 
spending time with someone, this can be done.’   
However, in a couple of instances concerns were raised over the potential for cherry 
picking and ‘people fighting over outcomes’; and, where the interviewees had a sufficient 
level of knowledge, that the PbR metrics could unfairly limit payment and potentially lead 
to the manipulation of the CHAIN data.  
The interviewees were also broadly positive about the actual and potential role of social 
investors in the rough sleeping/vulnerably housed sector.  One senior staff member in a 
large day centre commented that: 
‘the charity world needs to be open to new ways of doing things, and that as long as the 
investment is in the hands of trustworthy organisations with strong values’.   
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5.5.2.2 The SIB interventions 
All but one of the organisations interviewed had direct experience of working with the SIB 
(the exception being the UKBA interviewee, who had a working knowledge of both of the 
providers).  The intensity and nature of their collaborative work varied – ranging from 
providing outreach services through to specialist provision for individuals with health 
and/or complex needs. 
Amongst the individuals interviewed experiences were uniformly positive.  While one 
individual reported feeling ’kept in the dark‘ about her potential involvement, she 
subsequently reported that her involvement with the SIB had been a positive experience.  
Indeed, the skills and dedication exhibited by the navigators and other project staff was 
roundly praised – with contributors being ’impressed with the understanding and 
knowledge of both teams‘ who are ’very professional’, and that ‘they put a lot of effort into 
the entrenched guys’.   
While the majority of comments were positive, attentions were also drawn to less positive 
experiences.  These included ’rubbing some hostels up the wrong way‘ in their efforts to 
move people on into secure tenancies, and concerns that, should some providers’ inputs 
to the project be increased, they may need to impose some form of charge. 
Some partners highlighted how St Mungo’s is paying for a contribution for outcomes, 
whereas Thames Reach is not.  There was some disappointment about this and a view 
that it was a helpful approach for St Mungo’s to take.  Partners are willing to work with the 
SIB for the benefit of clients – it is this shared commitment to outcomes that motivates 
them.  The impact of this over time will be explored through subsequent phases of the 
research. 
5.6 Performance and experiences of early implementation 
This section reviews the performance of the SIB, and the individual providers, against the 
targets set for each of the five outcomes in year one of delivery.  The experiences of the 
providers and their partners of early implementation are also reported, illustrating areas of 
success and common challenges faced in working with their respective target groups. 
5.6.1 Programme performance in year one 
The performance of the programme in its first year of delivery is summarised in Table 5.1 
below.  The table sets out, for each of the five outcomes: targets for year one by quarter 
and for all four years of activity; and, the achievements by quarter and year one total.  The 
table is based on programme monitoring data.   
It is important to note that the data reflects the outcome metrics of the PbR model and as 
such does not capture the scale of work being undertaken, for instance towards entry to 
sustainable accommodation.  
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Table 5.1 Programme Performance Year One 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Tota
l 
Year 
1 
Total 
All 
Years 
Rough sleeping (bedded down 
street contact) 
      
Target below baseline 0 46 83 121 N/A -- 
Baseline 258 258 258 258 N/A -- 
Numbers sleeping rough 330 233 193 176 N/A -- 
Reduction in rough sleeping 
below baseline 
0 26 65 82 N/A  
Stable Accommodation       
Target for entering stable 
accommodation 
10 16 34 34 94 306 
Entering stable 
accommodation achieved 
8 42 44 45 139  
Target for 12 month sustainment      265 
Target for 18 month sustainment      191 
Reconnection       
Initial reconnection target 26 26 26 26 104 178 
Initial reconnection achieved 8 8 15 15 46  
Number returned 6 0 0 1 7  
6 month sustainment target 0 0 24 24 48 158 
6 month sustainment achieved 0 0 5 8 13  
Employment       
NQF target 2 2 3 3 10 39 
NQF achieved 0 0 1 0 1  
Volunteering/self-employment 13 
wk. target 
0 5 11 12 28 150 
Volunteering/self-employ 13 
wks achieved 
0 0 4 3 7  
Volunteering/self-employment 26 
wk. target 
0 0 4 4 8 64 
Volunteering/self-employ 26 
wks achieved 
0 0 0 1 1  
Part time 13 weeks target 0 2 3 4 9 39 
Part time 13 weeks achieved 0 0 0 0 0  
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 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Tota
l 
Year 
1 
Total 
All 
Years 
Part time 26 weeks target 0 0 2 3 5 36 
Part time 26 weeks achieved 0 0 0 0 0  
Full time 13 weeks target 0 0 2 2 4 31 
Full time 13 weeks achieved 0 1 1 5 7  
Full time 26 weeks target 0 0 0 3 3 27 
Full time 26 weeks achieved 0 0 2 2 4  
Health (annual target)       
Target below baseline     705 2,745 
Baseline     TBC TBC 
No A and E episodes     N/A  
Reduction of A & E episodes 
below baseline 
    N/A  
Source: GLA 
Performance for each outcome in year one is summarised below:  
 Outcome 1 - Reducing rough sleeping – the reduction in rough sleeping outcome 
is assessed on the basis of the number of individuals within the cohort found to be 
sleeping rough against an initial baseline assessment.  The programme fell short of 
the quarterly targets for reducing incidents of rough sleeping below the baseline 
measure, with 82 fewer clients being identified (against a target reduction of 121, 
representing 68% of target reduction).  
 Outcome 2 - Into stable accommodation – here the target set for clients entering 
stable accommodation has been exceeded, with 139 individuals entering 
accommodation against a target of 94 (representing 148% of the year one target, 
and almost half (45%) of the target for Years 1 to 4).  This performance is 
encouraging, and emphasises the priority placed by both projects in securing 
accommodation as the first step on the road to sustained recovery for individual 
rough sleepers.    
Subsequent stages of the evaluation will report the extent to which these outcomes have 
been sustained at the 12 and 18 month points. 
 Outcome 3 - Sustained reconnection to home country – performance under the 
reconnection outcome has fallen behind target, with 46 initial reconnections being 
achieved against a target of 104 (representing 44% of target), although seven of 
these were subsequently found to have returned to London.  Performance is also 
below target for six month sustained reconnections, with 13 being achieved in year 
one against a target of 48 (27%). 
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 Outcome 4 - Progress towards employment – although performance for 
qualifications achieved, and volunteering and part-time employment secured, has 
been below target, the targets for full time employment (although based on small 
numbers) have been exceeded. 
– Just one individual secured a qualification, against a target of 10. 
– Seven individuals achieved the 13 week volunteering and self-employment 
outcome (against a target of 28), with just one achieving the 26 week target 
(a target of eight).  
– None of the individuals achieved the targets set for part-time employment, 
which were set at nine for 13 week and five for a 26 week sustainment in 
year one. 
– However, both targets for sustained full-time employment were exceeded.  
Seven individuals achieved the 13 week sustained full-time employment 
target (compared to a target of four), and four achieved the 26 week target 
(compared to a target of three).   
The performance against the full-time employment targets represents good progress, as 
this outcome is considered by providers and stakeholders to be the most challenging to 
achieve given the characteristics of the cohort.  However, performance is more 
disappointing for the qualifications, volunteering/self-employment and part-time work 
outcomes, which can represent steps towards employment for individual clients. 
 Outcome 5 - Better management of health – The health metric will be a baseline 
created by using data provided by the Department of Health (DoH) of A&E 
admissions by the cohort.  There has been a period of negotiation with DoH by GLA 
and DCLG to obtain this data.  It is expected in April 2014.  This will provide both 
the baseline for the cohort previous to the SIB and for A&E use in year one (and 
then annually).   
5.6.2 Performance by provider 
Having reviewed performance at the programme level, the performance of the individual 
SIB providers is reviewed below, for each of the five outcomes.  Findings from the 
qualitative fieldwork with providers and partners is also used to explore areas of particular 
successes, and of challenge, experienced in year one. 
5.6.2.1 Outcome 1 - Reducing rough sleeping 
Both providers struggled to meet their quarterly reduction in rough sleeping targets, 
although St Mungo’s exceeded their target in quarter four.  Although performance for both 
providers can be seen to have improved throughout year one, both reported a series of 
challenges in meeting their targets. 
Table 5.2 Performance Year 1 – Reduced Rough Sleeping (by quarter 2014) 
 Quart
er 
St Mungo’s Thames 
Reach 
Combined 
Total 
  Targe
t 
Achiev
ed 
Targe
t 
Achiev
ed 
Targe
t 
Achiev
ed 
 1 0 0 0 0 O 0 
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 Quart
er 
St Mungo’s Thames 
Reach 
Combined 
Total 
  Targe
t 
Achiev
ed 
Targe
t 
Achiev
ed 
Targe
t 
Achiev
ed 
Reduced rough 
sleeping (number 
below baseline 
per quarter) 
2 0 0 46 26 46 26 
3 23 31 60 34 83 65 
4 58 35 63 47 121 82 
 
Experiences of implementation – successes and challenges 
Despite facing considerable challenges in year one of delivery, the provider staff 
interviewed considered that positive progress was being made and that they were having a 
”real impact on some of the really long term rough sleepers”.  In the case of St Mungo’s, 
staff reported that a third of all their clients had been seen sleeping rough only once in the 
preceding quarter – meaning they were no longer classified as rough sleepers.   
However several interviewees across both providers felt that the indicator used to 
evidence this particular outcome was not an appropriate measure of progress.  Two issues 
were commonly raised – the first being that in their view a single incidence of rough 
sleeping does not mean that considerable success has not been made with the client.  It is 
not uncommon that clients may spend the occasional night rough sleeping, and this may 
be due to a range of reasons.  In addition, the measure does not consider the client’s 
previous rough sleeping history, for example client previously bedding down every night 
prior to the SIB intervention, and only doing so sporadically afterwards, represents a 
significant degree of progress.  Although allowing an outcome to be recorded for up to two 
nights identified rough sleeping was felt to be helpful, several interviewees felt that the 
measure should be based on a statistical trend rather than individual rough sleeping 
incidences.  This has been rejected by GLA and the Project Board on the basis that the 
metric was developed through the consultation period to take account of: the baseline 
position of expected rough sleeping by the cohort; the risk that the SIB itself would result in 
higher incidences of recorded rough sleeping due to individuals receiving additional focus; 
the close correlation in CHAIN data for this cohort between being seen once and more 
than once.   
Several aspects of SIB provision were felt to be particularly helpful in progressing clients 
towards reduced rough sleeping outcomes.  First, the ability of the SIB to offer more 
flexible accommodation, both in terms of type and area, means they are better able to offer 
individuals alternatives to sleeping on the street.  The nature of the navigator role was also 
key in terms of developing relationships of trust, and credibility with their clients, to both 
support the transition into accommodation and ensure it is sustained.  These integrated 
and long term links were considered to be beyond the remit of traditional outreach teams 
and approaches.  Finally, establishing positive working relationships with existing outreach 
providers was widely considered to be crucial to success, to allow opportunities to 
intervene and facilitate routes off the street in partnership with other outreach teams. 
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Nevertheless a number of challenges in achieving this outcome were described, 
expressed in terms of ‘client level’ and ‘sector level’ factors, reflecting the context for the 
SIB.  The client level factors included:  
 As outlined above, entrenched rough sleepers, who may be in a hostel or other 
secure accommodation, may choose to bed down on the occasional night for 
random or arbitrary reasons, for example following sessions of alcohol or substance 
abuse or because they are lonely and want to be with their former peer group.   
 An example was cited of individuals found ‘slumped’ on the street being recorded 
as rough sleeping on the CHAIN database, when in reality they were under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.     
 Certain clients, particularly those with alcohol or drug dependencies or with mental 
health issues, may also exhibit unacceptable behaviour which can lead to their 
eviction from hostel accommodation.  
 In other cases some rough sleepers will not use hostel provision – for example due 
to language barriers or the lack of the right kind of support. 
The sector level factors reported included:  
 The need to change or challenge attitudes to reduce rough sleeping amongst 
existing agencies – where there may be an acceptance (or even collusion with a 
client) that individuals want to remain on the street.  Whether this is due to 
time/resource constraints amongst existing providers, or a ‘territorial’ mind-set at the 
borough level, is not clear – for example staff at Thames Reach described how part 
of their role was to use evidence of progression to influence the behaviour of other 
outreach providers. 
 As suggested above, people are recorded onto CHAIN as bedded down even when 
they might not be – as in the example above.  This is considered to reflect a need to 
demonstrate that an outreach worker is making contacts – i.e. a traditional output 
form of service monitoring rather than an outcome based approach.  There was 
also a concern – of a broader nature – that some outreach teams are not 
intervening with clients that they do see as they know they are ‘SIB clients’ and thus 
are not doing the ‘shake and wake’ that is expected. 
 People being incorrectly identified on CHAIN, which can result in a SIB client being 
registered as bedded down when in fact they have been mistaken for someone 
else. 
 The lack of hostel accommodation for couples can mean that individuals in 
relationships may be tempted to sleep rough in order to spend a night together.  
5.6.2.2 Outcome 2 - Stable accommodation 
The strong performance against this outcome at programme level is reflected in the 
achievements of both providers.  As Table 5.3 shows, both exceeded their targets with St. 
Mungo’s achieving 78 individuals (122% of target) and Thames Reach 61 individuals 
(200% of target). 
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Table 5.3 Performance Year 1 – Stable Accommodation Outcome 
 St Mungo’s Thames Reach Total 
 Target Achie
ved 
Target Achie
ved 
Target Achie
ved 
Entering stable 
accommodation  
64 78 30 61 94 139 
This represents positive performance for both providers, with progress against their 
respective 12 and 18 month sustained accommodation targets being reviewed in 
subsequent reports.  Because of the tariff associated with this outcome, it was identified as 
essential to focus on by the providers.  The outcome brings a high payment, but it also 
underpins other outcomes of employment and health as they are dependent upon the 
client being able to manage themselves and live independently. 
Experiences of implementation – successes and challenges 
The first fieldwork with providers and partners allowed their experiences of delivery in the 
context of each of the five outcomes to be explored.  In the case of the accommodation 
outcomes, the navigator model, and the opportunity to offer sustained support once an 
individual had secured accommodation, was seen as central to success.  Key features 
across the two providers included: 
 Working outside the traditional ‘borough frameworks’ – allowing providers to tailor 
their offer to clients in a way not always possible previously, as well as maintaining 
support if individuals move across borough boundaries.  
 The allocation of named workers to particular hostels – where they can build 
relationships with both hostel staff and clients to identify when clients are ready to 
move on and into sustainable accommodation. 
 The ability to work with landlords in different ways – including being able to support 
transition and to offer landlords additional security that issues will be addressed.  
 The ability to match individual clients with a wide range of accommodation so that it 
best meets their needs, both aiding transition and helping avoid breakdowns in 
tenancies.  
 The ability to effectively ‘vouch’ for clients - in terms of informing landlords that they 
will be supporting their clients on an ongoing basis, to help them secure appropriate 
benefits, pay bills as well as progressing towards work. 
Both providers also emphasised the importance of preparatory work with clients to ensure 
they are ready for independent living.  This can include teaching basic living skills such as 
cooking and washing, where the heightened level of personal support through the 
navigators is essential.  The ability to work intensively with clients to prepare them ready 
for independent living also means that some can be referred to accommodation earlier 
than hostels might.   
The ability to provide ongoing support after accommodation is secured, as well as 
advanced preparation, has been key, not least to help counter potential feelings of 
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isolation amongst those moving into new accommodation, but also to help ensure 
accommodation secured is sustained.  Ongoing support includes reminding clients to log 
changes in circumstance so that benefits information is kept up to date, helping attend or 
address missed appointments and ongoing support with independent living skills.   
Although only anecdotal at this point, the provider staff interviewed reported that relatively 
few tenancies secured had broken down, which was considered to indicate that their 
approach was being successful.  This will be explored in more detail once data is available 
on sustained accommodation at the 12 and 18 month points. 
The providers also referred to the ongoing challenges in securing accommodation 
outcomes for their clients.  These included: 
 Despite the providers own provision and that of their partners and networks, the 
lack of affordable accommodation in central London remains a barrier.  While both 
availability and cost are more favourable in the outer London boroughs, these may 
be areas which clients have no experience of or connections to. 
 This can be a particular issue with clients from Central and Eastern Europe, who 
have been found to be more likely to be work ready, but language skills and the 
high cost of rent present barriers to securing accommodation and work. 
 Identifying landlords who are prepared to accept what are perceived as ‘high risk’ 
tenants, particularly where no deposits are available, which may require a degree of 
persuasion and emphasising the continued support provided by the navigator. 
 A shortage of accommodation to support individuals unable to live without 
considerable support but who are not actually eligible for more intensive 
support/social service care provision.  This group includes individuals who cannot 
cope with hostel accommodation but are incapable of independent living, and as 
social service departments do not identify homelessness as a support need they do 
not always appear to work with housing provision in an integrated way.   
 Examples were cited in regard to clients with particular needs, such as older 
entrenched rough sleepers suffering from long-term alcohol abuse, who lack life 
skills but are deemed by statutory providers not to have sufficiently high levels of 
need to require alternative support. 
 There are specific issues relating to couples and to housing benefit.  As couples 
must make joint claims for housing benefit, a relationship of co-dependency may 
develop which might not necessarily be in the woman’s best interests – most 
notably where abusive behaviour and incidents of domestic violence have been 
identified. 
Measurement issues 
Generally the providers reported few issues with evidencing the accommodation outcome, 
with tenancy agreements commonly being available – for example in the case of St 
Mungo’s, the link between payment and the receipt of tenancy documentation from 
providers (as well as evidence for other outcomes) was thought to offer effective leverage.   
 75 
 
One issue emerging from the provider interviews was the difficulty of providing evidence 
for stable accommodation outcomes amongst some clients.  This appeared to be primarily 
for clients living in private rented accommodation, who could be reluctant to provide the 
necessary tenancy agreement to evidence the outcome.  There had also been a 
successful request for amendment made to the Project Board so that housing co-
operatives could be recognised with a different form of evidence. 
Similar issues were described for clients finding accommodation with a relative, as the 
relative has to provide written evidence that the client is living with them.  While neither 
problem is insurmountable, and apply to a relatively small number of cases, they can 
cause problems and require additional effort from navigators. 
5.6.2.3 Outcome 3 - Reconnection 
Both providers fell behind with their initial reconnection and sustained reconnection 
targets, as Table 5.4 shows, with performance being stronger for Thames Reach than St 
Mungo’s for both measures.   
Table 5.4 Performance Year 1 – Reconnection Outcomes 
 St Mungo’s Thames 
Reach 
Total 
 Tar
get 
Achie
ved 
Targ
et 
Achie
ved 
Targ
et 
Achie
ved 
Initial reconnection  40 15 64 31 104 46 
Number returned  1  6  7 
6 month sustainment 18 2 30 11 48 13 
For initial reconnections, St Mungo’s achieved 15 of a target of 40, and Thames Reach 31 
against a target of 64 (representing 38% and 48% respectively), while for six month 
sustained reconnections St Mungo’s achieved two against a target of 18 and Thames 
Reach 11 against a target of 30 (representing 11% and 37% respectively).  Seven clients 
reconnected were subsequently found to have returned – one St Mungo’s client and six 
Thames Reach clients. 
Experiences of implementation – successes and challenges 
Both providers reported that activities under this outcome had been challenging, both in 
terms of achieving initial reconnections and ensuring they are maintained for six months.  
Thames Reach based their higher target on their experience with their existing 
reconnections service.  Although the majority of those reconnected were yet to reach the 
six month point at the end of year one, the fact that just seven were found to have returned 
was considered a positive achievement after a slow start. Because of the tariff associated 
with reconnection, this was identified as a key focus for work in year two. 
Both providers reported that achieving successful reconnections posed a variety of 
challenges, including difficulties convincing clients to return to their country of origin, and in 
collecting the necessary information to evidence reconnections once they occur.  In 
addition, staff described how: 
 76 
 
 Their experiences of working with individuals in the cohort suggested that many 
from Central and Eastern Europe had been on the streets for a long time, and so 
had become entrenched in patterns of rough sleeping.  Consequently many of 
these clients have been found to have the same complex needs as other UK rough 
sleepers, making early reconnection unfeasible and requiring significant preparatory 
work.  
 In addition clients, particularly those from Eastern Europe, may have arrived as part 
of a group, and without the compliance of the ‘group leader’ other members are 
unlikely to leave the UK. 
 Similarly, many eligible individuals are reported to have been approached 
previously by other providers offering reconnection, so would either have already 
been reconnected or have experienced an unsuccessful reconnection before they 
were allocated to the cohort. 
 An additional issue is that, despite efforts to convince them otherwise, clients may 
not want to be reconnected and, if they have the right to remain or are EU citizens, 
there is no obligation for them to return.  In some cases this can lead clients to 
avoid contact with outreach and other support services, making the task of 
engaging with them more difficult.   
 A seasonal influence was also suggested by several of the staff interviewed.  
Although the winter weather in the UK is not conducive to rough sleeping, it is often 
less severe than conditions in individuals’ home nations when they are likely to be 
sleeping rough on return.  This emphasises the importance of working with 
agencies in clients’ home countries to ensure that accommodation is available for 
their return. 
Measurement issues 
Evidencing reconnection outcomes has proved challenging for the providers.  Collecting 
information and the necessary paperwork from foreign countries, either from the relevant 
authorities or from clients’ relatives, has proved to be difficult.  Provider staff described 
writing to authorities and clients’ relatives, and providing mobile phones to clients, so that 
they can confirm that they have been reconnected.  However telephone calls can be 
expensive, as can text messages, and those reconnected rarely have access to email.  
There has been a change to the evidencing requirements, agreed by the Project Board, to 
pay the full fee when sustained reconnection has been achieved where there are problems 
evidencing reconnection itself. 
5.6.2.4 Outcome 4 - Employment 
Performance under the employment outcome varied by measure.  As Table 5.5 shows: 
 Just one individual achieved a qualification outcome (Thames Reach, vs. a target of 
8); 
 Seven individuals achieved the 13 week sustained volunteering/self-employment 
outcome, five for St Mungo’s and two for Thames Reach (against targets of 13 and 
15 respectively), and just one the 26 week sustained outcome (St Mungo’s, against 
a target of zero); and 
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 None of the clients at either provider achieved a 13 or 26 week part-time 
employment outcome (against targets of nine and five respectively).  
Table 5.5 Performance Year 1 – Employment Outcomes 
 St Mungo’s Thames 
Reach 
Total 
 Tar
get 
Achie
ved 
Targ
et 
Achie
ved 
Targ
et 
Achie
ved 
NQF  2 0 8 1 10 1 
Volunteering/self-
employment 13 wk 
13 5 15 2 28 7 
Volunteering/self-
employment 26 wk 
0 1 8 0 8 1 
Part time 13 weeks 3 0 6 0 9 0 
Part time 26 weeks 1 0 4 0 5 0 
Full time 13 weeks 3 5 1 2 4 7 
Full time 26 weeks 2 4 1 0 3 4 
 
 Performance was stronger for full-time employment outcomes – and although the 
targets set were low both providers exceeded their targets for 13 week and 26 week 
full-time employment outcomes.  For St Mungo’s, five individuals achieved 13 week 
and four 26 week sustained employment outcomes (against targets of three and 
two respectively), and for Thames Reach two achieved a 13 week sustained 
employment outcome (against a target of one), although they did not achieve their 
target for one 26 week sustained outcome.  
Experiences of implementation – successes and challenges 
Both provider staff and partners recognised that the employment outcomes represented 
longer-term achievements, with it being more realistic to expect clients to move 
incrementally towards and into work over the course of the project.  While clients were 
considered to be ‘at different distances from the labour market’, the majority were felt to be 
some way from being able to secure employment, with other issues needing to be 
addressed before employment could be achieved and sustained.  Common challenges 
facing clients included having few qualifications and no or limited employment histories, in 
addition to the risk factors associated with rough sleeping (such as a history of life in care) 
and commonly combined with tri-morbidity (co-occurring psychiatric, substance misuse 
and medical illnesses), which together make finding and maintaining employment difficult.  
In addition work with the client group, particularly at the early stages, often focussed on 
dealing with crises rather than on moving forward.  In this context, some interviewees 
considered that targets (and expectations) had been set at too high a level for the first year 
of provision.  For many clients more realistic outcomes were considered to be measures 
associated with ‘progress towards employment’ – for example attendance on skills-based, 
employability or confidence building training provision. 
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Several interviewees considered that the level of qualification required under the 
employment outcome was too high, with achievement at NQF Level 2 being beyond the 
reach of many clients.  As clients may need to study towards lower level qualifications 
before progressing to Level 2 studies, achieving the NQF outcome will take more time and 
require additional resources.  There is a concern to ensure that clients are only supported 
along these pathways when it is right for them.  How this will play out as the programme 
matures will be explored in subsequent reports. 
In some cases clients from Central and Eastern Europe were reported to face different 
challenges in achieving employment outcomes.  In these cases, as with the 
accommodation outcomes, language and accommodation costs are the key barriers.  
Many of the cohort have been found to have the necessary work skills, especially in the 
construction industry, with the main issue being low wages compared to living costs. 
A series of success factors/facilitating actions were identified by the providers, which 
included:  
 Identifying the small minority of clients who have existing trade skills and providing 
support and hand-holding to help them get back into work (or to claim benefits 
should their employment break down). 
 Working with employers – many employers have shown a reluctance to consider 
former rough sleeping clients for employment opportunities.  St Mungo’s work 
directly with some employers to persuade them to consider their clients and offer 
continued support, which in some cases has led to positive results. 
 Forging links with organisations specialising in education, training and employment, 
particularly those working with homeless people – with St Mungo’s describing how 
they had established links with organisations such as ‘Sky Light’ and their own 
‘Recovery College’ to provide inputs on skills development, job matching, CV 
presentation and other employability support. 
 Staff working with clients commonly reported that efforts to boost their confidence 
could be very important, and could be essential in supporting progress on the 
journey to employment. 
 Facilitating access to English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes 
where language is a barrier. 
Measurement issues 
Staff at Thames Reach reported facing challenges in getting the relevant paperwork to 
evidence employment outcomes secured.  Clients are required to provide their payslips, 
which some are unwilling to do, and the navigators do not feel they can go to the client’s 
employer without the permission of the client. 
5.6.2.5 Outcome 5 - Health 
As described above, while a numerical target has been set for a reduction in the number of 
visits to accident and emergency departments by members of the cohort, no baseline is 
currently in place and data is yet to be collected to evidence this outcome.   
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As it is intended that monitoring data against this outcome will be collected and reported 
annually, subsequent evaluation reports will explore the performance of the projects 
against the health outcome. 
Experiences of implementation – successes and challenges 
Both providers described how many of their clients have a range of health issues.  In 
addition to some acute physical health needs, approximately half of the individuals they 
have worked with having alcohol related health issues and a further 25% having substance 
abuse issues.  In addition, 44% of the initial cohort were recorded as having a mental 
health support need, almost one in five of whom were recorded as having high levels of 
need. 
Consequently achieving improved health outcomes poses a particular challenge given the 
nature and current conditions affecting members of the cohort.  The view emerged that the 
achievement of the health outcome is contingent upon the success the providers have in 
meeting other outcomes – i.e. people in more secure accommodation and off the streets 
will be safer and less likely to require accident and emergency provision.  The navigators 
seemed to be less focused on this outcome than the others, seeing it as something over 
which they had little direct control.  
St Mungo’s have worked with a community interest company that supports the medical 
needs of homeless people across London. A representative of the provider was very 
positive about the partnership working and commented on the knowledge, skills and 
tenacity of the SIB navigators. In particular he reported that the SIB navigators have a 
“really good command of entitlements and rights” and can therefore act as effective 
advocates to help people access health and social care services.  
Measurement issues 
Currently there are no targets for the health outcome and, as described above, data is 
awaited from the Department of Health to allow performance to be assessed. 
5.7 Summary 
This section has provided an overview of the two delivery models and associated features 
of the two SIB providers, and explored performance to date in terms of achievements 
under the five SIB outcomes.   
The key findings include that: 
 There is a strong model of governance, with a Project Board (strategic) and Project 
Group (operational) bringing together providers and stakeholders and seeking to 
identify and address any issues that impact upon delivery. 
 Both providers are following similar approaches and delivery models – based 
around a navigator model to provide continued support to members of the rough 
sleeping cohort.  The models bring together different elements of best and effective 
practice; the innovation is in bringing these different elements together into a single, 
long-term support and coordination role. 
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 Both are following ‘client centred’ approaches to meeting needs, drawing on a 
range of internal and external support and provision, and continuing to offer support 
to clients to help ensure that the initial accommodation and employment outcomes 
achieved are sustained. 
 Performance in year one of the programme, against the five outcomes and in the 
context of the targets set at the outset, has been variable.  Areas of success 
included: 
– Moving clients into stable accommodation - where the providers achieved 
169% of target; 
– Achieving sustained full-time employment outcomes at the 13 and 26 week 
points – where again the targets set were exceeded.   
 The targets for reducing the numbers of rough sleepers, initial and sustained 
reconnections and other employment measures were not achieved.  All will need to 
be focused upon in the second year of delivery. 
 The providers described a range of challenges resulting from the nature of the 
target group and, in some cases, system-based barriers.   
 Early reports from partners and stakeholders were broadly positive about progress 
to date.  Although in some cases concerns were raised over potential negative 
aspects of the programme’s PbR element, initial concerns were reported to have 
been addressed.  Positive relationships have been developed and a shared 
commitment to outcomes for this group identified. 
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6 Client Perspectives 
The evaluation includes fieldwork with a sample of the cohort who have been engaged by 
the providers, to explore their perspectives on the Navigator support they have received 
through the SIB intervention. 
This section discusses key themes to emerge from the first fieldwork under this element of 
the research, and includes some illustrative case studies. 
6.1 The sample 
An outline of the characteristics of the cohort was provided above at section 2.2.  For this 
element of the research, the evaluation team worked with each of the providers to agree a 
sample of the cohort.  The research team received anonymised CHAIN data for the 
members of the cohort the providers were working with, from which a sample was 
constructed to reflect: 
 A range of ages; 
 Both men and women; 
 A range of nationalities; and, 
 A range of current housing status. 
The sample was then sent to the providers who commented on any sample members who 
they considered may be unsuitable for interview due to particularly high level needs 
(alcohol/substance misuse; mental health) or difficulties in contact or engagement.  Those 
posing a potential risk to researcher safety, or who were unlikely to participate in an 
interview, were replaced.   
The interviews were conducted by pairs of researchers in provider settings or, for some of 
those in stable accommodation, at the accommodation.  Providers’ Navigators brokered 
the engagement – explaining what the research was about, passing on an information 
sheet with contact details at DCLG and ICF, and asking the individual for consent to take 
part (consent was also explained and confirmed at the time of the interview).  All 
interviewees were given a £15 supermarket voucher as an incentive to take part.  
Participation costs – travel and other incurred costs – were reimbursed, and independent 
translation provided for those whose limited English language proficiency could present a 
barrier to their taking part.  Navigators provided the researchers with a briefing on the 
background of each client and their support pathway prior to the interview, although there 
were some exceptions meaning some detail was unclear (for example, age). 
A target was set of 15 achieved interviews with clients from each provider (total of 30 
interviews); with a total of 25 being achieved – 12 with St Mungo’s clients and 13 with 
clients of Thames Reach.  Some clients who agreed to take part either withdrew; did not 
attend at arranged and rearranged times; or could not be engaged despite multiple 
attempts by Navigators.  Key characteristics of the final achieved sample are presented in 
Table 6.1.   
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Table 6.1 Key characteristics of the sample 
Gender Age Nationality Accommodation  
4 Female 
21 Male 
 
4 people 20-30  
6 people 30-40 
6 people 40-50 
2 people  50-60 
2 people 60+ 
5 unknown 
British- 12 
Polish- 4 
Russian- 2 
French- 1 
Argentinian- 1 
Algerian- 1 
Bolivian- 1 
Hungarian- 1 
Greek-1 
Own flat- 12 
Supported 
housing/Hostel-  6 
Rough Sleeping- 2 
Room in shared 
house- 1 
B&B- 1 
‘Couch surfing’- 1 
Unclear - 2 
Each stage of the evaluation will include fieldwork with clients, and a subsample of those 
participating in each stage will be contacted in the next, to build a longitudinal sample that 
explores pathways over time and (both the achievement and breakdown in) long term, 
sustained outcomes. 
6.2 The variety of the cohort 
Although a small sample, the research with SIB clients confirmed that whilst the cohort is 
clearly defined by recent episodes of rough sleeping (see 2.2) they are a varied group with 
a range of backgrounds and support needs.  The sample included: 
 Clients with a range of mental health problems, including one who was described as 
‘delusional’ and who reported a range of severe physical problems; 
 Older people in receipt of pension credit; 
 A wide range of nationalities with different levels of English language proficiency; 
 A wide variety of backgrounds within the single largest group (British males); 
 Individuals with ongoing alcohol and substance misuse issues; and, 
 Individuals with employment histories in the UK and their home country, as well as 
those with little work experience and a long history of rough sleeping. 
There is therefore no ‘typical’ client within the sample, reflecting the rationale for the SIB 
Navigator intervention model providing highly personalised pathways of support. 
Case Study 1   Simon73  
Background 
Simon is a middle-aged British man.  Prior to being supported by the SIB 
(St Mungo’s), he had been in a hostel for about a year and a half, following 
some personal troubles.  It was not clear how long he had been sleeping 
rough before entering the hostel.  Simon is a qualified plumber, but hadn’t 
                                            
 
73
 All client names are pseudonyms.  
 83 
 
worked for around three years.   
Simon had recently moved into private rented accommodation, and had 
started a job as a plumber at a London university. 
Support  
Simon was first approached by a SIB Navigator in the hostel.  He explained 
that it had been made clear to him that the Navigator would offer him 
support: 
‘in the hostel, but more so when I moved… [stuff about] my road to 
employment, benefits… getting stuff for my flat… moral support’ 
Simon reported that his SIB key worker had worked with him in a number of 
ways:  
 Helped him to find a flat in Westminster.  The housing officer at his 
hostel had started to do this but ‘things were taking ages… 
[Navigator]’ gave it a bit more oomph, within a month and a half [of 
Navigator taking over] I had the place’.  He also, along with a St 
Mungo’s volunteer, helped him to furnish his flat; 
 Helped Simon to find a job at the university, which at the time of 
interview he had been doing for two and a half weeks.  Finding a job 
was a big achievement for Simon as: ‘three years is a long time to be 
out of work… it’s a big relief to have sorted myself out’; 
 Encouraged Simon to start court proceedings to re-gain access to 
his daughter and supported him through this process.  This was 
successful and Simon is looking forward to seeing his daughter 
again soon.  
Simon was very appreciative of the Navigator support he had received, and 
reported that it was different (and better) than what he had received prior to 
this.  In particular, the Navigator was able to get things done in a way other 
workers couldn’t.  Alongside that, Simon explained that he knew that he 
was always there for advice and support: 
‘If I am stuck or have an issue, I know I can always go to him, whereas 
other workers might say that, but you didn’t really believe them.’ 
Plans  
Simon is optimistic for the future; he knows he’s only got one chance at a 
Westminster flat and he’s determined to keep it.  He is happy with his job 
and thinks ‘it’s a job I can stick to… I feel secure, I know I’ve got a routine.’   
Simon finds it reassuring that, whilst he has begun to sort himself out and 
settle down, he knows that his Navigator will continue to support him, ‘I still 
get stressed sometimes… [and] just having the answer there, the help 
there, is really useful.’ 
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6.3 Awareness of the SIB  
Clients identified with their Navigator as their ‘key worker’ and with the provider 
organisation, although few referred to the SIB ‘brand names’ (Street Impact for St Mungo’s 
and Ace for Thames Reach).  No-one in the sample had heard of ‘the SIB’, but there was a 
view that this was a new model of key worker support that differed from what was available 
elsewhere (as illustrated in the case study above).  There was limited awareness amongst 
those who participated in the research about why they were eligible for the new support.  
Most simply understood that they were eligible due to something about their 
circumstances.  But the view of the SIB support as different to what had been 
available/received by them before led several clients to explain how grateful they were for 
the support and a perception that ‘the ones that get it are lucky’. 
6.4 First contact 
Clients had been contacted by their Navigator in a range of settings and circumstances.  
Some had been sleeping rough, some were in hostels, some were in accommodation and 
some had been introduced through other services that they were accessing.  This latter 
route illustrates how the SIB providers are working with other services, including hostels 
and day centres, to access members of the cohort.  Instances included where a hostel 
worker had explained to the client that there was a new key worker who would be 
supporting them; or there had been a joint meeting of an existing worker, the client and the 
Navigator where the new offer of support was introduced.  There were also instances 
where the client knew the key worker from previous support offered or received.   
Whilst most clients described the move from one worker to another as simple and 
seamless, this was not always the case.  ‘Abel’ (Thames Reach), a Hungarian in his 40s 
who had been rough sleeping on and off for four or five years, explained that he had been 
supported by ‘Matt’74 whilst living in a hostel some years previously.  Following time on the 
streets he was being supported by a key worker from a (non-SIB) provider when Matt 
arrived at the hostel and explained that he was now working for a different organisation 
and could help him quickly find a flat. Abel thought that there had been a dispute between 
the two key workers, but Matt’s claim to be able to help him immediately meant that he 
‘agreed to go with Matt.  In that way, Matt grabbed me’.   
6.5 Coordinated, responsive support 
All of the clients had received a range of support through their Navigator, no matter how 
long they had been engaged by them.   
6.5.1 Accommodation 
A central element of the support described by the clients interviewed was the work that the 
Navigators had undertaken to help them secure, and maintain, suitable accommodation.  
Accommodation is central to the SIB because it is key to ending the cohort’s rough 
sleeping, as well as providing the basis for progress towards employment and health 
outcomes.  The experiences of the cohort reflect how the persistent approach to securing 
and sustaining appropriate accommodation is central to pathways to other outcomes. 
                                            
 
74
 All Navigator names are pseudonyms. 
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Mike (Thames Reach) is a British male in his late 30s and an alcoholic.  At the time of the 
interview, he had recently been contacted by his Navigator whilst in a night shelter.  Prior 
to that he had been in a hostel but had abandoned it as he wasn’t happy there, although 
there was some suggestion by him that he may have had to leave due to his behaviour.  
Mike explained how his Navigator had worked very hard to find him accommodation: 
‘He got me through the channels, tried to get me into hostels suitable for me… [these were 
difficult to find] due to my mental health problems and my alcohol problems.’ 
Janice is a woman in her 60s who had experienced domestic violence and had been 
sleeping rough when she was met by the SIB Navigator (Thames Reach).  She was 
supported to move to Southend where she has family and friends.  Her Navigator had: 
accompanied her to look at a suitable flat, negotiated the rent down, visited the landlord, 
provided a deposit and organised for the landlord to make repairs.  She was interviewed 
by telephone and felt positive about settling in Southend with the support she was 
receiving. 
As well as finding suitable accommodation, clients explained how Navigators had 
supported them to sustain their tenancy and to live independently and successfully.  
Examples were given of a Navigator paying for household essentials, such as cutlery, 
furnishings, curtains, blankets and other items such as a television or cooker.  This helped 
clients live in their new accommodation as a home.  For example Tony, a Bolivian in his 
late 20s, explained how his Navigator had bought him a hoover so that he could keep his 
room clean, and contrasted this with how he had lived when in a hostel and how dirty it 
had been.   
Once accommodation was secured and sustained, clients felt able to consider next steps.  
As one described:   
‘I’m very glad for the help, I was in trouble, I was in a very difficult situation but now I feel 
OK. I’m glad to be off the streets... I must take care of myself to get my life better.  It 
depends more on me than on anyone else.’ (Tiago, Portuguese, 42). 
Where it was still being addressed, accommodation remained their priority.  
‘I don’t know what I want to do in the future.  I’ve been focusing on the move and my flat… 
But I will talk to [Navigator] about the future.’ (Peter, British, 40). 
6.5.2 Accessing other provision 
As well as activities to support access to and sustained accommodation, clients explained 
how their Navigator had also provided a wide-range of additional support to help them.  
Examples given included: 
 Accessing support for alcohol and substance misuse; 
 Help with gaining identification and legal documents such as passports; 
 Organising multi-agency meetings to address ongoing mental health support needs; 
and, 
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 Paying for training, skills courses, or certification and the construction trade CSCS 
card in particular. 
As with the discussion of accommodation above, the descriptions of support that clients 
received reflects those from the Navigators themselves (in section 5).   Clients consistently 
highlighted how their single Navigator had provided them with support across ‘everything’ 
that they needed, rather than having to work with different people.  One client described 
the support of their Navigator compared to previous key worker support as being ‘like 
chalk and cheese’.  A key theme, which built trust and relationships, was the ability of 
Navigators to get things done quickly, building trust, and to be persistent.  This included 
advocating for the client at meetings or with agencies to ensure that they received support. 
‘[Navigator] never gave up, always listened, always fought for me… with a different 
organisation I’d still be in a crappy hostel.  And near enough dead’ (James, British, 25). 
Case Study 2   Paul  
Background 
Paul grew up by the coast in England and is 41 years old. He married in his 
20s and had a child. He was a printer by trade and was employed doing 
this when he was younger. When he ‘split up with missus, my daughter’s 
mother, the drug use got out of control.’ His daughter was put up for 
adoption and Paul spent a short amount of time in jail. When the SIB 
Navigator made contact Paul had been rough sleeping for over two years, 
and although a large number of services had attempted to engage him, this 
was the first case worker he felt that he wanted to interact with. 
The ‘one thing he did differently was he crouched down, not right in my 
space but at the end of my sleeping bag, and we had a little chat. Straight 
away I knew that this guy wasn’t pushy and he asked if I’d like to sort out 
my housing and all the rest of it’.  Fraser, the St Mungo’s Navigator, gave 
Paul a telephone. ‘That was the crux of it really. He could get hold of me 
and I could hit the panic button and get hold of him.’ 
Support 
Fraser supported Paul to visit a doctor, taking him by cab, who prescribed 
him methadone.  This initial trip to the doctors was the turning point for him 
and he felt that it was Fraser that:  ‘initiated that stability…He was 
instrumental in getting that started, breaking some of the habits of 20 years 
of drug use.’  
As the relationship developed Paul moved into a hostel where he has been 
living for over a year. ‘I was in a mess and was on the way out. It was a big 
full stop on the chaos that was going on for me then’.  
Paul has serious health problems as a result of long term drug use. He 
nearly lost his leg about seven years ago, he has necrosis in his foot and 
DVT. As a result of this recently he had been in hospital for six weeks. 
When he left hospital he had an arterial bleed which meant he lost over two 
pints of blood.  
He suggested ‘Had any of that happened when I’d been out there I’d 
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probably be gone’. Throughout his time in hospital ‘Fraser was there, 
keeping my spirits up… getting me supplies’.  
As well has helping with his health issues Fraser has encouraged Paul to 
do ‘things that normal people do’. For example they are both have an 
interest in music and so Fraser organised for them to go to recording studio 
at St Mungo’s and play some music together. They also regularly go for 
coffee where Fraser offers support and guidance to Paul. 
Plans 
Looking to the future Paul aims to leave the hostel by the end of the year 
but perhaps before.  He sees this as a big step but he knows that he will be 
supported throughout.  He explained that Fraser is always patient and takes 
time to talk through with him the information he needs to make decisions. 
6.5.3 The importance of the relational approach 
The relationships established between clients and their Navigators emerged as a 
consistent theme, and one that was central to the offers of support being taken up and 
subsequent outcomes achieved.  Navigators were described as taking a different 
approach to other workers, one that was personal and that was long-term.   
‘We talk on a friendly basis, about things in general.  There’s no agenda.  It is nice to be 
able to be a bit more relaxed [than with other services].’  (Peter, British, 40) 
Most of the clients who participated in the research highlighted the availability of their 
Navigator.  Clients described knowing that they could call on their Navigator at any time of 
the day, about any issue, and they would receive help.    
‘If you need something [Navigator] would always help, you can always go to the office. 
They never say we’ll call you back and don’t. If you leave a message someone will call you 
back… Thames Reach don’t do it for the money… they want to help’ (Claude, French, age 
not known). 
For those who were becoming more settled in accommodation, the frequency with which 
help was required was declining as the client sought to be more independent.  There was 
also a concern for some that they should not over burden their Navigator with requests for 
assistance – although all still felt that they could contact their Navigator with any issue that 
they needed to. 
‘[St Mungo’s Navigator] is there if you need him. He is one of them people that will come if 
you’ve got a problem, he will put something down and come and see you. He is one of 
them people that just makes the effort, he’ll just come and see you, or phone you…it’s just 
like having a brother really, he’s one of the best people I’ve ever met’.  (Adam, British, 55). 
For clients who were not British nationals, having a Navigator who spoke their language 
and understood their culture was important.  This was seen to help their ability to 
understand the issues that the client was facing, as well as propose appropriate solutions. 
Some of the Thames Reach clients had experienced a change in Navigator (as a result of 
staff turnover).  They explained that they were getting, or had got, to know their new ‘key 
worker’ and emphasised the importance of regular meetings and contact in building their 
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new relationship.  But the fact that the Navigator came from the same organisation was 
important in providing continuity. 
‘They don’t treat you like a commodity.  They don’t treat you like they’re trying to make 
money out of you’ (Jim, British, 50s). 
Case Study 3   Mateusz 
Background 
Mateusz is a young Polish man in his early twenties. He has been rough 
sleeping in Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea for about three years. 
When he first came to London, he moved in and out of temporary, unstable 
jobs but seemed to be able to find new jobs relatively easy. Then, it started 
becoming harder to find employment. He ended up on the streets. As he’d 
managed before, he thought he could continue to cope on his own. “For a 
long time, I said I don’t want help”. Before he ended up on the streets, 
Mateusz had been relatively independent and did not have significant other 
needs. As a result of being on the streets, he started drinking.  Mateusz 
described being on the streets: “you don’t control life, street life controls 
you. It takes over”. 
Support 
St Mungo’s first made contact with him around a year ago but he was not 
interested in accepting their offer of support and he did not keep in touch 
with the St Mungo’s outreach worker. Over six months later, some of his 
friends were living in a hostel and told him that they were working with St 
Mungo’s. Their key worker in the hostel gave Mateusz the contact details of 
the St Mungo’s outreach worker. At this point, Mateusz had a change of 
heart and decided he should accept the help: 
 
“I thought, why not. If they are trying to help me, I should take it”. 
  
Mateusz has received wide-ranging support from his Navigator. She has 
helped him to: 
 
 Move into a short-term hostel and then into a semi-independent 
project. He is happy with his accommodation and recognises that it 
is a “lot better than being on the streets”; 
 Get a passport by paying the administrative fee and helping him to 
complete the paperwork; 
 Obtain a NI number; 
 Access benefits; 
 Enrol at college for English lessons.  
He was very positive about the relationship he has with the Navigator and 
the nature of support he has received. He feels it has made a real 
difference to him.  He sees her between once a week and two or three 
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times a week and explained: “I call her whenever I need something. If I 
need to go the Jobcentre, she will meet me down there”. He commented on 
the Navigator’s reliability: “she never says I can’t come. If she can’t make it 
that day, we do it the next day but she doesn’t say no”.  
 
Plans  
 
Mateusz has talked with his outreach worker about possibly taking part in a 
detox programme (although he is not drinking a lot at the moment, he thinks 
a short detox programme might be good) and getting a CSCS (Construction 
Skills Certification Scheme Card) so he can potentially work in the 
construction sector in future.   
6.6 Summary 
This section has presented findings from the first round of research with clients of each 
SIB provider to explore their experiences and perceptions of the Navigator interventions.  
The examples of support that they provided mirror that described by the Navigators 
themselves.  Their experiences and perceptions also confirm the rationale of the SIB 
intervention model in terms of the need for a flexible, personalised and long-term approach 
that coordinates provision.  Three case studies illustrate the way in which Navigators 
support their clients. 
 The sample of clients was selected to provide a variety of backgrounds and 
characteristics.  Nonetheless, the experiences of the sample demonstrate the 
variety of backgrounds, their support needs and that there is no ‘typical’ client. 
 Clients identify with their Navigator as their key worker and with their provider 
organisation, with limited awareness of the name of the intervention or the SIB.  But 
they are aware of the intervention being something new and different to the support 
that is provided elsewhere. 
 Clients had been contacted by their Navigator in a range of settings and sometimes 
with the help of another organisation.  Although clients reported good joint working 
between the SIB Navigator and other services, this was not always the case with an 
occasional incidence where different key workers were reported to have been in 
dispute. 
 Accommodation is central to the SIB, the model of support and the clients’ 
experiences; it is central to ending their rough sleeping.  Clients highlighted the 
persistence of their Navigator in securing suitable accommodation and the wide 
range of support they received to help them sustain it and to make it their home. 
 Clients reported a wide range of support from other organisations that was 
identified, brokered and coordinated by their Navigator.  Navigators advocate for 
their clients and provide a constant source of advice and support. 
 The relational aspect is central to effective key worker support.  Navigators are 
available around the clock and actively build and maintain trusting relationships with 
their clients.  Whilst frequency of support reduced as clients became more stable, 
Navigators were seen to be available should any need arise.   
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 For clients who were not British nationals, having a Navigator who spoke their 
language and understood their culture was important. 
Subsequent rounds of research will continue to explore the experiences of cohort 
members and the progress towards and achievement of sustained outcomes.   
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7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This report presents the findings from the first, baseline, data collection and analysis for 
the qualitative process evaluation of the London Homelessness SIB (‘the SIB’).  The report 
has also provided an overview of the background and context for the SIB.  This final 
section considers the findings of the first stage of the qualitative evaluation and identifies 
the learning from the SIB to date. 
7.1 Key findings  
The discussion of the evaluation research is split in the report into two key areas: the 
development of the SIB as a PbR contract funded through social investment, repaid as the 
provider receives payment from the commissioner for outcomes achieved; and, the 
delivery of the contract by two providers and the achievement of outcomes to date.   
7.1.1 The development of the SIB 
Key findings from the development of the SIB are: 
 It was important that the SIB was developed through consultation with a wide range 
of stakeholders – this ensured there was market interest and supported the 
development of a viable model.  
 The SIB was thoroughly designed through detailed research and analysis.  This 
was necessary for a credible model of outcomes and metrics, based in the available 
evidence that could be refined and developed through ongoing consultation and 
market engagement. 
 The SIB is a complex model of multiple outcomes for a complex and vulnerable 
group. Despite the detailed development work, there were limits to the evidence 
base and informed judgements were the basis for commissioners, providers and 
investors in reaching final decisions.   
 Social investors are motivated by the potential for both social outcomes and the 
returns that their investment can achieve.  A higher assessment of risk brings a 
higher cost and investors make individual judgments.  The process of assessment 
and agreement can be facilitated by an intermediary, at a cost. 
 The development of the SIB required a high level of investment from all 
stakeholders - DCLG in developing the model; GLA in developing and undertaking 
a new commissioning structure; providers in developing a tender for a PbR contract 
(including within the commissioning structure); providers and investors in 
negotiating and agreeing investment. 
 The SIB offered a strategic opportunity for providers and investors and there was a 
high level of interest in the learning that it can provide for future service contracts 
and social investment products. 
 The development of the SIB fits with best practice criteria that have been proposed 
for SIB products.  Although there was a single procurement process there are two 
very different structures, demonstrating the diversity of SIB models. 
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7.1.2 The delivery of the SIB 
Key findings from the initial research into the delivery model and performance of the SIB 
providers to date are that: 
 There is a strong model of governance, with a Project Board (strategic) and Project 
Group (operational) bringing together providers and stakeholders and seeking to 
identify and address any issues that impact upon delivery. 
 Both providers are following similar approaches – based around a key 
worker/navigator model, with options for the personalisation of services and 
funding, following the suggested approaches set out in the programme 
specification. 
 The models bring together different elements of best and effective practice; what is 
innovative about the SIB interventions is that these different elements are brought 
together into a single role that supports a client along the entire pathway from the 
street (or wherever first contact is made) and blends direct support with wider 
provision brokerage and coordination to sustained long term outcomes. 
 The delivery models include outreach provision to engage with clients (or engage 
with providers with whom members of the cohort are already engaged), before first 
attempting to secure initial places before considering longer term accommodation 
options.  Once accommodation is in place, the navigators maintain contact with 
their clients to ensure the accommodation outcomes are sustained, and progress is 
made towards the employment and health outcomes. 
 Where relevant and appropriate, members of the cohort may also be offered the 
opportunity of a facilitated return to their home country as part of the providers’ 
reconnection provision.  But, this is proving hard to achieve in practice due to a 
reluctance amongst the target group to be reconnected and many having rights to 
remain.   
 Performance in year one of the programme, against the five outcomes and in the 
context of the targets set at the outset, has been variable.  Areas of success 
included: 
– Moving clients into stable accommodation - where the providers achieved 
169% of target; 
– Achieving sustained full-time employment outcomes at the 13 and 26 week 
points – where again the targets set were exceeded.   
 The programme under-performed on the other employment measures 
(qualifications, volunteering and sustained part-time employment), although the 
progress towards these is not evidenced in programme reporting. Performance on 
the reduced rough sleeping target, and the initial and sustained reconnection 
outcomes also fell behind target.  
 The have been issues in developing effective ways of working with some partners, 
linked to their reservations about the SIB as a mechanism for public service 
provision and as PbR as a structure for promoting an outcomes focus.  The shared 
commitment to outcomes for the target group had supported a process of meetings 
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and discussion that had led to joint working. Overall, partners were positive about 
the resources the SIB provides and the model of intervention. 
 As would be expected given the nature of the target group, providers experienced a 
range of challenges in achieving outcomes for the members of the cohort they were 
engaged with.  Nevertheless many positive aspects of the navigator model were 
cited.  The achievement of client outcomes over the implementation period will be 
the focus of subsequent strands of the evaluation. 
7.1.3 Key findings from research with SIB clients 
 The examples of support that clients provided mirror those described by the 
Navigators and provider staff themselves.  Client experiences and perceptions 
confirm the rationale of the SIB intervention model as providing a flexible, 
personalised and long-term approach. 
 The experiences of the sample who participated in the research demonstrate the 
wide variety of client backgrounds and support needs.  There is no ‘typical’ client. 
 Clients identify with their Navigator as their key worker and with their provider 
organisation, with limited awareness of the SIB.  But they are aware of the 
intervention being something new and different to the support that is provided 
elsewhere. 
 Clients had been contacted by their Navigator in a range of settings and sometimes 
with the help of another organisation.  Although clients reported good joint working 
between the SIB Navigator and other services, this was not always the case. 
 Clients highlighted the persistence of their Navigator in securing suitable 
accommodation and the wide range of support they received to help them sustain it 
and to make it their home. 
 Clients reported a wide range of support from other organisations that was 
identified, brokered and coordinated by their Navigator.  Navigators advocate for 
their clients and provide a constant source of advice and support. 
 The relational aspect is central to effective key worker support.  Navigators are 
available around the clock and actively build and maintain trusting relationships with 
their clients.     
 For clients who were not British nationals, having a Navigator who spoke their 
language and understood their culture was important. 
7.2 Learning from the first year of the London 
homelessness SIB  
As with the summary above, the learning from the SIB to date can be split across the 
learning from the development of the SIB and the delivery to date. 
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7.2.1 Learning from the development of the SIB 
The innovative nature of the SIB and the infancy of SIBs as a product within a developing 
social investment market provides the context for the learning identified here.   
7.2.1.1 Learning from the development of the PbR model 
 The development of outcome measures, metrics and the evidential requirements 
requires a complex interplay of evidence, modelling and judgement.  Detailed data 
analysis is required but this should be supported by wide-ranging consultation and 
stakeholder engagement.  There is a cost associated with this process that is 
necessary for developing a product for the investment market. 
 The development process is made harder, bringing higher associated costs, 
because there is not always an evidence base for a particular intervention nor for 
modelling the associated outcomes and metrics:  
– there may not be evidence about past achievement on which to base 
predictions;  
– there may not be evaluated practice that can be used to model interventions 
with a high degree of certainty;  
– it can be difficult to cost outcomes and savings due to a lack of evidence; 
and, 
– where comparator cohorts cannot be created, baselines can provide an 
understanding of expected achievement, but these too are limited by the 
data available.  
Given the desire for innovative practice, such a context is likely to be common for 
SIBs. ‘Sense checking’ through market engagement with different stakeholders can 
address evidential limits and the SIB suggests that there are different levels of 
analytical purity that can be the basis of SIB and PbR, away from the comparator 
group model. 
 Providers see PbR as an emerging trend in service commissioning and although 
they have some reservations about what this might mean for them and the wider 
VCS they: recognise the strategic importance of experience in both designing PbR 
and delivering PbR contracts; and, welcome the opportunity for flexibility in service 
delivery that is outcomes rather than delivery focused.  They are willing to invest in 
order to gain this experience, but PbR will present particular challenges for smaller 
organisations without these resources and newer organisations without the internal 
evidence-base from which to model assumptions.  Ultimately, providers are 
required to use their expertise in making judgements about what is realistic in terms 
of both achievement of PbR outcomes and thus in turn the impact for them of the 
cash flow that will result. This introduces new levels and forms of risk within 
provider business models. 
 PbR contracts are also new for commissioners, both in their procurement and their 
monitoring and management.  A competitive dialogue process offers a structure for 
engagement with a selected pool of credible providers and helps build 
commissioner confidence in the viability of proposed delivery models as well as 
amending contract requirements whilst retaining an open-tender procurement 
process.   
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 PbR contracts place a high level of administrative burden on commissioners, with 
detailed evidence and audit required to support the release of outcome payments.  
In parallel, PbR limits the scope of what commissioners can expect and the new 
role of outcomes monitoring rather than delivery scrutiny (with providers free to 
innovate) can present a challenge.  Commissioners do not want providers to fail as 
they want outcomes to be achieved and this is a tension within the PbR model 
where outcomes are the sole focus.  Commissioners need to accept that there is an 
inherent risk in PbR structures that outcomes will not be achieved and providers will 
fail but the lack of secured funding reduces the leverage they hold over contracted 
providers. 
7.2.1.2 Learning from the investment process 
 There is concern amongst providers and some investors that SIB investment 
models result in ‘leakage’ of funding away from provision through the payment of 
returns on investment.  Balancing this with the requirement to account for risk 
through returns in order to secure investment requires negotiation and agreement 
on all sides and neither providers nor social investors are homogenous groups with 
shared priorities and concerns.  The level of risk will always be considered too high 
for some investors; and, there is not a consensus about an appropriate level of 
investment cost.  
 The lack of comprehensive, rigorous data available to model the SIB interventions 
increased the risks in the contracts and to associated investment.  Investment 
decisions were driven by the potential for high social outcomes and ultimately this 
made the investment more attractive to some investors than others.  Investors must 
protect their capital and receive a return. 
 Investors had concerns about some of the features of the PbR metrics and would 
have liked earlier involvement in, and consultation about, the details of the model.  
This needs to be offset by their reluctance to invest resources in detailed review 
and due diligence prior to contract award.  One suggestion for how this could be 
achieved was the possibility of the commissioning structure for a SIB procured 
through open tender being one where preferred bidders are awarded a contract in 
principle earlier and then longer times provided for negotiation – so that investors 
can contribute to the refinement of both the models and contracts; and, providers 
can more easily secure investment without speculative negotiation.  An alternative 
process could identify potential ‘deal breakers’ earlier in the process.  Increased 
intermediary capacity and learning over time could improve understanding and 
anticipation of key issues, and reduce fees. 
 Neither investors nor providers considered the SIB contracts to be of high worth in 
revenue terms – both manage a portfolio of higher value investments or contracts.  
But there is a high level of strategic interest in: the potential of SIBs for securing 
new investment; and, in learning about PbR as a structure for outcomes-based 
commissioning. The strategic interest in the SIB provided a driver for investment in 
learning.  The SIB was considered to be comprehensively developed and to have 
learnt from other PbR and SIB schemes. But it remains very early days for SIBs and 
all accept there is learning to take place, and an appetite for this, on all sides.  This 
raises the question of whether the same drivers will remain as SIBs and PbR 
become more mainstream and whether contract sizes would need to provide larger 
amounts of revenue and return. 
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 Investors prefer to see a sharing of risk between providers and investors and, 
ideally, commissioners.  100% PbR models increase risk and increase the cost of 
investment.  Both under-performing and over-performing scenarios offer risk and 
return for all parties and where both are shared or more evenly distributed, 
investment is more attractive. 
 There was a time pressure in the development and commissioning of the SIB, with 
a desire by the GLA as commissioners to procure the contract and for delivery to 
begin.  A longer timescale or one with more flexibility would have helped some 
social investors make investment decisions through their institutional structures, 
with more time for due diligence and provider engagement. 
7.2.2 Learning from the delivery of the SIB 
The SIB is trialling an innovative approach to supporting entrenched rough sleepers 
towards long-term, sustained outcomes.  This section identifies the learning from the first 
year of delivery.  The learning from long-term outcomes will be provided in later reports as 
delivery reaches the point where they should be achieved. 
 Delivery to date suggests that a Navigator model is an effective key work approach 
to supporting entrenched rough sleepers towards long-term outcomes.  
Practitioners and clients identify key features of the model to be: 
– A relational and non-judgemental approach that is persistent and builds 
trust; 
– A long-term approach that extends from initial street contact to sustained 
outcomes, across the full pathway of support that is usually split across 
different roles; 
– Support that is provided in home language and culturally sensitive; 
– A focus upon a personalised package of flexible and responsive  support 
tailored to individual circumstance and need; 
– An immediate focus upon securing appropriate accommodation and 
providing practical and emotional support to sustain this; 
– A focus upon supporting clients to access existing provision, including 
advocating for and coordinating appropriate support; and, 
– Flexible funding that can be used to purchase goods and services quickly 
and according to individual need. 
 
Delivering this effectively requires skilled, motivated practitioners. 
 Although the cohort targeted by the SIB is clearly defined, there is a wide variation 
in the characteristics and support needs of the individuals within it.  There is no 
typical client.  An informal approach to assessment provides the basis for an 
effective Navigator approach. 
 Securing and sustaining stable, appropriate accommodation provides the basis for 
pathways to long term, transformational outcomes.  But not all entrenched rough 
sleepers will achieve these; for many the ability to sustain accommodation is itself a 
successful outcome, requiring a range of issues to be addressed through support.  
Substance misuse and mental health needs present particular barriers to 
progression. 
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 Partnership working is a central element of effective Navigator interventions.  As 
with all partnerships, effective practice requires a dedicated focus to build 
understanding and clarity about roles and responsibilities.  A shared commitment to 
achieving outcomes for entrenched rough sleepers facilitates joint-working and 
provides the basis for partnership development.  This is particularly important when 
there are multiple key workers, whatever the length and scope of support they’re 
able to offer. 
 A PbR structure to an intervention for entrenched rough sleepers enables a flexible 
approach that is outcomes focused and not restricted to a set model of delivery.  
Evidence to date suggests that the balance in the SIB PbR does not create 
perverse incentives to achieve inappropriate outcomes, although this will only be 
confirmed as delivery builds in the second and third years.  Outcomes that are 
currently behind target will need to be achieved for contract value and investment 
returns to be realised.  
7.3 Recommendations 
The first stage of the qualitative evaluation of the London Homelessness SIB provides 
learning for both future SIBs, PbR contracts more broadly and for the providers and wider 
stakeholders in delivery.  Here recommendations are made for each group. 
7.3.1 For social impact bonds 
 SIBs are one form of social investment.  Social investors are attracted by the social 
impacts as well as the returns that improved outcomes provide in SIB investments.  
Commissioning: should consider the ways in which investors can be engaged in the 
development of SIB structures so that risks that may impact upon investment can 
be identified and addressed; or, allow sufficient time for due diligence and investors’ 
different decision making processes to be followed.   
 Whilst SIBs remain new, specialist support is required to build capacity and facilitate 
investments.  Although an intermediary body may not be necessary, financial 
modelling tools, contract and other templates are all important.  Guidance on what 
investors require in due diligence would help providers prepare.  Until SIBs are a 
more mature product, specialist support will be required and this brings a cost. 
 An intermediary body and SPV are not always necessary.  SIB commissioning 
should be open to different investment structures, as this facilitates the involvement 
of a wide range of social investors and different ways of accounting for and 
addressing risk.   
 SIBs must be well researched and robustly designed. But the limits of available data 
for innovation mean that they must also be developed through stakeholder 
consultation.  Evidence available through ‘what works’ reviews and outcome banks 
such as that recently produced by the Cabinet Office75 will assist and should be the 
starting point for SIB feasibility studies.  These will help to reduce costs but 
                                            
 
75
 The ‘Unit Cost Database’ was launched in February 2014 and contains the costs associated with over 600 
outcomes, http://data.gov.uk/sib_knowledge_box/toolkit  
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nonetheless these costs will remain and should be factored into value for money 
calculations. 
 ‘Competitive dialogue’ offers an appropriate process for commissioning a SIB.  It 
allows an open tender, enabling the market to respond to commissioners 
requirements, but provides a structure for a short-list of credible providers to be 
engaged.  Consideration should be given to awarding contracts prior to investment 
being brokered, so that investors can be certain of what they are investing in and 
more efficient provider-investor negotiation facilitated.  
7.3.2 For payment by results 
 The design of a PbR model is dependent upon high quality data, which is not 
always available.  To account for this, rigorous research should be accompanied by 
meaningful stakeholder consultation.  In modelling PbR, commissioner and provider 
decisions about what can be achieved will ultimately be a matter of judgement 
without a robust evidence base from tested interventions.  As a result, the 
assessment of risk is complex and some of the risk should be shared with the 
commissioner if a wide range of providers are to consider PbR viable.   
 PbR brings new roles for commissioners and a heavy administrative burden.  
Attributable outcomes must be clearly defined and evidence requirements as simple 
as possible.  Commissioners should prepare for their role by ensuring sufficient 
capacity for monitoring and providing supportive governance that is responsive to 
learning.  
7.3.3  For delivery of the London Homelessness SIB 
 Effective partnership working is essential and should remain a focus of the SIB 
providers as they seek to achieve sustained outcomes and address areas of under-
performance.  The shared commitment to improved outcomes for the cohort 
provides the basis for partnership working, but effective joint working will require 
ongoing discussion and negotiation. 
 If any Navigator leaves their post, their clients’ transition to a new Navigator should 
be carefully managed so that there is no break in support and a sound basis is 
provided for a new relational approach to develop.   
 The Project Board should keep the evidential requirements of the SIB under review 
whilst maintaining the integrity of each outcome.   
 
